Does the saga of the EFV make you want to pound walls?
Does the idea that the USMC wasted 24 years developing an armored vehicle only to get a big bill out of the whole thing upset you?
Does the thought that the US Navy can get an airplane (P-8) into service in a shorter time frame than it will take the Marine Corps to potentially get the Marine Personnel Carrier into service make you scratch your head in frustration?
Then saddle up to this old article from National Defense Magazine. Just a tidbit, the link is here.
“It’s much easier to detune current capabilities than to start over,” said Michael Bolon, senior vice president of Navy and Marine Corps programs at General Dynamics Land Systems.General Dynamics proposed a detuned EFV.
The company has asked the Marine Corps to give the program another chance and procure just 200 of the tanks, enough for two expeditionary brigades, and use leftover money to upgrade hundreds of current assault amphibious vehicles. Under this proposal, the EFV could enter production within two years and the government could avoid $184 million in cancellation costs, Bolon told reporters on Jan. 25.
The Defense Department already has spent more than $3 billion on the program, which recently saw the testing of four prototypes off the coast of California. The success of these experiments has General Dynamics saying it could shave millions from the unit cost of the EFV if the government were to keep the program.
Without changes, one EFV would cost the Marine Corps $17 million. Bolon said that General Dynamics has provided the Pentagon with modifications that could bring that per-unit cost down to less than $10 million. These savings would result from reducing speed and weapon capabilities and equipping the EFV with a simplified hydraulic system, Bolon said.
The Marine Corps had a chance to still win but for some reason (whether from the Pentagon or from inside the Marine Corps itself) chose not to pursue the option.
Excuse me. I need a drink.
NOTE: The Marine Corps did everything right in the approach to the EFV. They developed doctrine first, then a concept of operations, then drew up requirements, put it out to industry and then selected General Dynamics to build the thing. The problem came in the implementation. We lacked a sense of urgency and did not monitor GD closely enough. They (I'm making this assertion I have no proof) kept coming back with the "we're close" and because the capability was so desired the program muddled along. The problem is the way that the Marine Corps does armored vehicle development. It trudges along with a new vehicle coming along once every 50 or so years. Consider the timeline of the LVT. First developed prior to WW2 the first designs were modified and kept in service until the 1950's. The next gen LVT-5's served from around the end of Korea over to the end of Vietnam. The LVTP-7/AAV will serve until around 2020 or so. I know you get tired but the comparison for the US Army is the M-44, M-75, M-113, M-114, Bradley, improved Bradley, Stryker, improved Stryker and soon the AMPV and the GCV. The Army has a much more robust armored development system. If we won't keep pace by developing new vehicles then purchases of new built designs of existing vehicles with modern upgrades should become standard operating procedure.
