Saturday, August 11, 2012

Carrier Navy. Fixing the fleet...first...lets dump the LCS!


The LCS.
  
We have to look back a bit on this one.

The US Navy has suffered probably more than any service during this war on terror.  Not from a deployment stand point (they've been as busy as ever), not from a personnel standpoint but from a "reason for being" standpoint.

The US Army and Marine Corps has been busy on land fighting our nations battles.  The USAF has been in the air supporting those efforts...The Navy has been looking for a role.  While looking for relevance during the past decade they lost sight of their reason for being...that is they forgot that the primary mission is to defeat our nations enemies at sea.

The LCS is suppose to fight the at sea version of counter insurgency.

It sounds good in theory...especially when you had Bush Administration officials talking about generational warfare.  That theory gave way to a savage fact.  Counter insurgency/nation building didn't work on land and its doubtful that it could work at sea.

Luckily for the US Navy, the situation off the coast of Africa provided a test bed for the sea borne version of counter insurgency with a mix of pirate and terrorist activity.  Even without the LCS the tools were plentiful, the will to use them to effect lacking.

This all leads to my belief that the LCS is a ship without a mission.

In my scenario where the Carrier Battle Group was under attack, the LCS could play no role.  At best it could steam to the scene and pick up survivors.  That's all it could contribute.

And now the US Navy is about to build around 55 of these ships!  Ships that add nothing to the Navy's combat power, can only show the flag and specialize in a mission set that has been abandoned.  The Navy should dump this puppy today and focus on winning the nation's wars at sea.  This should be fix number one.  

Next.  Fixing the airwing.

22 comments:

  1. One use for the LCS you might consider is a radar picket similar to the DDs used in the same role off Okinawa in Iwo Jima in 1945 to guard against kamikaze attacks.

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    1. they don't have the systems (unless you're counting the international versions) to handle even that. even if they did all they could do is tell you that doom is coming. i just don't like the concept as currently outlined.

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  2. Dump the LCS concept, replace with Gibbs & Cox's Evolved Flight II Arleigh Burke class destroyer (one of the concepts in bidding for the Hobart class destroyer), but keep that flight deck. Being able to land a CH-53K with 20,000 lbs of cargo on it is a valuable asset to a frigate or corvette.

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    1. never heard of it. i'm going to have to check it out...sounds good though.

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    2. Here is a G&C marketing slide on the Evolved Burke,

      https://docs.google.com/open?id=0ByVQu4lA4SjvM2QzODA2NzgtNTVhYi00YWYyLWJmMzktYmM5ZmZiNmNlMzA0&authkey=CMv7te0G

      I did a bit of photoshopping on it and came up with what I called the "Littoral Warfare Destroyer".

      https://docs.google.com/open?id=0ByVQu4lA4SjvM2Y1MDJhNTctN2Q5Zi00NTM3LTg0N2EtMWIzNjczZjcyZWVj&authkey=CNmbtOkP

      Major changes,

      * Swapped out SPY-1D for SPY-3 in an enclosed mast. (COMBATSS-21 instead of AEGIS)
      * Raised and enlarged the flight deck to make room for a mission bay beneath (Absalon/LCS style).
      * DDG-1000 sonar suite (SQQ-90)
      * VLS reduced to 32 cells.
      * Added a Mk110 57mm aft.
      * Integrated Electric Propulsion

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    3. I disagree with you on just 32 cells but I love the Integrated Electric Propulsion idea.

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    4. I threw in IEP, but I could see just sticking with the existing Burke propulsion plant to save costs.

      The intent of the LWD was to make a vessel based on the Burke, but less expensive, and aimed at filling the LCS and FFG roles.

      For this, IMHO, 32 cells is enough. (e.g. 12 SM-2/6, 32 ESSM, 8 VLA-ER, 4 TLAM) This provides a useful AAW augmentation for CVBGs, or limited AAW escort missions, while not requiring a larger forward VLS. (the aft VLS was removed to make room for the larger flight deck and mission bay)

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  3. The LCS as a ship is a disaster but the roles remain. Minesweeping, littoral ASW (a different proposition than blue water ASW), and littoral low to medium intensity combat, which could range from pirates in a speedboat to enforcing blockades to handling a few anti-ship missiles from a non-state entity. We may also be getting back to a situation where blue water escort duty is a real role as SSK/SSI proliferate. Then, as you have pointed out, there is coastal/riverine COIN.

    The USN has steadfastly refused to address what is required for these roles because to define any of these roles for the current LCS is to have to admit it can't perform that role, but that doesn't mean the roles aren't there and none of them are going away anytime soon. The current LCS needs to go away ASAP but that doesn't mean there shouldn't be an intelligent range of lower cost ships.

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    1. good points but the Navy is embarked on a hodge podge solution to all those problems. costal/riverine fighting is taken care of by the force they've assembled...if anything they need a proper mothership...the littoral antimine mission is bieng taken care of by a package designed for the MH-60....pirates can be handled by any warship...including merchant ships that have the right personnel onboard....the only real issue is at sea anti-sub work but the lcs definitely can't handle that.

      everything is covered except for the anti-sub work and i imagine they think the p-8's can solve half that problem.

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    2. "...a situation where blue water escort duty is a real role as SSK/SSI proliferate." Speaking of escort duty has the US Navy even conducted convoy protection exercises since the end of the Cold War? If a war with China kicks off and lasts past two weeks (assuming things don't go nuclear after the first few days) won't we need convoys of merchantman and MSC vessels to resupply the ground troops and air bases in the Pacific? Are we even remotely prepared for that?

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  4. Chinese submarines are just now starting to deploy any distance from China, our SSN's will eat their subs for lunch, and our allies in the region are very well equipped for asw and convoy escort. Japan has the 2nd best navy in the world and they are heavily geared toward the escort and asw missions. All this aside long term we certainly do require cost effective general purpose frigates for escort, asw, etc.

    As for LCS I made some comments earlier but we can only hope the USN cuts the program at 24, buys some cost effective mine warfare craft, patrol boats, and an actual frigate.

    I disagree LCS was the USN's answer to terrorism. It's far too screwed up conceptually to be a logical response to anything. They made it very fast to rush back to port to change modules and rush back to the fight properly equipped. Right there someone needed to say OK lets take a breath and really think about if that's a good idea. Because it's not only a terrible idea but he modules don't work, are too expensive to buy enough of to allow swapping, and even they weren't it takes too long to swap modules. On top of that they made sure there weren't enough sailors aboard to maintain the ship, they entirely under armed the vessel, they created a speed boat sized frigate to carry 140 knot helicopters around at 45 knots, lowered survivability requirements to below the definition of the word survivable, and spent $500 million + the many more millions for the modules on an under armed vessel that can't escort itself much less another ship.

    Once upon a time there was a concept called Street fighter. The ship was actually called LCS and back then it was about 500 tons. The USN made it 3,000 tons and added two helicopters and turned a fast patrol craft into a ship so commanding officers could get their tickets punched aboard a a real ship. That's the only logical explanation for LCS I've ever been able to divine.

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    1. Lane,
      I think the LCS was a combination of the lessons learned in Desert Storm/Praying Mantis/Ernest Will. If you look at these actions in the Persian Gulf, it strikes me that that LCS is almost exactly what was needed. First the serious mine threat could have been dealt with much more quickly if only modules needed to be transported rather than MCM's. Then the high speed and shallow draft would have allowed LCS greater freedom of maneuver in shallow waters to compete with fast attack craft on equal terms. Remember that there were several incidents where our ships were outmaneuvered by Iranian attack craft during the quasi war we were fighting there. LCS has the capability to escape from a possible trap without opening fire if there are strict ROE's.

      The original Street Fighter was based on the idea that the best way to fight a FAC was with another small missile boat as shown by the Israelis, but the effectiveness of helicopters against both the Iraqi and Iranian Navies seems to have disproven that hypothesis. Hence the size of LCS is the minimum to carry helicopters.

      The minimum manning is simply something that must be accepted in the modern navy. While LCS probably went too far, personnel costs are just too high for 200 man crews on minor combatants. So when looked at from this point of view, I think LCS made perfect sense. The problems came as the program was terribly mismanaged and the strategic situation moved on from the very limited set of scenarios LCS was designed for.

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  5. The Navy played a vital role in OEF. Carrier air generated 72% of all combat sorties?

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  6. LCS conceptually did not make "perfect sense". Making a frigate go 45 knots to rush back and forth to switch modules is idiotic on myriad levels. Firstly now you're buying many expensive modules and having the module crew sitting around trying to do proper training in isolation and then marry them up to a strange ship and crew. What has happened in reality is the expense of the modules means we can't afford to buy that many and the last USN official report says it will take 96 hours to over a week to swap the modules.

    Instead of a frigate that can do asw, anti surface, and anti air we're supposed to have 2 LCS one doing asw, the other anti surface and both needing anti air protection from a 3rd ship? That's ridiculous.

    While I agree the most useful thing about LCS is that it carries two helicopters many other frigates do, the last USN frigate class did, and nobody else has thought fit to create a frigate that goes 45 knots to haul around 140 knot helicopters. It's illogical.

    Having a $500 million 45 knot minesweeper is beyond ridiculous. Mine hunting is a low deliberate process. Whoever thought we can afford $500 million mine hunters needed to see a doctor not convince others the idea has merit. The idea of large vessels being able to do mine hunting as an adjunct for smaller cost effective vessels is one thing but when your primary platform for mine warfare is a frigate you've clearly entered the twilight zone.

    On top of all this instead of integrating a combat system on a ship we get to integrate various modules in addition to the ships systems. This is the same as simply taking piles of money and setting them on fire. On top of this the USN in it's wisdom decided to have 2 different classes of LCS with different systems. They couldn't make this program worse if they were actively trying to do so.

    Not a single module today actually works. Buying them is an additional expense not counted when the ship is purchased so we've got significant hidden costs. Every module not aboard an LCS is sitting around with a module crew trying to figure out realistic ways to train and integrate themselves well with a strange crew.

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    1. You will note that I agree that the LCS program has been badly mismanaged. I also agree that a single module per a ship is probably a bad idea in a combat environment. However, I don't believe that LCS was a hopelessly foolish concept to begin with.

      First your statement that LCS was designed for 45 knots to rapidly switch modules. I was under the impression that the speed requirement was to allow for tactical flexibility against the small boat threat and to allow a single vessel to cover a larger patrol area. As I stated earlier, this speed advantage can be beneficial in situations short of war.

      Second, while a $500 million minesweeper is ridiculous, having a fleet of 55 corvettes that can be rapidly switched to minesweeping is quite useful. Mines have been an enormous threat since Korea yet the USN has only 14 minesweepers with limited strategic mobility. When the possible economic damage that mines can inflict is considered, the time saved by having a ship in theater that can be converted to mine countermeasures could be important.

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    2. The speed requirement was for rushing back to and from port to swap modules. At top speed I think LCS burns up all her fuel in one day. That's not a design to exploit high speed tactically very often and certainly not for very long.

      The problem with your analysis is that we can't afford 55 mine warfare modules, training 55 mine warfare module crews without ships is problematic, using even half the LCS for mine warfare means they're not doing anything else, and most importantly the same mine warfare module for LCS can go on any other ship including a fishing trawler.

      Moreover, the mine warfare community not having it's own ships is problematic on myriad levels. I'd be perfectly happy to agree we should have 24+ 1,000 to 1,5000 ton mine hunters and additionally some flexibility in deploying mine warfare systems from other ships. We also have two USN squadrons with the MH-53E mine sweeping helicopter that can be deployed by air, besides the forward detachments they already maintain.

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  7. Before getting into the details, I got to say this: All those saying kill the LCS program are basically (fill in adjective) because SOME SHIP HAS to replace the LCS. Unless someone identifies a class which can be built in the numbers and at the cost the USN projects, then ANY suggestion to "kill this" is misguided.

    Now to some comments. The LCS is specifically being projected to serve as a picket ship at the forward edge of a TF area. Not so much as a static DER but supposedly as a lily pad for other sensors like UAVs. Not my idea but what has been stated.
    Lane the LCS is NOT a result of the Streetgither concept. The NPS Sea Lance concept is (see Sol's earlier thread). The LCS is so constricted by its (2) hullforms, it has limited logistics capability and (since I define a mothership as needing that) are poor motherships.

    Optimal crewing is no longer considered possible on LCS. The USN has shot itself in the foot, since there ARE models for small crews which work, i.e. MSC ships.

    Rapid change out of mission module is now NOT considered possible by the latest "OPNAV Perez" report. Each LCS will probably have a given set of modules for long periods depending on AOR.

    Of course the sealift capability of MSC must have escorts, the Navy has often overlooked that mission.

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  8. how is the LCS going to act as a picket ship with any of the proposed uav's that its intended to operate? the firescout? its only utility is against land targets or small boats. other than that its useless. that applies to every other sensor being discussed.

    mothership? you scratched that yourself. pirate fighter? the dutch showed that that can be done with a frieghter. so what exactly is the mission?

    name a frigate from any navy in the world and you have a replacement. the LCS as a concept is just plain wrong. courage would have it killed today.

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  9. Firt see Bob Work's comments on ID and other websites IRT LCS as picket. Basically the Navy wants to link the UAV's out front of LCS with the "Battle Network", certainly doable - efrective TBD.

    NO the navy has never intended the LCS as a land attack ship nor were the Perrys it's replacing.

    Just saying any frigate can be off since there is NO standard definition of littoral warship rqmts. We mostly agree that the USN blew the LCS rqmts. The USN version is skewed, but other navies have been more successfull at it.

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  10. ole' Bob Work lost any viability as a naval thinker with his foolish push to get green energy onto every ship and plane in the fleet. i don't mind going green if it is done with real deal tactical considerations but its obvious that his reasoning is politics and only politics. second, i don't care about his stating that its a picket ship. it ain't and there is nothing he can do to change that. he fouled stuff up and everyone knows it when it comes to the LCS>

    my main point is this. what is its job? can you name one function it can perform except for fighting pirates? i can't. you can launch UAVs from any ship in the fleet...amphibs, destroyers carriers. you don't need a new class of ships to do something like that.

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    1. I have NOT heard the Under promote green enery, did you mean SECNAV/Energy?

      Actually for all the hoopla and BS online the LCS while on diesels are fairly economical (not the same as at high spd).

      The LCS may well be able to perform some missions well? We do NOT know for a fact that all the "failures" currently being surmissed will in fact come to be.

      THE question is does the USN continue by betting the come, or change course based on reports?

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  11. A general purpose frigate can do asw, anti air, anti surface, convoy escort, radar picket, among myriad other missions. It's a surface combatant that can also protect other ships

    LCS does what exactly? It can't protect itself, much less other ships, from aerial threats. Same applies for asw unless that module happens to be aboard and they ever get that module to actually do anything (last USN report stated the ASW module did not contribute to the ASW mission). For anti surface LCS is out ranged by almost every other surface warship, down to 100 ton missile boats, and thus itself requires protection from surface threats.

    The problem is not that getting rid of LCS means we need other ships to replace LCS but rather LCS replacing current USN ships results in a huge loss of net capability.

    LCS replacing our entire cost effective mine hunting fleet is ridiculous on multiple levels. It can't defend itself, much less other ships. It's not an escort and itself requires a lot of support. It's primary surface warfare module is a 3nm range missile supposed to defeat speed boats. That's an absolute total joke.

    The entire conceptual construct upon which LCS is based has been found by the USN to be fictional construct. It can't operate in the manner intended which leaves aside that what was intended was far from adequate.

    As for LCS not directly coming from Streetfighter I'd suggest reading the following case study:

    http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QFJrM-RqgO4J:www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/Case%25207%2520LCS.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us

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