The problem is that the program makes little to no sense.
Not only are upgrades to the HUMVEE possible, but they're also desireable. Instead of operating a wheeled fleet with another vehicle added to the mix we should instead upgrade what we have and make sure that MRAPs in storage are available to be rushed to theater if needed.
Question. Has the US Army or Marine Corps put forward a compelling reason for why the JLTV is needed? Extend that to all the other armored programs and it becomes ugly. The only armored vehicle programs that are needed are the Army's M-113 replacement and the Marine Corps' MPC/AAV upgrade/ACV.
Everything else can and should be canned. That includes the JLTV.
Bradley upgrade? Yes. Ground Combat Vehicle? No. JLTV? Fuck no! Humvee Upgrade? Yes. ACV/MPC/AAV Upgrade? Yes. Stryker Upgrade? No. M-113 Replacement? Yes.
Until the ground services are able to come up with compelling and common sense solutions to the armored vehicle fleet then my suggestions/recommendations are just as viable as what you're seeing coming from HQ Army and Marine Corps.
The real savings aren't in hardware, it's in personnel. Look at how the Germans expanded the number of divisions in WWI. In 1915 the German Heer went from divisions of two brigades with two infantry regiments, one cavalry regiment and a light infantry battalion each to a simpler three infantry regiment division (sound familiar?). The Krauts took the personnel from the brigades and cavalry regiments, then created new divisions and regiments that the Allies never imagined would be possible.
ReplyDeleteThere are similar redundancies in the US Army's Division, Corps and Army level units. Do we need Corps level NBC battalions or Artillery regiments? These units should be dissolved and the junior officers sent to create new combat groups while the General Officer Weapons Systems are put out to pasture.
From brigade on up, no HQ should be single-service. Air components officers should be permanently assigned. Marine and Naval officers should be able to be serve as staff or line officers at brigade or battalion level for these HQs.
You could reduce the overall size of the US Army while increasing the number brigades OR increasing the size of the brigades while maintaining a similar number of them.
A leaner, more agile and more lethal US Army is better than a Cold War-oriented one preparing for mass mobilization.
Couldn't agree more on increasing the size of US Army brigades. It's ridiculously wasteful having two brigades with 4 maneuver battalions assigned (two each) when having 4 in one battalion means one less brigade HQ, artillery battalion HQ, support, ISR, etc.
ReplyDeleteI'd tend to disagree on brigades not being single service. The differences in doctrine, training, etc., are too diverse for this to work; moreover joint for jointness sake isn't really useful and can be wasteful. Joint HQ's can make sense at the next echelon but even here not always.
Another reason joint at lower levels is problematic is the USAF simply is not going to assign, frex, a squadron to an Army division. It's exactly why the US Army invented the attack helicopter (lack of USAF interest in direct support) and currently operates a variant of the MQ-1 at division level. The USAF does not work and play well with others a significant amount of the time and letting lower echelon units task it's squadron's interferes with it's component air commander running the air war and ATO.