via Military.com
Airborne units may one day have tank-like firepower they can jump with on future forced-entry operations.U.S. Army requirements officials at Fort Benning, Ga., are in discussions with the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, N.C., to develop "mobile protected firepower for light airborne infantry," Col. Rocky Kmiecik, director of the Mounted Requirements Division at the Army's Maneuver Center of Excellence, said Thursday at AUSA's winter meeting.Army leaders at Training and Doctrine Command are working on a Joint-entry Operations Concept that involves using the airborne community's forced-entry capabilities to thwart future enemy forces from using area-denial tactics against U.S. military forces, said TRADOC Commander Gen. Robert Cone Wednesday.Pretty awesome but its only a toe in the water.
Time for the Airborne Force to jump all in. They need to mech up. There is no reason for them not to experiment using Mike Sparks idea of air dropping M-113's and riding, not walking off the drop zone.
Whatever they finally do in the future, Mike Sparks is somewhere laughing his ass off. Slowly, after much criticism his ideas are winning the day.
I think the MEU could benefit from a few of these light tanks. Stick them in the infantry support role. Plus they won't hog up all the LCAC space. I remember they would only put one M1 on a LCAC at a time.
ReplyDeleteKeep the M1 for kicking in teeth but get a few light tanks to protect the MPC and the seriously under gunned ASV's.
this is just more proof that the work arounds that the theorist came up with just don't show the promise that many hoped for. airburst 30mm rounds are still small against fortifications, precision mortars, precision artillery, hellfires...all that can't do the job that large caliber direct fire can.
ReplyDeleteonce again reality beats theory.
Obviously armor is important to ground forces all one has to do is look at the Battles of Hue, Fallujah, Mosul, Najaf, etc. What I question are 12 battalions of airborne forces. WWII style airborne operations seem to be unlikely (never say never - right?), but one does have a good argument about it being the only way to put a large number of forces on the ground in a prohibitive environment. The MV-22 may have solved this problem. Getting back to the topic - light armor. The Styker MGS might solve the problem as well as an airborne Stryker force. I realize the tracks vs. wheels debate rears it's ugly head, but I will not get into that.
ReplyDeleteI also think the U.S. Army needs to look at moving away from BCTs and moving toward battlegroups. The above topic would be much easier to accomplish with battlegroups - IMO.
with the distances involved in the pacific, with the restrained terrain that will be found their ranging from jungle to urban and with the need to have a force that is quicker than ships, i personally see a rebirth of airborne infantry. the MGS as a concept is fine but its gun is notorious for being unreliable. additionally a wheeled platform always takes up more room than a tracked one and it would be easier to adapt either the CV90120 to the role of airborne tank or adopt some other tracked vehicle that is also C-130 compatible.
Deletethe Army made a serious mistake in moving away from the division system. that's how they're best utilized. i'm not familiar with battle groups so that might be better too.
Division/Corps structures are outdated and have redundant HQ, CS and CSS units that should be eliminated.
DeleteUnfortunately what the Army replaced these with was a half-assed anemic 'unit of action'/BCT structure. Even the Army has now realized that the BCTs were too small to be effective and they are adding a maneuver battalion and engineer elements to each BCT which should push them up to circa 5000 personnel i.e. closer to what Douglas MacGregor proposed with his combat groups concept.
everyone says that but what is considered redundant at the Division level is actually essential when you field a large number of troops.
Deletewhat has happened recently (post Gulf War 1) is that before Gulf War 2 hit the Army was trying to become more expeditionary. to meet that goal they developed the Stryker and made up the Brigade Combat Team concept. the problem with it is that it isn't built for sustained combat. adding another battalion and engineer elements isn't going to help unless you actually have the logistics capability to back it up.
that's part of the secret sauce of the MEU. if you look at the logistics element its really over built for the number of Marines to be sustained...but it gives the capability of 15 days of sustained combat without support. in order for the Army to actually duplicate it, it seems like the Combat Group might work if you add more logistics units...but i don't see that happening. which is why it won't work.
I didn't say something above the Combat Group level isn't needed, it's just that the army, corps and division structures are hopelessly outdated and need to be replaced. The US Army is never going to be deployed as a single-service at the division again. Therefore, the army/corps/division sized units need to be replaced with Joint corps-equivalent sized units that can support 6-10 combat groups. It would free up tens of thousands of soldiers stuck in the army/corps/division echelons and free up billions of dollars.
DeleteAnd the Stryker experiment has failed. Since they can't be deployed via C-130s, either put a real turret on it and turn it into a proper wheeled IFV or bring back some Bradleys for these units. Either way they should assign Abrams tanks to the Stryker brigades in place of the failed MGS. If they are worried about weight of Abrams, buy some of the Japanese Type-10 tanks (48-ton combat load) and be done with it.
I partially disagree on the SBCTs. While the much publicized C-130 and 96 hour requirements have gone away, I still think the vehicle and unit fill a niche. They can perform road marches faster and with less log implications than heavy units (which require loading on HETs for admin movements, or incur significant wear and tear and support if done on their own tracks). Adding a turret to the Stryker will mean it can't carry a full squad anymore.
DeleteI could see enhancing the RSTA squadron to perform traditional Cav missions with a turreted recon Stryker variant.
I can also see eliminating the MGS in favor of a true tank battalion. This would reduce strategic mobility, but greatly increase the SBCT's punch and survivability.
MGS technical issues persist. It never entered full rate production. Only 142 vehicles are produced and three of those lost in battle.
ReplyDeleteStryker MOTE calls for 27 MGS divided among three platoons. The army now has 9 Stryker based brigades but only 139 MGS. Numbers just don't add up. I suspect only 3 or maybe 4 brigades actually are equipped with this variant.
ReplyDeletei knew they had problems with the vehicle but not that bad. i wonder why they just don't use a different turret on the thing. make it manned instead of remote and get it to work.
DeleteMGS was designed around the requirement of fitting it into a C-130. Otherwise, they would go with a conventional turret.
ReplyDeleteThe same height constraint forced the Army to abandon more powerful armament for the infantry carrying Stryker. The Canadian and aussie Stryker equivalents have 25mm bushmaster. Unlike her peers, US military always sacrifice firepower for mobility when comes to ground combat vehicle design.
ReplyDeleteIMO, I don't necessary think a light armor (i.e. MGS/AGS class platform) is the ideal solution for early entry forces. But the ability of capable engaging/defeating enemy mechanized forces is absolute critical. Personally I favor firepower and mobility over protection. Light tactical vehicle mounted ATGMS is a better solution. Remember Lockheed Martin’s LOSAT concept? Another good candidate is ground based HELLFIRE/JAGM. If these options are cost prohibitive, then at least come up with a true fire and forget TOW round.
ReplyDeleteI'd rather have EFOG-M than LOSAT or Hellfire. Or Spike-ER/NLOS.
DeleteThen you can plink away without exposing yourself to direct fire.
yeah but we've seen the limitations of missiles when used in the direct fire role. they're lacking when compared to a cannon. additionally you're wasting money using missiles against IFV's...the missing piece in the puzzle for early entry forces is the direct fire gun.
DeleteRaytheon and ATK just developed a new propellant for the TOW that doubles range and reduces flight time by 33%. A Fire-and-Forget seeker was nixed in 2001 and is the only thing it is missing to keep TOW relevant for another 20 years.
Deletehttp://defense-update.com/20121008_rf_tow_contract.html
TOW III?
Raytheon should mate an upgraded Javelin guidance section with the new TOW propulsion and the 2A warhead. Add a fiber optic cable and a lofted trajectory and it would be competitive with Spike ER. If they could design an upgrade path for existing launchers, they would sell a bunch.
Deletethat would be funny since Spike ER was already offered as FOTT candidate and rejected. It would be odd if Raytheon tried to re-invent the wheel with a Spike clone and based on Raytheons inability to get a decent NETFIRES NLOS missile working, I'd rather trust a true Spike NLOS than a crappy Raytheon clone.
DeleteBut a Fire-and-Forget TOW seeker would still be very popular with the dozens of TOW users. Huge, untapped market.
Netfires and Spike ER are two different beasts entirely. Netfires was far more complex.
DeleteThe former had two missiles, PAM and LAM, with ranges of 40km and 200km, respectively. It used wireless, netted data links with targeting handoff and automatic target recognition (ATR).
Spike ER is an man-in-the-loop, 8km weapon with no ATR and fiber optic guidance.
A Raytheon-built "TOW ER" would appeal to the Made in the USA crowd, and would be FAR less expensive to field if it used modified, existing launchers. Those launchers could also fire existing stocks of missiles.
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ReplyDeleteHow many M113s (or other vehicle) would we have to airdrop for full mobility, and what does that do to the number of sorties needed? Factor in sustaining such a force on the ground.
ReplyDeleteFull mobility via HMMWV may be better. Air drop them with the A kit but retain the option to add the B kit in theater.
They had an M551 replacement 20 years ago in the M8 which was cancelled to fund other programs.
ReplyDeleteM8 was cancelled not to pay for other programs, but to protect one division being cut from active force. Back in 1996, army leadership was given a choice: keep one battalion of M8 for the 82nd AB, or maintain 10 division force structure. As expected, army choose to save personnel over hardware.
ReplyDeleteAs a matter of fact at the time of M8 termination, army already purchased 3 production representative vehicles. They were deployed to Afghan shortly after Operation Enduring Freedom. Their fate are unknown....
ReplyDeleteThe Army has been developing, and failing to field, light tanks for the 82nd more or less continuously since they realized the M551 was a mess. There's a long row of prototypes and nothing entered service when the Army had money, so good luck getting anything during sequestration.
ReplyDeleteThe fundamental problem is that whatever they want to parachute is too big for helicopter lift but too small for ground maneuver units so it is a very limited procurement item that cannot spread either development, procurement or maintenance/upgrade costs over a large enough number of units to be viable. The only solution is to develop a light vehicle family that can be lifted by CH-47F/CH-53E and procure them across the 82nd, 101st, and USMC but that will never happen due to Army/USMC politics.
it could probably happen if the vehicle was properly scalable. it would have to come in at about 30 tons with the option of adding armor to up it to 40 tons...it would need at least a 105mm cannon...or a smaller hyper velocity mount. the Marine Corps needs to decide if its going to follow the Army to the M1A3 or continue with the M1A1 or buy what you're proposing.
Deletewith the 82nd looking, the Marine Corps probably interested the only one left is to convince the 101st. but another player that i think could get hooked into the concept is the Rangers. imagine what they could do if you could make something light enough to jump and then get lifted by CH-47? even if its not a regular part of their formations, to have it on hand to support should peak their interests.
A vehicle slingable from a CH-47F will have to be at most 10-12 tonnes. So more like the British CVR(T) or SUSV.
DeleteI looked into this awhile back: the sweet spot looks like a vehicle of about 11 tonnes (basic armor package) that can up-armor to about 13-15 tonnes. That allows CH-47F lift but also exploits the ability of the ability of the CH-53E to sling a heavier load at sea level.
DeleteCH-47F can sling load 12 ton vehicle using center hook. A 12 ton combat vehicle is pure fantasy. It can't even lift a single 4x4 M-ATV.
DeleteMaybe we should asking whether we need an 18th Airborne Corps instead of wondering if it needs armor.
ReplyDeleteMass paratroop drops against a Mali-type insurgency might be feasible, but against any adversary with MANPADs and autocannon is going to wind up like the Sosabowski's 1st Polish Airborne Brigade.
The 173rd airdropped into northern Iraq during OIF. The Iraqi army had tanks, BMPs, MANPADS.
DeleteHogwash. One battalion of the 173d dropped into an area already free of enemy troops. No MANPADS, no AA guns, no infantry, no tanks, etc., near the drop zone and with complete air superiority. It might as well have been Fryar DZ at Benning.
DeleteSo? I think it's a perfect example of the value of airborne forces and how best to use them. Don't drop into the teeth of the enemy. And be sure conditions are favorable. The Iraqi army had tanks, AAA, MANPADS, SAMS, and so on, but they couldn't blanket every part of their country with them.
DeleteI never said there was no need for Airborne units, but I do question the need to maintain an entire corps of supposedly airborne units.
DeleteThere was a small drop by the 8nd Airborne in Afghanistan, several drops by Ranger units and there have been a handful of drops in Mali by French paratroopers, so there are applications for Airborne units. But apart from the battalion-sized drop by the 173rd in Iraq, there have been no combat Airborne operations of above battalion size for decades.
For practical reasons, namely robust air-defense weapons, what we have are air-deployable units and not really Airborne units. We will never see WWII-sized air drops again.
So, once again, I pose the question: do we need an entire corps devoted to an form of deployment that is prevented by air defense vulnerability from being used by anything larger than a battalion?
What if there was a better use for the 18th? Maybe we can look at it as a basis for a new Rapid Deployment Force and dispense with the pretense of it as 'Airborne'.
The 18th Airborne Corps only has one true airborne division, the 82nd.
DeleteThe 101st Airborne is actually an "air assault" division (i.e. helos, not parachutes).
The 10th Mountain used to be a light infantry division (non airborne). I assume it is now a divisional organization for Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs).
The 3rd Infantry is a heavy division (HBCTs).
IMHO, we don't really need a special division for air assault (the 101st). All IBCTs or infantry division should be capable of this with the appropriate augmentation. IMHO, the 101st should switch to one of the other "standard" types.
And yet for some unclear reasons army still distinguish a regular infantry brigade (IBCT) from an airborne infantry brigade (AB IBCT). Are there any subtle differences at and/or below company level?
DeleteAccording to some unconfirmed reports on Army of 2020 design, regular IBCT will have two 105 batteries with a third battery trading 105s with triple 777 155s. AB IBCT’s artillery battalion retains the current 3x105 formation for faster deployability.
Technically speaking, there are no such things as armored divisions or heavy infantry divisions anymore. 4th BCT 3rd Infantry is an IBCT. Two brigades under 1st Armor are non-HBCT configurations (1st BCT is a srtyker formation, 3rd BCT converted to IBCT). Now Can you still consider 1st Armor as a heavy division in the traditional sense? I don't think so.
DeleteI believe there are some differences, but I'm not sure what the are at this point.
DeleteObviously airborne IBCTs are jump qualified. :)
I think there is some confusion and I apologize if I have muddied the waters. This isn't about nomenclature, it's about structure. The Army-Corps-Division echelons have too many redundant levels of command AND the airborne/air assault units are too large to operate against well-equipped enemies.
DeleteThe 101st takes up as much cubic space as a heavier unit, yet there is some perception that they can reenact some Ride of the Valkyries. With a moderately well-equipped enemy with decent MANPADS and autocannon, those types of ops will be too expensive in men and materiel.
Smaller battalion level ops with air drops or air assaults might be useful, but division or brigade level ops are over. If we are fighting on that scale, however, we are likely facing an enemy far better armed than guys driving technicals or a nation we've had starved of arms imports for a decade.
Look at how the 82nd, 101st and 10th Mountain are equipped when they deploy these days: MRAPs, MATVs, etc. They are too lightly equipped to operate in a very lethal threat environment.
Why continue with the pretense that these are airborne/air assault light infantry. Stick the 10th in SOCOM, pare the airborne/air assault division down to a brigade of each and re-equip the remainder as a basis of a new Rapid Deployment Force with CV90-120s or whatever.
I can see a battalion of air assault or airborne infantry used in a Mali situation or to re-take some of the Senkaku islands, but having a division of either of them when they will NEVER deploy as a division is a waste of resources.
I somewhat disagree and somewhat agree. I think the always-ready, airborne Division Ready Brigade concept still has merit. To have one, you need three airborne brigades to allow for DRB rotations. Might as well keep them together in a division-like organization. I think we need airborne brigades. There is no other way to build up ground combat power as fast, even with a major airfield. It takes time to land and unload aircraft, especially at small airfields.
DeleteEven if you only drop a battalion, it will be to secure an airfield for follow-on forces. And the first forces to land should be the remainder of the brigade.
Not sure I agree about too many levels of command. I think you will inevitably find span of control issues if you try to remove too many echelons. At least I think you will need a "Divisional" sized command element, even if, say, you move supporting assets to the Corps. IIRC, the whole unit of action (UA) and unit of employment (UE) concept ended up with two levels of UE (UEx and UEy) for this reason. (Though I admit i'm still fuzzy on these concepts)
Is there really anything at the Army level these days? Or is it analogous to the joint theater command?
I largely agree with you about the 101st, though. Too big and too heavy. Turn them into pure airborne, IBCTs or a Stryker/IBCT mix. Move the aviation assets to a separate aviation brigade.
I think there is value in having unit types "lighter" than SBCTs. It's a mistake to assume we will always need MRAPs and M-ATVs in every conflict. However I do think IBCTs need to have 100% vehicular mobility. This whole "light fighter" machismo does nobody any good. Yes, they may be in good shape, but without their wheels, they have less tactical mobility than a Roman legion. If they need to hump it somewhere, just leave the vehicles behind.
IMHO, their standard TOE should have enough troop carrying HMMWVs and/or FMTVs to move the entire BCT. I'd vote for HMMWVs, because they have more tactical utility. You can fit an entire platoon in four troop carrier HMMWVs. Yes, they don't have all around protection from IEDs, mines, RPGs, HMGs, etc., but you can actually put 8-10 HMMWVs in a C-17 (unlike, what, two Strykers?). And HMMWVs can be moved by UH-60s.
We can formalize the optional hillbilly armor developed for the M1152s and give them a gun ring and racks for gear like the SOCOM GMVs. That way, we can tailor their protection-level in theater.
We can have a pool of MRAP/M-ATVs available at the Division or Corps level to augment IBCTs if the threat warrants it.
In theory, we could use JLTVs for this purpose, but from what I've read, they are too heavy and way too expensive to be issued in the numbers needed.
UA, Ux, Uy. When we live in an era of satellite phones and digital maps, instead of freeing units from command & CONTROL echelons, we add more. How the is adding more layers of command going to help our guys operate inside the OODA loop of the enemy if we are hopelessly mired within our own?
DeleteThe US Army is still stuck in WWII-mode. We don't need Army, Corps or Division level command echelons. There has been no wars since WWII where we have deployed anything more than a brigade without at least one other service's coordination. So, let's dispense with the pretense of their being any need for a pure, Army-only command echelon at division or corps level.
So, if the Army-Corps-Division is redundant, replace it with a Joint Force command at the Corps-echelon with the appropriate CS/CSS for strike and logistical support to sustain 6 to 10 beefed-up BCTs.
I could go on and on, but you should really just read MacGregor's Transformation under Fire and update the hardware in it. He does a better job than I could. It will open your eyes to how pathetic the UA/UX/UY crap is.
While your at it, check out Donald Vandergriff's ideas on re-working the personnel system.
oh you lost cool points for being a MacGregor disciple. that guys a loon. oh and let me ask a simple question. whenever their is a ground war when isn't the US Army the main force? yet MacGregor wants the US Army to instead mimic the USMC when its role is clearly different? the Army MUST maintaine its division structure, its Corps and Army structures simply because they will and usually are the lead force when it comes to war. in any situation where extended action isn't needed then yeah, Marine formations seem ideal but that isn't what the Army is for.
DeleteThe commmand and control echelons have a purpose. They define and limit the span of control so an echelon commander can remain focused.
DeleteLook at the order of battle for Operation Iraqi Freedom. There were around 19 allied combat brigades (or brigade-sized elements), seven-ish support brigades and two SOF groups under the JLFCC. Maybe 75+ combat battalions. There is no way one HQ (JF or corps) can effectively control that many elements without breaking them down into sub-commands.
The problem has less to do with our advanced C4I equipment than with limitations in the gray matter between the ears of the commanders.
Just MHO.
Shit, I'm down in cool points and I wasn't even aware I had any.
DeleteI said a corps-equivalent Joint Force command to support 6-10 large BCTs. More BCTs, then more Joint Force commands with an appropriate number CS/CSS units. Joint Force command would be overseen by Theater commands like CENTCOM.
I wouldn't say I'm a disciple of MacGregor, just an acolyte that thinks his ideas make more sense than the UA,Ux,xyz garbage. And MacGregor isn't trying to say the Army should do what the Marines do, he's been saying that the Army needs to be able to move its heavier units faster and in units that fit somewhere in between a brigade and a division. He calls them combat groups. The Army called units like that Combat Commands in WWII and the Krauts had another name for it: kampfgruppen. So MacGregor isn't proposing anything new, just something a little more formalized and realistic.
Before you insist on retaining Army/Corps/Division command echelons (which date back to before Napolean), who would we ever go to war with that would require us to mobilize to WWII-levels with Armies, Corps and Divisions? All the big boys on the block have nukes, so it isn't going to get that big before it goes supernova.
Who are we more likely to go to war with based on our past 25 years? Regional powers like Iraq, Iran or North Korea or 'peer' enemies?
Who will acquire nukes in the next 25 years? Thus the size of potential adversaries against whom we will fight a conventional war will be smaller due to the 'proliferation of WMDs'.
Sol, please tell me you have at least read MacGregor's books.
I bought Transformation under Fire last night. I have read some of his presentations, however.
DeleteI'm not adverse to the more robust combat group concept, or making all echelons above the combat group JF commands. I think both ideas have merit. I'm really not a fan of the current 2 battalion brigades. This was done to artificially bump up the number of BCTs for deployment rotation purposes. Now that we are out of Iraq and leaving Afghanistan, it makes little sense to keep them.
I still question whether a single JF command can effectively utilize 10 BCT equivalents without sub-commands. And I'm unclear about his proposed garrison organization of these units. Will they still be under the same JF command?
In OIF, we did have a roughly two Corps force (1 MEF and V Corps) commanded by the JF commander.
IIRC, the WWII Combat Commands were HQs that had no dedicated units. They were task-organized and drew units from a pool, not unlike the ROAD Brigade structure. This is very different from the current BCTs and MacGregor's proposed Combat Groups, both of which have dedicated units.
Hence the reason I pointed out MacGregor was proposing something formalized. Sorry I wasn't clearer about the ad hoc nature of Combat commands and kampfgruppen.
DeleteThe good thing about the BCT's is that the Army is adding back the 3rd maneuver battalion along with more engineer units, so it makes for three dedicated combat battalions and one ISR battalion. The early UA concept was already compromised since it eliminated a company from the battalions and then short-changed the brigades by removing a maneuver battalion. The Army rationalized this by beefing up the recon battalion and pretending it could be a brigade reserve in a pinch. I remember reading a lot of complaints about this setup, so it looks like Army has learned from experience that small BCTs aren't practical. The ironic thing is that BCT are moving closer to the MacGregor Combat Group sizes 15 years after MacGregor proposed it.
The only thing I think MacGregor is adamant about is the general size of the units, ca. 5500 soldiers, to ensure adequate firepower, recon, and logistics. I've seen a few of his speeches and he basically just says tweak the design, experiment with it, see if it works. He made his bones in an Armored Combat Regiment, so I think he saw that as the basis of his combat group concept, but that is speculation on my part.
And Sol, the reason MacGregor Combat group concept is more deployable is because it ditches a lot of artillery since the munitions are smarter (thus no need to reenact the 2nd Battle of the Marne) so you don't have to sacrifice protection and firepower of tanks and IFV's. Thus the Marines do their thing and the Army does its thing with the heavier stuff.
Is the Army adding back the third battalion to all BCTs? SBCTs had the third battalion by default but, AFAIK, the IBCTs and HBCTs still only have two.
DeleteHave they beefed up the ISTR squadron in each BCT? Last thing I saw, it was still too light to perform traditional Cav missions.
I think the current BCT structure is still short of MacGregor's combat groups in terms of independence. IIRC, they are still expected to operate in a divisional context.
The way this article is written, Army is adding back to all BCTs a 3rd Battalion and adding engineer elements, plus they are shrinking HQ Staff as well.
Deletehttp://defense.aol.com/2012/02/24/army-eyes-deeper-brigade-combat-team-cuts-odierno-says/
I haven't seen anything about ISTR battalion changes.
Sounds like they are considering adding them back, but no decision has been made.
Delete18th XVIII is not an airborne force anymore. Airborne designation is kept for historical reason.
ReplyDelete