B. Smitty sent me a copy of the CBO report on the US Army's Ground Combat Vehicle. It makes for interesting reading and I've attached a copy so you can see what the fuss is about.
I think this one pic I grabbed says it all. The US Army wants an APC that's as large as a Main Battle Tank, yet at the same time they're talking about maintaining strategic AND tactical mobility?
Impossible.
Read the report below and see how this concept is from the fevered dreams of some madman at TRADOC. What this document is really screaming is that the US Army still thinks IEDs are present and future threat on the battlefield. What has me really scratching my head is the obvious. The Bradley can be modified....lose the turret and the 25mm chain gun, add a 50 cal RWS, put in a couple more seats and add a bit of blast protection and you have your GCV on the cheap.
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| Pic taken from the CBO Report. |
Impossible.
Read the report below and see how this concept is from the fevered dreams of some madman at TRADOC. What this document is really screaming is that the US Army still thinks IEDs are present and future threat on the battlefield. What has me really scratching my head is the obvious. The Bradley can be modified....lose the turret and the 25mm chain gun, add a 50 cal RWS, put in a couple more seats and add a bit of blast protection and you have your GCV on the cheap.
43699-GroundCombatVehicles
Hmm. A turretless Bradley won't come close to the protection level of the notional GCV. It will also lose the potent 25mm/TOW/coax combo with the hunter-killer EO/IR optics. (however the GCV loses TOW too, IIRC)
ReplyDeleteThey claim the hybrid diesel-electric drive will give the GCV similar fuel economy to the Brad, but YMMV.
For strategic deployability, a Bradley is certainly lighter, but that doesn't matter as much for shipboard movement.
What will be more of a problem for the GCV is navigating local infrastructure in foreign countries (e.g. roads, bridges, towns). However the M1 has the same problem now.
IMHO, if we are going to build a HIFV, it should share at least automotive components with our MBT. (i.e. tracks, engine, transmission, suspension) That would mean a smaller spares and support pipeline for HBCTs.
no its worse than that. what you're doing is trying to make the iron triangle fit the threat but bombs will always be cheaper than armor. the enemy will always be able to defeat armor. tactics and mobility are the things that will spin it back in our direction. the FCS was at the wrong time but the right idea. funny thing is that the Army finally has some of the pieces in place to make it work but now they're reverting Hitlers Germany way of the armored vehicle.
Deleteit just won't work.
Hmm. I disagree. Yes, you can always make a bigger or better bomb, but it's not always practical to use it, and not every adversary will have it.
DeleteTactical mobility on the battlefield is enabled by the ability to move under fire without suffering crippling casualties.
The idea of "perfect SA" in place of protection has been debunked. Active protection is in its infancy. Passive protection is the only proven solution at the moment.
I recall the Japanese Tank Killer teams of World war two who did not have the tank guns, anti-tank guns in enough quantities to defeat US tanks.
ReplyDeleteSo they found likely avenues of approach and dug foxholes in the path the Tanks had to travel due to terrain and sat a Brave Japanese soldier in the hole along with a large artillery shell and a hammer.
Even if the adversary has no delivery systems or adequate weapons a way to destroy any tank is one brave man and the desire to kill.
The main thing is that US Army seems to fully understand it's requirements. After years of actual fighting they've had a come to Jesus moment in terms of number of dismounts (9 not 6) and protection. Now it's certainly possible they've gone over board in terms of protection resulting in the high weight but at least they can seem to know what levels of protection they want. Maybe it's not realistic and needs to be toned down and weigh less but that remains to be seen.
ReplyDeleteSol I disagree with you on FCS. It was a fictional construct on multiple levels that even internally was nonsensical and was really a political response on the part of the US Army to remain relevant in terms of deploy ability. Then entire notion of getting present protection levels with say 2/3rds current weight seems to completely ignore what happens when other nations using that same advanced armor simply utilize it on full weight vehicles. Near perfect situational awareness was also part of FCS and is just fantasy land or a technological wet dream.
Bombs being cheaper is not the relevant equation. Look at Iron Dome shooting down very cheap rockets with $40K missiles. It's a bargain for Israel. The US military doesn't lose because a cheap mine destroys an expensive vehicle but rather when casualties reach a level the American people no longer support politically. The protection levels on GCV are thus partly a reflection of the political reality of our society demanding low casualties.