Saturday, June 19, 2010

Please Explain.


I was reading an article by Chris Rawley over at Information Dissemination and I'm a bit confused.  Read his article here.  But he makes this statement...
In an hybrid warfare environment, a stateless enemy with only a handful of higher end, state-provided, sea denial capabilities such as anti-ship cruise missiles will likely choose his targets carefully to maximize impact at a minimal cost. A capital surface combatant off the coast makes a more tempting and high profile target than a larger number of smaller green water combatants.
This leads me to my confusion.

1.  Why would we build ships that are in other words designed to be lost...along with the crews...in order to preserve our capital ships...
2.  How can the SecDef question the relevance of Amphibious Assault while at the same time pushing the concept of the building Littoral Combat Ships if amphibious assault can't occur because of anti-ship missiles, shore batteries etc???

This is almost idiotic! 

Greg over at Defense Tech penned an article you can read here.  In it he made this statement.
The proliferation of low-cost, precision anti-ship missiles into the arsenals of potential enemies means large deck amphibious ships are becoming “wasting assets.”
So amphibious assault doctrine is to operate 50 miles or more off shore and now the US Navy is designing a class of ships to push in closer???  We are actually embarking on a path where we will have 50 or more 600 million dollar a piece throw away ships to operate in hostile, congested waters with small crews and limited defensive countermeasures and its the path of the future?

Wow.

I DON'T GET IT!

21 comments :

  1. I think the idea is that you minimize the exposure of capital ship assets in-shore but flood the enemy with smaller "expendables" in the hope that the enemy will try to preserve his anti-ship assets (which are presumably scarce) until a juicier 'big' target emerges. I guess they are hoping that the enemy will not want to waste their precious missiles on LCS assets and wait it out. Stupid doctrine...but then when have Pentagon planners shown any signs of strategic imagination?

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  2. thats as reasonable as anything...but i would think that they're misreading the perception machine....or rather the news psychology.

    I forgot the name of the Perry class frigate that was damaged by a suicide boat but that was once our lower cost, LCS type ship.

    I think that all it takes for the bad guys to win is to sink an American ship--no matter what the size...they do that and they win.

    Even the Iranians had a public relations win with the capturing of the British Marines in a small boat ....

    once again, you're right...no strategic imagination.

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  3. I think the Pentagon has just become arrogant given that they haven't faced a major naval defeat since WW2. They have forgotten what it means to lose a ship with all hands, what that does to a nation's psyche even without the 24 hour news cycle to add fuel to the fire. Going to war...proper nasty war with a determined and even half-way well equipped enemy like Iran or China is going to be a nasty shock I feel. You are right...all it takes is one loss to shake the public...the problem is that in the event of all out war..it will be far worse.

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  4. Amphibian assault means bringing in land forces from beyond horizon (Blue Water), at times under fire; littoral warfare means providing a continuous presence within horizon (Brown Water).

    Vastly different modes of operation here. The emphasis is on for formal than on the later (both in surface and submarine operations) these days.

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  5. Oops, typo....

    "The emphasis is less on the former and more on the later these days."

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  6. I don't understand your confusion here Solomon. It seems obvious to me that

    A) small ships with small crews are more expendable than big ships with big crews (and maybe hundreds of Marines embarked). At Omaha Beach the destroyers got close enough to scrape their bottoms and they saved the landings, while the battleships, cruisers and big transports stayed well out of range. 5 or 6 of these destroyers were eventually sunk by mines. Sad, yes but not a catastrophe.

    B) Littoral warfare is dangerous. It's the maritime equivalent to close-quarters infantry combat. Mines, suicide speedboats, mobile anti-ship missiles, shallow waters, minisubs, armed UAVs, etc.,etc. If the US Navy and the American public isn't ready for the loss of a ship or two - even if it's one of those fancy and expensive LCSs - than perhaps they should just stay home or stick to humanitarian rescue. I disagree with Ron. American lost ships all through WWII and didn't loose the will to fight. If the cause is just, why would it now?

    Perhaps "a ship's a fool to fight a fort" but going in harm's way is what navies are for.

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  7. Think about all those young recruits ready to sign up for duty aboard the USS Expendable!

    You're right Solomon--this does require an explanation.

    It would be like sending a special (cheaper, less trained and capable) battalion of 03s into the battle area to distract the enemy.

    That's not how things are (should be) done.

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  8. Thank you Resident Author. You get what Johnathan missed.

    We're the USA! Our fighting men are not expendable...sometimes bad stuff happened in the course of accomplishing the mission but never with the mindset that some one is expendable.

    The idea that we're going to build 50 or more expendable ships is crazy.


    Oh and the example of poorly trained infantry being used as cannon fodder, just like some want small ships to be is spot on.

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  9. @ Resident Author

    Such comment sounds like coming from an armchair general.

    What military operation - amphibian, littoral or otherwise - doesn't carry its unique risk? Such specific risks call for adaptation of specific hardware and tactics.

    As the commenter says above, littoral warfare is by far riskier and more dynamic than fighting from afar.

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  10. and you sound like a policy wonk Anonymous!

    we all know that fighting in the littoral zone is dangerous.

    are you guys stuck in the belief of your own superiority? that's common knowledge....but the doctrine is jacked up.

    on one side we have a part of the Navy....the amphibious side...that's pushing out to sea and using ship to shore connectors to protect large amphibs....the connectors are in the 'danger zone' for a relatively short time...

    but the other side of the Navy is pushing for ships to operate directly in the area of greatest danger...and even acknowledging that operating in the littorals is dangerous, they're designing and pushing for a ship that appears at least on paper to be vulnerable to all kinds of threats.

    that is the disconnect and some of you don't even want to accept it.

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  11. Lighten up, Sol. This is a discussion, not dissertation.

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  12. i normally do but geez, this is a military blog...i know the littorals are dangerous yet i have two people lecture me on that fact as if it never occurred to me.

    then you ignore the issue that i was trying to bring up about the Navy building throw away ships and yet that's ignored and my position demeaned....

    i'm usually even keeled but this is rubbing me the wrong way.

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  13. Lecturing "you"?

    Take it easy; it's not personal.

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  14. If you think that Americans aren't expendable, talk to the Marines who were on Wake Island or Guam after Pearl Harbor. They were written off.

    I'm not ignoring the issue of building "throw away ships" as you call them. If they can't operate in littoral waters than what can? Let's rather call them HRS - High Risk Ships. Let's give the sailors who volunteer to serve on them a higher rate of pay, like in submarines. Because any way you paint it, these guys are more likely to die in a combat situation than sailors on one of those "over the horizon" attack vessels.

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  15. ok, gloves come off.

    the situation on Wake Island/Guam was one of a tactical necessity. it wasn't done with the idea that they weren't valuable, it was done with the idea that Mission Accomplishment comes first...then troop welfare....but even with that brutal but necessary rule in effect, no one is considered a throw away.

    you do the men who sacrificed their lives in order to preserve freedom a disservice.

    you also bastardize the history of a fine organization.

    you keep ignoring a main point of the issue here. why do we have conflicting doctrines inside the Surface Navy?

    as i said earlier the Amphibious side is pushing further out to sea, but another side is pushing closer....

    I could see this idea possibly working if you're talking about COIN at sea and you're using CB90's. I don't see it working with the LCS or another similar sized and priced ship.

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  16. Solomon, if this is unacceptable to you than let me turn around and ask you: how would you expect the US Navy to handle the littoral mission? What sort of platforms would you like to see there and how would you lessen their vulnerability to the plethora of threats they would meet?

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  17. See:
    http://www.amazon.com/They-Were-Expendable-Bluejacket-Books/dp/1557509484/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1276969759&sr=1-1

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  18. This is not 'conflicting doctrines inside the Surface Navy,' Sol.

    The dynamic of naval warfare is changing, from open sea (Blue) to coastal (Brown) zone. Other armed forces, namely those with less resource than we do, are gunning for this type of warfare.

    If our navy won't adapt accordingly (be it conflicting to traditional norm or not), we will likely find ourselves unable to get close enough to the shore to effectively engage the adversary.

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  19. Hey Anon,

    You can just call me "sir."

    Yes combat always carries risk (never said otherwise), but to intentionally distribute that risk to personel/assets that you deem are more expendable than others is not the way the US has done things.

    When risk is distributed based on a unique mission or task that is different. For example Marine Recon teams unherently undertake more risk than general infantry. They work is smaller numbers, often well behind the lines, with little opportunity for support.

    Don't confuse these two things--they are quite different.

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  20. Hey Sol...

    http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/138164

    I think your blog needs a siren like Drudge!

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  21. The littorals are a dangerous place to operate. With the increased investment of foreign nations in littoral vessels, as well as the proliferation of lower cost anti-ship missiles, mines, etc, this risk has only grown. Instead of thinking of the new littoral vessels as exposed to higher risk, think of the capital ships as becoming more protected from these risks. The same is true of the amphibious vessels that gain greater protection in the bluer waters, and spend less time in the more dangerous green waters as they deliver their payloads.

    In the littorals, size does not always confer additional protection - larger ships are more visible and less mobile than smaller ones in these regions. If you could imagine the public's reaction to the loss of smaller littoral vessel, can you imagine the reaction to the loss of a much larger, more expensive capital ship?

    That being said, the LCS is too expensive and fragile for this mission as well and is therefore destined for failure.

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