Beautiful photos of a magnificent and terribly misunderstood aircraft. In the book _Decisions_ I believe it was, it is highlighted how badly the USN treated the F-111B program as a whole and how hard GD strived to make things work in the face of deliberate indifference from NavAir. Indeed Naval Air Systems Command has had a Very Bad reputation for generations of aircraft when it comes to 'sliding the specs' to keep the prime contractor always on the edge of failure. Usually they start with too vague and even non-responsive requirements listings, then they keep upwards spiralling the requirement until it's unmeetable. They did this with GD on the A-12 as well as the F-111B and finally got their asses sued and the SPO sent to prison for signing off on a contract which their own research showed could not be met, for weight. OTOH, if they -like- the design, as with the F-14 and later F/A-18E, they will slide the bar to the left and let jets that have outright failed one of the KPPs of OPEVAL squeak through anyway. In the case of the F-111B, the inheritance of the USAF interdictor design point suffered typtical NIH syndrome discrimination and so GD was treated like dirt from day one. Indeed, the mission requirement was _never intended_ to be a dogfighter and so it's Ps values were oriented towards interception, not ACM. Here the 111B was noteably better than the F-14 which _failed_ in both it's loiter with missiles (2hrs + 6 Phoenix @ 150nm, which the F-111B met) and it's bringback capabilities (the Turkey is lucky to bring back 2 AIM-54, the 111B could make 4 all the time and 6 with adequate WOD). Finally, while the famous Congressional Hearing where RADM Tom Connelly is infamous for stating that there wasn't enough thrust in Christendom to make the F-111B perform around the boat was in fact utterly facetious. The truth is that the program was cancelled before carrier suitability testing even commenced. The preproduction aircraft which was used was completely reworked and it's high lift improved to the point where it actually -passed- and was considered very easy to board with. Something that cannot be attributed to GD institutional bias because, by that time, Grumman (then working on the F-14 followon) testpilots were doing all the flight tests. In this it should be noted that the 'Turkey' is called this because it has about the same ability to catch the three wire as a tossed coin in a hypersonic wind tunnel has of coming up heads as opposed to knife edged in the tunnel wall. Not until the last five years of it's life, when the F-14's rep as a pilot killer was well known throughout the USN, did the DFCS (essentially fly by wire) come onboard the program. The F-111B failed, not because it wasn't what the USN needed. Because the USN had needed a missileer ever since the Tu-95/AS-3 Kangaroo combination became standardized (i.e. The F6D era of the late 50s). For this mission, the F-111B was a better jet in terms of both fueled loiter and Mach sprint intercept acceleration curves because it was NOT designed as a fighter as the F-14 only marginally succeeded in being. The F-111B failed because it was subject to the corrosively corruptive influences of institutional partisan bias and Navy penile envy. Specifically, by the time the F-111B was finally panning out, the TFX program itself was essentially dead, victim of manufacturing flaws in the wing and tails. While the USAF FX-15 was on the drawing boards. Which the USN could not stand being a generation behind on as a 'real fighter'. The problem is that, overwater, netcentrically supported by E-2s while doing the 'Fleet Defender' OAB mission, the F-111B would have torn the guts out of the F-15. So much Energy Maneuverability.
Worst Energy-Maneuverability ever.
ReplyDeleteRemember this intended to serve as a joint fighter. The Navy bailed on it and the Air Force relegated it to a strike platform
I hope that the F-35 doesnt end like this...
ReplyDeleteBeautiful photos of a magnificent and terribly misunderstood aircraft.
ReplyDeleteIn the book _Decisions_ I believe it was, it is highlighted how badly the USN treated the F-111B program as a whole and how hard GD strived to make things work in the face of deliberate indifference from NavAir.
Indeed Naval Air Systems Command has had a Very Bad reputation for generations of aircraft when it comes to 'sliding the specs' to keep the prime contractor always on the edge of failure.
Usually they start with too vague and even non-responsive requirements listings, then they keep upwards spiralling the requirement until it's unmeetable. They did this with GD on the A-12 as well as the F-111B and finally got their asses sued and the SPO sent to prison for signing off on a contract which their own research showed could not be met, for weight.
OTOH, if they -like- the design, as with the F-14 and later F/A-18E, they will slide the bar to the left and let jets that have outright failed one of the KPPs of OPEVAL squeak through anyway.
In the case of the F-111B, the inheritance of the USAF interdictor design point suffered typtical NIH syndrome discrimination and so GD was treated like dirt from day one. Indeed, the mission requirement was _never intended_ to be a dogfighter and so it's Ps values were oriented towards interception, not ACM.
Here the 111B was noteably better than the F-14 which _failed_ in both it's loiter with missiles (2hrs + 6 Phoenix @ 150nm, which the F-111B met) and it's bringback capabilities (the Turkey is lucky to bring back 2 AIM-54, the 111B could make 4 all the time and 6 with adequate WOD).
Finally, while the famous Congressional Hearing where RADM Tom Connelly is infamous for stating that there wasn't enough thrust in Christendom to make the F-111B perform around the boat was in fact utterly facetious. The truth is that the program was cancelled before carrier suitability testing even commenced. The preproduction aircraft which was used was completely reworked and it's high lift improved to the point where it actually -passed- and was considered very easy to board with.
Something that cannot be attributed to GD institutional bias because, by that time, Grumman (then working on the F-14 followon) testpilots were doing all the flight tests.
In this it should be noted that the 'Turkey' is called this because it has about the same ability to catch the three wire as a tossed coin in a hypersonic wind tunnel has of coming up heads as opposed to knife edged in the tunnel wall.
Not until the last five years of it's life, when the F-14's rep as a pilot killer was well known throughout the USN, did the DFCS (essentially fly by wire) come onboard the program.
The F-111B failed, not because it wasn't what the USN needed. Because the USN had needed a missileer ever since the Tu-95/AS-3 Kangaroo combination became standardized (i.e. The F6D era of the late 50s).
For this mission, the F-111B was a better jet in terms of both fueled loiter and Mach sprint intercept acceleration curves because it was NOT designed as a fighter as the F-14 only marginally succeeded in being.
The F-111B failed because it was subject to the corrosively corruptive influences of institutional partisan bias and Navy penile envy. Specifically, by the time the F-111B was finally panning out, the TFX program itself was essentially dead, victim of manufacturing flaws in the wing and tails. While the USAF FX-15 was on the drawing boards. Which the USN could not stand being a generation behind on as a 'real fighter'.
The problem is that, overwater, netcentrically supported by E-2s while doing the 'Fleet Defender' OAB mission, the F-111B would have torn the guts out of the F-15. So much Energy Maneuverability.