Hasik gets it wrong.

Big Time Hat Tip to Jonathan for sending me this article!

Hasik is a defense analyst with a big following inside the beltway.  He's one of the 'inside' guys so I was surprised by how wrong he was in his latest analysis of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle program.  Read his entire post here, but a tidbit....

Rather, the general was describing two possible ways forward after the EFV:1. A landing force carried entirely in ACVs.
2. A mix of ACVs and wheeled vehicles, with the latter borne by hovercraft or displacement landing craft.
So, there's no exotic two-part vehicle under consideration, and as I suggested yesterday was possible. Indeed, the second option—the two-parter, it would seem—is actually a rather tried-and-true approach. Plenty of other amphibious forces have amphibious tractors (usually AAV7s from BAE Systems) and hovercraft (often from Griffon), and those that don't definitely know how to drive ashore in landing craft with bow ramps.
This merely reinforces my assertion yesterday about the competitive way forward for industry, though I will extend my remarks slightly:
First, the Navy's follow-on hovercraft, the Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC), should have a secure future. If one really wants to stand over the horizon for an amphibious assault, helicopters and hovercraft are the technically proven way to do it. Hovercraft admittedly aren't as robust under fire as AAVs, but then again, neither are helicopters. And, with both helicopters and hovercraft, the assault force can have options for going where the enemy isn't.
Second, the emphasis on wheeled vehicles, hauled ashore by SSCs or displacement landing craft, means that the Marine Personnel Carrier program will likely continue in the Corps's plans. After all, the Marines had mostly been thinking about proven designs—Nexter's VBCI, ARTEC's Boxer, GD's LAV-V, and Patria's AMV—with modifications for their particular requirements. Those are reasonably priced vehicles whose long-term costs are well-established. They're not EFVs or GCVs, so there's no reason to get worked up a priori about affordability.

My opinion, but Hasik is missing the real debate here.

1.  The ACV is going forward.  The Marines will have a follow on to the AAV. 
2.  The proposal to have a mixed force arose because the EFV was so expensive.
3.  With the EFV canceled and the ACV replacing it, the idea of a mixed force loses its luster.  The Marine Corps has in essence placed the Marine Personnel Vehicle on hold until studies can be determined as to whether it makes sense to purchase two vehicles instead of one.
4.  His attempt to link the SSC to future amphibious assault doctrine is a misnomer.  In no plans have I read that the SSC will be used in the assault phase.  He can compare the survivability of the SSC to aircraft but there is no comparison.  The SSC is a relative sitting duck.
5.  He goes on to make the statement that the Marines might be interested in a high speed LCVP for landing personnel.  Not bloody likely.  The Marines are tailoring themselves as the medium weight force of the US.  Buying high speed LCVPs would put us in the role of Commandos.  It ain't happening.

In all I'm just disappointed but not surprised.  Naval analyst usually have a hard time with Marine Corps issues.  What is annoying is that he and others like him have the ear of policy makers.  And that is a club that has benefits and no entry without membership.  And thats the shame of it.

Unless the Marine Corps gets its message out then those that don't know it, don't understand it or purposefully want to misrepresent it are going to be heard.

We can't let that happen.