Tuesday, June 12, 2012

Stryker Brigades are killing the Army.

The US Army is losing its future in pursuit of its Stryker concept.  Check this out from AOL.
To bypass these chokepoints, the wargamers experimented with a concept called "seabasing," putting an entire Army Stryker brigade afloat on ships and then landing them at minor harbors -- fishing villages, for example -- or even bare beaches without ever going through the ports. In some ways it was a 21st century version of the D-Day landings 68 years ago, albeit with much smaller forces going much longer distances. Army leaders were excited about the idea, but the actual players struggled with how to implement it. Unlike some past simulations, this year's wargame didn't handwave the logistical difficulties of such an operation or postulate future technologies that would somehow make the problem go away.

"This time they forced us to only play capabilities that are in the current [budget] program, which added a good dose of reality," said one participant, who asked to remain anonymous. Today, for example, the US military flies personnel overseas and only sends their equipment and supplies by sea, which means it has few ships designed to accommodate large numbers of troops. So the wargamers improvised by chartering two civilian cruise liners. They also had to hire civilian vessels to carry some supplies; that proved a problem when the simulated enemy mined the sea lanes, scaring some commercial transports into turning around without making key deliveries - something military crews would not have done.

The wargame also showed a bottleneck in the ability to get troops from the transport ships to shore without going through the easily targeted major ports. To unload from the big seagoing ships onto small landing craft while both are out at sea, the military relies on something called a Mobile Landing Platform, a kind of floating, self-propelled pier that can serve as a port facility in mid-ocean. The problem, the same participant said, is that "there's only three mobile landing platforms that are currently resourced" in long-term budget plans, and some of them were needed in a second simulated conflict underway at the same time in the Pacific. "We had to fight for those to enable the seabase," he said.

So while seabasing is a neat idea, it turns out the Army needs more ships of specific types, such as those Mobile Landing Platforms, in order to implement it. But those additional ships aren't only not in the current budget plan: They would never be in the Army's part of the budget at all. Like long-range cargo planes, seabasing is something the Army has to beg its sister services to buy so they can get it to the fight. That's not a happy fact for the Army to encounter, but it's a lot better to encounter it in simulation than in a real shooting war where it's too late to fix anything.

"One of the great challenges is being honest with yourself: You have to actually identify what you can do and where you have real difficulty -- and that is happening," said a civilian participant. "The thing is, we have to be very clear now. The stakes are much higher from both a bureaucratic and strategic sense... Right now DoD [the Department of Defense] is making hard choices about what capabilities they have to invest in and what capabilities they feel can take some risk in, [and] it's very important that the Army test their real demands pretty hard before DoD makes any of their choices permanent."
Notice whats at work here?

They didn't include the 82nd Airborne...they could have flown straight into the warzone and parachuted in...right on top of the refugees.

They didn't include the 101st...they could have teamed with Marines on an LHA or even converted an oil tanker and flown straight to the refugees.

But a mechanized brigade...that you have to supply and replenish?  That you have to support in the field?  That isn't designed for amphibious operations?

The game players in this scenario probably had to play the game with certain units.  The problem for the Big Army is that its choosing the wrong units to get into the Pacific.  Light Infantry divisions.  Airborne and Air Assault divisions will be the Army's saving grace in the Pacific.

Not Stryker Brigades.

The sooner the Army realizes it the better it will be.

10 comments :

  1. Rather than writing a sensationalist headline, wouldn't it be more accurate to just say, " the Army needs more MLPs"?

    In reality, there are other ways to get equipment off of those ships (e.g. INLS, RRDF, ELCAS). But there arent enough of these either.

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  2. So the Army wanted to build MEU's. Shot I'd trade my bunk at a LHA for a balcony cabin in princess of the seas.

    I always have said this. They need to shrink the army to a border homeland security force with all them damn Tanks and heavy assed vehicles that you can't move fast and far. Keep a few light infantry to respond and dump their budget money into doubling the Marines, more amphibs

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  3. While one could make a reasonable case for getting rid of the US Army and increasing the USMC to compensate it's not clear this would be good for the Corp. Could the corp keep it's expeditionary nature if it had to maintain large numbers of heavy maneuver brigades that would never be either expeditionary in nature nor deploy from the sea?

    The problem with the US Army is that it keeps forgetting it's main rationale is to maintain light forces that can deploy quickly while maintaining heavy maneuver forces for a worst case scenario. The USMC maintains the actual medium weight forces as well as power projection from the sea together with the USN.

    The Stryker brigades were originally a political response to the reality of what it takes to move heavy maneuver units, as was FCS, in terms of the Balkans. The original idea of moving them around the world by air in 96 hours was a complete fantasy as indicated by the US Army entirely dropping the notion of the deploying the brigades by air.

    While there's nothing per se wrong with the US Army wargaming some sea-basing conops the entire sea-basing concept seems to many to be a transformational concept when in fact all it means is having more ships and sea based platforms. Supporting forces ashore logistically is nothing new, requires significant shipping, and is not a panacea.

    The more evolved sea-basing concept sees the maneuver elements based at sea, utilizing the sea as part of the maneuver space, as well as basing the logistic support at sea. On one level sounds great, on another level it sounds like welcome to the Marines, and finally sounds like fantasy land where the US has the budget to create sea bases that somehow differ significantly from what the USN Gator fleet and USMC are able to do now.

    The US Army does not need to base at sea and frankly it might not be fully aware but it really doesn't want to get into that game. What it should want to do is train it's heavy maneuver units at the large land bases this requires as insurance against a serious threat to the nation while maintaining lighter forces, along with the Corp's medium expeditionary from the sea forces for more common uses.

    If we really do need more sea-basing, vs more afloat pre positioned forces and/or maintaining more CONUS based fast sealift, then it's not at all clear why the USMC wouldn't be tasked in this role, and/or simply increased in size to flesh out the new requirement(s)? Moreover, if the nation really did require the US Army to operate from a sea-based concept exactly why would this operation be performed by Stryker brigades?

    The entire conops here is flawed. Somehow we need the strategic and operational flexibility of a sea based force to justify that level of investment and cost but the threat can somehow be dealt with by a light mechanized brigade without tanks and other supporting units? There's not a lot of Middle East nations without significant heavy armored forces we don't in fact want to throw Stryker brigades at. We need to bother with all this for Africa or Indonesia? It's ridiculous. We have a sea base for Indonesia and it's called Australia. Our former most important and centrally located sea base, the Philippines, sounds like it regrets kicking us out some years back.

    For anyone still reading this and interested in more information see the following:

    https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:c2VFExcfJGwJ:www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub743.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESjnmROBrKd1nPrInDsECrrCxKcQv520TbLnU2UrqNCvS6yTwv-aYLeQJ9VQj6ydYdbB-3gB6zmQ0G7c1pXsBvIcZ_g706ppaKemXNYmqpj8nGrpft3sFm-Fd5TVYiO1-nluY6D5&sig=AHIEtbSJARgwxbom35jOQzLAio4mt1n8Mw

    sorry the link to the PDF didn't appear to be working

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  4. Sea Basing isn't just about Stryker Brigades. The same technology can move heavy units ashore too.

    Marines and the USN Gator fleet really serve complementary roles to Sea Basing. The former is geared towards early, forced entry and the later for follow-on forces and logistics.

    The existing Gator fleet doesn't have the throughput necessary to sustain significant operations ashore, or to land more than a handful of Brigades. Sea Basing aims to enable use of the brigade sets and sustainment on board MSC pre-positioned ships without needing a major port.

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  5. Just a thought
    According to wiki, bad source i know,
    overlord lasted 80 days
    4000 allied tanks were lost

    How many were deployed?

    A huge war effort, and crossing the channel is easier than the pacific, but there is no reason, beyond lack of (easily purchasable) sea based logistics that stryker, or even tank brigades, cant be easily deployable

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  6. a comparison that means nothing. the US Navy currently has less than 300 ships...thats alone is almost as many ships as the rest of NATO combined. the US Navy has the largest amphibious navy in the world...yet it can only deploy in a resisted landing two Marine Corps 2.5 Marine Battalions.

    we don't have the capability to deploy a stryker brigade or definitely a tank brigade in a forcible entry type situation. if the Army wants to be a player then it has to be with Airborne or Air Assault or Light Infantry units.

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  7. 2.5 Marine Brigades right? Not battalions.

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  8. wow. yes you're exactly right. my mistake. question. why is the Army so against highlighting the 82nd and perhaps forming all these other independent Brigades into another Airborne division and using them specifically for the Pacific? in many cases they could beat the Marine Corps to hot spots!

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  9. As I said, its not currently possible, but its only a matter of buying the ships.
    Air deploying units is even less possible.

    Sure, you can fly over a lot of men in passenger airliners, but you cant fly over transportation for them, or fuel for those transports, or food, or small arms ammunition, never mind artillery.
    If that is all forward deployed, fine, but if its not, airborne units are not that flexible.

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  10. I agree with TrT. Airborne units don't have the needed level of ground mobility, protection or firepower. Same goes for light infantry divisions. I'm not a fan of the air assault division concept in general. Seems like a capability every infantry division should have, to some extent. The 101st also has limited organic ground mobility.

    Frankly, I'm not a fan of the light infantry division concept either. I'd like to see us re-form these units into more robust divisions that can actually do something without significant augmentation once they arrive.

    That being said, I could see making an airborne brigade available, however they don't necessarily need to be based in theater.

    I'm a fan of Stryker Brigades, but the Army may find a need for more tracked vehicles to handle difficult terrain in many parts of the region.

    ReplyDelete

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