I think we missed out on a great opportunity with the cancellation of the MPC.
Not only were we going to be able to select a wheeled amphibious personnel carrier that was either proven in combat or in testing but additionally, we missed the chance to standardize with the Army and become fully digitized.
Yeah.
We could finally do something joint that has teeth. We could leverage off Army architecture in the Stryker and fully integrate ourselves into mechanized combat.
Additionally, we missed out on savings for maintenance and could have finally gotten our infantry into proper armored protection.
Instead we're faced with continued vacillation and doubt about whether or not the Amphibious Combat Vehicle will be a high water speed variant or a product improved version of what we have now.
Bad times don't last and neither do design teams. The people from BAE and Lockheed Martin will soon go on to other projects. All the work done on these vehicles will be lost and even if we're able to afford them 10 years from now the institutional knowledge will be lost in those shops.
Are we so wedded to tracks that we couldn't see another way?
Are we so wedded to over the horizon assault that we can't see the gold sitting right in front of our faces?
It would appear we are. That's a shame. The EFV/ACV is now historic in its failure and in its length of development without product.
Chesty would be ashamed.
I am always questioning US military acquisition approach. Why can’t we eat our pride and just buy OTS solution. No more R&D nightmare or program management fiasco, all you need to do is a write up of realistic requirement list and matches it with an existing product at best possible as you can. This approach is especially effective for “low end” weaponry: guns, ground vehicles, etc. Other countries can afford buying new armored vehicles because they skip the development phase and don’t have to take technical/financial risks associated with new development.
ReplyDeleteProbably the same reason the UK military is half the size it should be for the spend. The equipment has to built in the UK/US and or have some major UK/US workshare. It is then no longer off the shelf it is customised at which point if it involves a larger defence contractor (as is likely as they've bought most of the smaller guys out)they start rubbing their hands in glee for the next decade long gravy train.
ReplyDeleteFor many things this is enshrined in law e.g UK warship production which basically means BAE gets to name their price. Im guessing its the same in the states.
Well I am not talking about industrial offset policy. We can select a foreign OTS solution and do final assembly here in the states with local sub-contractors/suppliers. I am questioning the wisdom of developing something new from scratch, and the high risks associated with it. The army wasted 5 billion dollars on FCS before its cancellation, another 1 billion spent on the Crusader artillery system. With that amount of resources we can have PzH2000 and Puma IFV in service by now. Marine’s situation is unique due to her specialty nature. There aren’t lot options on the market for a high performance amphibious vehicle. I understand the rationale behind EFV, but they screwed up the execution part. Then that no good SOB Robert Gates killed it off without any consideration, that’s the worst outcome I can think of. The final EFV prototype resolved many critical issues regarding performance and reliability, it might be working after all.
ReplyDeleteThe Pzh 2000 is way too heavy and the puma only carries 6 troops.
DeleteThe efv was a leaky flat bottomed pos.
Pzh2000 is too heavy compared to what exactly? Almost every 155/L52 system weighs roughly the same. The absolute lightest systems are the K9, the Turkish version is heavier than the Pzh2000, and the wheeled G6-52. The difference between a 155/39 and 155/52 are very significant (40km vs 60km with an M982). The V-LAP round has been fired out to 67km from a 155/52.
DeleteThe US Army sits back and watches almost everyone moving to the L52 and would have been well served by any such system, especially the Pzh2000. Just because Iraq in 1991 had almost no ability to aim their artillery doesn't mean being out ranged by their 155/45 G5's was a welcome state of affairs. Artillery range matters. We had serious issues dealing with the 130mm in Vietnam
My opinion was this was just a bridge to far for most USMC leadership. I never heard any highers up that were excited about it. The thoughts of splitting the squads, having roughly twice the numbers of vehicles, wheels not tracks, not fully surf capable and self righting like a AAV. Just too different from the AAV and would have required too much rethinking of doctrine and tactics. So it just sputtered out.
ReplyDeleteShame, i thought it had a lot of potential to be the vehicle that we needed even if it is not the vehicle that we wanted.
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ReplyDeletecasters and wheels & castor wheels