The MLP. Mobile Landing Platform.
We have it, so what are we gonna do with it?
We've seen major exercise after major exercise occur and they've all been conducted without the MLP making an appearance. This can be looked at as a minor issue since the first has only recently come into service but two things make this a concern. via Wikipedia.
In March 2012 the USN requested a fourth ship in the FY14 budget of the National Defense Sealift Fund, and proposed that both MLP-3 and MLP-4 would be MLP-AFSB variants.[8] Congress rejected both requests on the grounds that the Ponce could do the job and AFSB's should in any case be funded out of the main Navy account.[14] As of March 2013 the Chief of Naval Operations is still planning to buy two MLP and two MLP-AFSB despite the uncertainty caused by the sequester,[5] in fact the late-2012 "Vision for the 2025 Surface Fleet" by the head of Naval Surface Forces envisages buying more MLP variants as a cheap alternative to traditional amphibious ships.[6]I've complained that the Marine Corps has a ship that is based on a concept that is no longer applicable.
I think a look at recent history is proving that to be correct. The second issue (and perhaps the more troubling one) is that the Chief of Naval Operations has floated the idea that these ships can serve as a cheap alternative to traditional amphibious shipping.
Combat vs. Mercantile ship building standards. It should cause concern. The idea that US Marines would be asked to ride into combat aboard ships that are built to Mercantile standards should be an automatic non-starter. The idea that an additional MLP is being produced when doctrine hasn't been aligned with projected (under todays dollars) funding should also raise eye brows.
I don't have the training schedule, but the next major amphibious exercise should include the MLP whether Maritime Prepositioned Ships participate or not. Experience can be gained by simulating the unloading of MPS ships by using amphibs as surrogates.
In a war game at the Army War College last year, the MLP played a significant role. In the end, the first problem that came into focus was a need for more than four of these platforms. The second problem that became apparent was a lack of hulls to properly support the sea basing concept, and forces deployed. The reality of the nightmarish budgetary environment was driven firmly home.
ReplyDeletei heard about it but never got my hands on the afteraction of the wargame. from what i know of it, it turned into an uber wish list of LCACs, JHSVs and more cargo helos.
Deletewhat i'd really love to know is how these played such an important part. the choke point is never the unloading of the MPS ships, its always the number of LCACs and JHSVs that can be used to move cargo from ship to shore.
even using the platform that MPS ships bring with them doesn't seem to be the hold up so i'd really want to see what they came up with.
reality is staring everyone in the face. the Marine Corps is downsizing as is the Army. if amphibious ship number remain the same or go to the once magical number of 38 then you'd have spare hulls to slam army equipment aboard. so that makes the issue of what to do with the MLP even more glaring. personally i see SOCOM getting 4 AFSB ships that will be converted to MLPs if the need arises.
Sol, to answer your question: "the choke point is never the unloading of the MPS ships, its always the number of LCACs and JHSVs that can be used to move cargo from ship to shore" I would say:
DeleteMPS ships are THE warehouse for the ARG, and UNTIL the amphibs can go alongside the MPS and get what they need the US Navy will be lacking. I blame the USMC for that myopia. Sure we need more "connectors" to get cargo from amphibs and MPS to the beach BUT how will those vital landing craft GET TO the AOA? What ships are there in the ARG with sufficient landing craft spots much less can connect to the JHSV? Part of the answer is the INLS pontoon system and all its components (which are ONLY carried on MPS). That WORKS well up to Sea State 3, going beyond that point is a bridge too far from a safety standpoint.
What needs to be done IMHO is modify existing and build the next LSD to allow skin to skin cargo transfers.
SOCOM has NO interest in a huge AFSB based on MLP design. Can you point to something that supports your opinion? I know that NSW wants a smaller more lethal ship (there is an RFP in the works now).
Bottom line: MLP should not be basis for new amphibs AND should be truncated at ONLY 2 hulls. It is a POS from a design standpoint. It is a limited Flo/Flo to boot. BTW the MLP is going to another shipyard to get its Core Capabilities Set added to perform its intended primary mission.
Those three platforms were certainly among items on a long wish list . The only thing that really prevented a massive bloodletting was the game running out of time.
ReplyDeleteThe MLP played a pivotal role due to major ports being not so much excluded from use, but too dangerous to depend on. The focus turned to less prepared ports, and minor fishing villages as landing areas. The lack of hulls led to commercial assets being leased to move a combat brigade into theater.
At the end of the war game, all involved realized how ill prepared the military is at this point. It also exposed a need to rethink and refine current concepts a bit more.
arc415, too bad such an encumbered desing was on a wish list, but for those who don't know how semi-submersible ships works it may have looked good?
DeleteThe MLP is perfect by no stretch of the imagination. Where it turns into a platform needed is in a scenario where ports are scarce. It looks good from a sea basing standpoint, as a hedge against choke points. The downside, as with many other defense programs, is MLP becomes the supporting leg of a family of systems needed in order to perform its function.
Deletemore than that. it assumes total incompetence on the part of every other system that can be used as a workaround to whatever the problem is. seizing ports? a Marine Corps mission. suppose to be for the Marine Corps what the airport seizure mission is for the Army Rangers.
DeleteI don't think it assumes total incompetence, so much as it forces a rethink of unquestioned presence of things the military has taken for granted for far too long. We've grown accustomed of moving troops into theater through airports that are safe and sound, and the same can be said for ports. Any halfway competent enemy realizes both types of facilities are choke points, and also susceptible to a number of different attack types.
DeletePort seizure and airfield seizure are viable methods, and ones trained for. What current leadership at all levels overlooked for far too long is just how vulnerable those facilities are once we have them.
Lessons long ago held as absolutes have been forgotten, and we need to relearn them.
Gents you MUST realize that the MLP has to go back to a shipyard to be modified thereby taking it OUT of the game. A fully functional clear deck aft semi-submersible is what was needed. The use of a cut down tanker design went away about 15 years ago in the industry. The MLP can not do what is being dreamed about for it. NAVSEA gave the MLP to NASSCO to help them with ship orders.
DeleteI have played in many wargames. The ones where port seizure is assumed are for lower Phase ops. The MLP will sit offshore (at what standoff distance arc?) and dribble cargo onto too few connectors/landing craft to make a difference.
Remember an MPS ron carries about 100,000 tons of tactical equipment and supplies. Do you honestly think ONE MLP per ARG+MPS ron is going to make a difference?
I don't know if it fits the Commandants current plan for the USMC.
ReplyDeleteto make it fit, I think it needs about 8 tilt-rotor to lift it out of the water so it can move with the rest of the aviation assets.
Long well-deck type amphibs would offer the most opportunity for a 'straight-face' assault of adequate First Wave capabilities, without hope and prayers about 'taking' a Port intact and without asymmetric warriors burning out the first RoRo at the pier.
ReplyDeleteAll this talk is the result of too many years and decades without plausible Connector-characteristics to indeed support a hostile landing in potent quantities at a place and time of our choosing. Call it a symptom of decadence and high risk of focus-drift.
With the LSD-41 type just being modernized for another 20+ years of service integrated into the much younger Fleet surrounding it, building 8-16 new copies at the cost of 2-3 LSD-41 for each LPD-17, the 'old' but proven and able long well-deck LSD-41 type is one cheap and readily doable way to build amphibious capabilities in fiscally austere times - perhaps the only responsible one.
Here are some hard well-deck length realities:
- LSD-49 - 180 feet = 2 LCAC (= 2 MBTs) or 1 LCU (= 2 MBTs) or 2 LCU-F (= 6 MBTs)
- LPD-17 - 188.7 feet = ditto
- LHD - 267 feet = 3 LCAC (3 MBTs)or 1 LCU (= 2 MBTs) + 1 LCAC (= 1 MBT) or 2 LCU-F (= 6 MBTs)
- LSD-41 - 440 feet = 4 LCAC or 3 LCU or 6 LCU-F (= 12 MBTs)
The alternative to going 'cheap-&-long-well-deck' is the shrinking of those amphibious capabilities further under fiscal contraction by pursuing those 2-3x more expensive LPD-based schemes, which all happen to have short well-decks, i.e. much less ship-to-shore capability than any MEU really needs.
Short well-deck ships have been for too long a sad joke on the MEU's need to carry GCE in One First Wave. Why folks celebrate LPD-17 'shorties' is an odd one to figure.
To summarize, LPD-17 shows up with 189 feet while LSD-41 shines with a full 440 feet.
2020, while I like a modified repeat of one of the current LSD classes as the cheapest & easiest replacement program, the latest USNI article and some other news indicates that replacing the LSD may be on the chopping block.
ReplyDeleteBTW instead of lengtening which cause problems in the longitudinals, why not simply widen the next LSD to full PANAMAX restriction. I don't understand why the current designs are so skinny? And IF they could be widened to allow SSC and/or LCU side by side, then redo your equation.