I just had a startling revelation.
The US Army with the Ground Combat Vehicle competition and the vehicles that have been entered into it, is admitting that technologically its behind the Israeli Army..at least when it comes to combat vehicles.
Monday, August 27, 2012
Namer APC's of the Golani Brigade operating on the Golan Heights
I just had a startling revelation.
The US Army with the Ground Combat Vehicle competition and the vehicles that have been entered into it, is admitting that technologically its behind the Israeli Army..at least when it comes to combat vehicles.
I belive that the Namer is probably the most survivable APC out there...but at 60 tonnes of weight do you think it would be a good choice for the US Army ? wouldnt that make it to big to be carried from one place to another?I do belive that its a very good armored car ,but what do you think of the CV 90 ?lighter(could be carried by a C-130)and as lots of versions that would be interesting to the Army and the USMC(including an air defense version,something that bouth branches are lacking).But one thing you have got right:its more advanced and survivable that any APC in the western world...
ReplyDeleteIts nice for the Israeli's to have a heavy weight vehicle. They arnt going anywhere. If they where to do something offensive its right next to their home. Its hard for the Army/Marine Corps, to have a APC that weights about as much as our MBT. But its a awsome vehicle.
ReplyDeleteThe Israelis do some very good work but they have the advantage of being able to optimize for a very specific area with very specific requirements.
ReplyDeleteTo your point, however, big armies that think of themselves as in the 'premier league' have always had a hard time learning from conflicts they don't view as more generally applicable. Personally I think the US had an enormous amount to learn from the South African experience that would have come in very handy in A-stan and Iraq, but the non-learning goes all the way back to all of Europe ignoring many lessons of not just the Russo-Japanese war but even the American Civil War before it.
The biggest US Army problem was believing an IFV carrying 6 dismounts was a good idea. They've finally gotten over this and the next IFV has a firm requirement for 9 dismounts. The Namer carries 9 dismounts on a tank chassis and is 60 tons sure but the Puma IFV is 43 tons and still carries only 6. Just scaling up a Puma probably gets you a 50 ton IFV.
ReplyDeleteIt's not just Israel developing heavy infantry carriers but Russia as well. Our new IFV could do a lot worse than basically being a Namer class vehicle with a large RWS (30+mm gun with ATGW). An armored brigade is transported and supplied by sea and how much the IFV weighs is a minor factor.
As far as not learning lessons from other people's wars it's worth pointing out the 1973 Middle East war was heavily studied by both sides during the Cold War and was critical to how doctrine and equipment was developed. That said there's lists of conflicts where nations draw the wrong conclusions, if any at all.
Check this out:
ReplyDeletehttp://defense.aol.com/2012/06/21/congress-dont-let-army-botch-gcv-the-bradley-replacement/
MacGregor has a point when he says that it the Army's structure that needs reforming, not the vehicles that need modernizing.
Think about it: Meyer and Starry fomented the acquisition of the Apache, M1 Abrams, M2 Bradley, MLRS systems. All were designed around the AirLand Battle philosophy of being quick, hardhitting and survivable to enable US Forces stop a Soviet breakthrough and then mount deep thrusts in the counter-attack.
And since then the Army has done nothing to develop a new philosophy structure or the structure that would be needed to support and execute it (and don't get me started about the lame, hokey Units of Action).
Until the Army cashiers redundant flag officers and totally ditches Corps and Division units, designs a new doctrine and structure, it shouldn't buy any new platforms.
I'd love to see the Namer or CV90 as a Bradley replacement, but why? The Army hasn't earned it yet.
Macgregor is probably still in shock that after he proposed large brigades operating under joint HQ's the US Army went with small brigades of 2 heavy maneuver battalions operating under Army HQ's. Thus I disagree the Army didn't come up with new doctrine and organization but rather that it was entirely misguided.
ReplyDeleteI think it's 15 years old now but the Army should dust of their copies of Macgregor's "Breaking the Phalanx" and see what they should have done and can still do.
the army isn't designed to fight from the brigade structure culturally. thats why the concept failed and will fail even if they follow mcgregors example.
ReplyDeletethe division based model would have served them much better both in afghanistan and iraq. mcgregor attempted to develop a medium army that just has no place in future conflicts. it will be a light or heavy world. just like it has always been for army units
Macgregor didn't actually call them brigades but rather groups. They were large brigades of 4 maneuver battalions, organic helicopter squadron, etc. I do agree the Army has not traditionally been a brigade centric force but it's worth pointing out the modular brigades take almost all the assets from division to assign directly to the brigades thus making division less relevant; moreover, a heavy division now has 8 maneuver battalions in 4 brigades vs a Macgregor structure of 16 maneuver batt in 4 brigades under a joint HQ.
ReplyDeleteThat joint HQ is really a corp level HQ. There's a lot of merit to this structure including how one or more brigades could be Marine or even allied. This aside assuming the Army keeps the division then the Corp should evolve into a true joint HQ. In either case in a 10 division army we really don't need to go division, corp, army, theater/UCC. We'd be better served getting rid of one level of command and making the HQ above division true joint HQ's.
but i think you're hitting on my point. we already have deck chairs lined up but the problem is that the support units are starting to wag the dog again.
ReplyDeletehow many supporting units do you have attached to each brigade now? those units were once saddled on the division and the brigade commander could worry about using his forces...now he's playing nurse made to a whole camp following. its a logistic nightmare and tossing the tooth to tail ratio off again.
It's a fair point but personally I'm less concerned that the brigade has to deal with supporting units, which they've always done, then the division having few assets to weight the effort properly or tailor it's brigades to specific missions and objectives.
ReplyDeleteMoreover, I worry less about a brigade commander and his staff properly employing his assets than all the extra HQ's the Army created by going with small brigades. With 4 brigades controlling 8 maneuver battalions you've got 4 artillery batt HQ's, 4 support batt HQ's, etc. Two brigades of 4 maneuver batt each cut the number of support and combat support HQ's in half.
Large brigades are simply more efficient, increase tooth to tail, are better able to sustain losses in heavy combat and remain effective, and are tactically and operationally more flexible. Exactly what does a "brigade" of two maneuver battalions do when one needs to consolidate an objective? Does the brigade continue operations with a single battalion? With 4 maneuver battalions detaching one is normal procedure.
If the Army had large 4 battalion brigades and had a controlling HQ for every 4 does it matter if that HQ is called a division or corp? I'd suggest Macgregor's point that at that level of command (30,000 or so troops) we're better served with a joint HQ than single service. In either case the Army needs far fewer command slots so a huge officer corp can get their tickets punched and more actual combat units supported by a far leaner organization. Just my opinion.