Monday, July 22, 2013

Thompson gets it half right about the Humvee Upgrade.




Thompson has an article out at Forbes that makes the case for continuing the JLTV program as is...meaning with Marine Corps participation.  Read it here and a tidbit follows....
JLTV is the product of hard-won lessons in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq — a light utility vehicle that reconciles the need for survivability with the imperatives of mobility, versatility and maintainability. It affords the same 360-degree ballistic and blast protection as an MRAP in a much lighter vehicle that is more fuel-efficient than the humvee. By exploiting new automotive and networking technology, the JLTV will deliver a next-generation jeep that is far safer and more supportable than anything in the joint inventory today.
But that brings me to the impact of budget sequestration on joint-force survivability. Last month, Marine Corps Commandant James Amos told a group of reporters that while he likes the new vehicle and his service needs it, if sequestration continues as currently planned, then “it’s questionable whether I can afford JLTV.” With big manpower bills to pay and other pressing needs that must be met such as finding a replacement for 40-year-old amphibious landing vehicles, the Commandant says he may have no choice but to modify his humvees and forego JLTV.
What that means in stark terms is that someday Marines will die unnecessarily in some overseas fight because they will be riding in a humvee that can’t take direct hits the way a JLTV could. Amos knows that, but he also knows that without a new jumpjet and amphibious tractor, he could take even more casualties. Or he could end up with too few troops after budget cuts to get the job done. So he is engaging in budgetary triage, which means the Marines might back out of the JLTV effort.
Where he's wrong is when it comes to the survivability of the humvee upgrades.  I've followed Granite/Textrons entry closely and I've taken a glance at what BAE had on offer (I don't know if they still are working on something...its been awhile since I checked on their product line) and what they did do is pass blast tests with relative ease.  So protection is checked.  Cost is the issue and the JLTV program was under severe pressure to push down the price even though it delivers stripped down vehicles with less armor than planned.  So cost for upgrades to the humvee are in the unknown category while the cost of the JLTV is in the acceptable range after erasing every bell and whistle and stripping it of alot of its armor.  But a bigger issue emerges for the Marine Corps.

Why is the new mantra with every joint program that the Marine Corps is involved in insists that if you pull out of it or better yet DELAY IT, you will in essence kill it?

This budgetary lack of freedom will bite the Pentagon in the ass.  Some brilliant, hard charging, take no prisoners Commandant is going to tell the SecDef one day to kiss his ass if he wants the Corps in another joint program.

As it now stands the Marine Corps can only kill Marine Corps priority/specific procurements.  The MPC.  Dead.  The ACV.  Delayed.  The JLTV.  Its joint so we can't let you delay it.  The F-35.  Its joint so its safe too.  Something is wrong with this picture.  The Marine Corps is not in charge of its budget, the other services are.  Instead of participating in a joint Army-Marine JLTV program, in hindsight the better option would have been to simply wait till the Army picked a vehicle and then to contract Marine Corps specific modifications.  

4 comments :

  1. "Some brilliant, hard charging, take no prisoners Commandant is going to tell the SecDef one day to kiss his ass if he wants the Corps in another joint program."

    Why? joint programs get shit, and Marine only programs get killed.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Has Loren ever not like a major defense industrial program?

    ReplyDelete
  3. Ref Loren: he's a LockMart shill and nothing more. If there's a program LockMart can make money off, Loren will be lying about how essential it is in Forbes.

    Ref the F-35: You have to remember how much cost, complexity, delay and pain VTOL has driven into the program. The USMC will never be allowed to back up one inch on eating all the high F-35 costs now because so many of them are directly attributable to the USMC's rabid insistence on VTOL. With many joint programs your points may be valid but the F-35 is case of what goes around comes around.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Every so many years someone will get the idea that "this one program will solve all our problems and make us dominate the battlefield" because they forget a fundamental truth about war.

    There is no silver bullet. You don't need a superweapon, you need the right mix of weapons and capabilities. The F-35 is trying to be that "superweapon" and all things to all services. There are really good reasons we don't all fly the same jets or aircraft. There is no good reason we all wear different uniforms and boots.

    ReplyDelete

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.