via AF.mil.
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, Afghanistan (AFNS) --"Nuff said.
Two A-10 Thunderbolt II pilots assigned to the 74th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, provided close-air support to 60 U.S. Soldiers July 24.
The Soldiers were part of a routine clearance patrol that was ambushed after their lead vehicle in a convoy of 12 turned over during a patrol of an Afghanistan highway. The situation forced the Soldiers to establish an overnight base while they pulled the vehicle out of a ravine. As the sun rose, the unit began to receive heavy fire from a nearby tree line. The members were pinned behind their vehicles and three of the Soldiers suffered injuries. The unit was under fire and the wounded members needed a casualty evacuation so they called for close-air support.
However, there was one problem; the ground unit didn't have a way to confirm the enemy's position. The unit did have a joint fire observer who was able to communicate an estimated location to the A-10 pilots who arrived on scene shortly after receiving the call from a local base's joint terminal air controller responsible for coordinating aerial engagements.
"I flew over to provide a show of force while my wingman was looking for gunfire below," said the flight lead of the two-ship A-10 mission. "Our goal with the show of force was to break the contact and let the enemy know we were there, but they didn't stop. I think that day the enemy knew they were going to die, so they pushed even harder and began moving closer to our ground forces."
When the enemy combatants didn't flee after the show of force, the A-10 pilots decided to deliver air-to-surface munitions to protect the friendly ground forces.
"Even with all our (top-of-the-line) tools today, we still rely on visual references," said the lead pilot, who is on his first deployment from Moody Air Force Base, Ga. "Once we received general location of the enemy's position, I rolled in as lead aircraft and fired two rockets to mark the area with smoke. Then my wingman rolled in to shoot the enemy with his 30 millimeter rounds."
According to the pilots, that really stirred up the attacking force. The enemy moved even closer to the friendlies in an attempt to prevent the A-10 from attacking again. The ground forces were now taking on a large amount of fire from the trees and surrounding high terrain.
"We just kept putting down more 30 mm rounds," said the second A-10 pilot, also deployed from Moody AFB. "The bad guys were closing in and according to the muzzle flashes there were a lot of them, but because people were shooting all over the place, the JTAC didn't feel safe bringing in helicopters in to evacuate the wounded personnel."
The pilots said usually after the first or second pass, the enemy runs away, but this enemy force was large and willing to fight. The pilots continued to fire 30 mm rounds, but the enemy force refused to fall back. Now, the enemy force was close enough to engage the unit with grenades, so the convoy's commander approved the pilots to engage "danger-close." The term is meant to clearly communicate to the ground and air forces that the need for support is so grave the ground commander is willing to accept the potential risk to the friendly unit for the life-saving employment from the air.
"We train for this, but shooting danger-close is uncomfortable, because now the friendlies are at risk," the second A-10 pilot said. "We came in for a low-angle strafe, 75 feet above the enemy's position and used the 30-mm gun -- 50 meters parallel to ground forces -- ensuring our fire was accurate so we didn't hurt the friendlies.
The engagement lasted two hours that day, and in that time, the A-10s completed 15 gun passes, fired nearly all their 2,300, 30-mm rounds, and dropped three 500-pound bombs on the enemy force.
"That last gun runs must have made them give up," the two pilots agreed "because the firing stopped."
Shortly after the engagement was complete, an MC-12 aircraft specializing in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance arrived and began scanning the area for enemy forces that might be regrouping. Sometimes when close-air support leaves, enemy forces will attack again, so the A-10s remained on-station until all the Soldiers were safe.
"We wanted to make sure the area was safe because we had the pararescuemen from the 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron coming to transport the injured to Bagram's hospital," said the second pilot. "The flight doctor assigned to our squadron treated the wounded in the emergency room. It was an example of a successful mission with contributions from all assets of our base."
After the pilots landed and debriefed, they went to the hospital to see the wounded Soldier.
"He was laying there and next to him was a picture of his high-school girlfriend," the lead pilot said. "We were glad knowing we helped get him home alive. He said, 'Thank you for shooting those bad guys'. Luckily we were only a few minutes away and all the friendlies made it out that day."
Providing close-air support is the squadron's main mission here, and is the specialty of the aircraft they fly, the A-10 Thunderbolt II nicknamed the "Warthog."
"This was one of the most intense sorties our squadron has come into contact with in the last four months in theater," the lead pilot said. "Afterward the Afghan National Army said they found 18 enemy dead, so I can only imagine how many were out there. This was close-air support and this is what we train for."
How the fuck is the F-35 (the A-10's "replacement") supposed to handle this type of situation?
ReplyDeleteBecause I don't see it even coming close.
would you be the pilot that would hazard a 200 million dollar airplane doing a demonstration of force flyby?
Deleteno way in hell the F-35 can do this mission in the same way. so what does that mean? ineffective ground support for our forces...you either bomb them or you don't. and rules of engagement will mean that lives are lost. that and an improper mission fit for an airplane that is designed to do deep interdiction and little else.
I spent 3 years activated for the ANG in 2003 to 2006 as a communications technician manning a bomb range. During that time I got to see hundreds of A10 training scenarios as well as Marine Reserve hornets configured for ground attack.
DeleteI saw many instances of A10's performing CAS operations just like the above for training. The A10 pilots, both Air Guard and Active, would easily get down and dirty when necessary. These were things the F15 and F16's doing CAS would not even dream of performing.
I also saw Marine Reserve pilots who would perform the exact same level of precision and daring with hornets. An A10 is designed to get slow and low, F18's not so much. I think if the Marines end up with the F35, the pilots will find a way to make it work. I have faith in the people, and I never met a Marine who did not want to smell jet wash when he was getting CAS.
Why don't the marines just forget the F-35 idea and instead spend a much smaller sum of money on Super Hornets, armed drones (development money already being spent by others), and take over the Air Force's A-10. If they want a new plane,how about VTOL version (or some sort of add-on kit) of the A-10?
ReplyDelete*Sigh*
DeleteBecause we made a decision a long time ago that STOVL was our way of the future. We have not had a real debate about it since then.
The A-10 does not need a VTOL kit nor could one be made. We would have to accept the fact that it is land based only, like the majority of our F/A-18 and our C-130s. The A-10 is actually the most expeditionary strike aircraft in the US inventory. Easy and low maintenance, good fuel economy, and high FOD tolerance.
The A-10 (or a legitimate successor) sounds like a perfect fit for the USMC.
DeleteI'm not sold on the whole STOVL/VTOL concept, but a carrier launched version would sure be cool.
Better yet the Army should get them too, its bullshit that the Army doesn't have its own fixed wing CAS, especially when the airforce brass act like they don't want to be bothered with the mission. I wonder if A-10 could be fitted with rato equipment. I would think such gear would need to be attached out under the wings so as not to interfere with the performance of the engines. Or would that even work, because the rockets would still be forward of the engines and could throw exhaust and FOD stuff backward? C-130s can do it but they have their rato units mounted aft of the engines. Interesting question though.. Oh and by the way I know I bitch about the airforce a lot but mostly that refers to the high tech fighter mafia and poser base pukes I've met. There are a lot of CAS and transport and bomber crews out there being professional and getting the real work done. Good job to those pilots in the article.
ReplyDeleteGreat post. Thanks.
ReplyDeleteEvery time it's pointed out that there are times you still need to fly eyes on low and slow someone will tell you either it can be done with a fast jet or that we're in a new age and we can just drop a smart bomb from 20,000ft.
ReplyDeleteThe real point is that eyes on low and slow is best performed by a purpose designed cost effective aircraft. The issue isn't that an F-35 can't do CAS but rather a far cheaper aircraft can do the job better and that it's irrational replacing cost effective aircraft with one far more expensive to purchase and maintain. If anything a plan to replace the A-10 with the F-35 is a plan to get out of CAS as any type of primary mission.
Moreover, whenever the job can be done with a smart bomb from 20,000+ft just about the last aircraft that one would want performing this mission is a very expensive strike fighter. A UCAS is cheaper and far more persistent, so is the A-10, and if you need a lot bombs heavy bombers are a far better platform. In any case the USAF has tried on various occasions to rid itself of the A-10, and the CAS mission, and with the F-35 they are eventually going to get their wish.
CAS is a mission, not a platform or flight profile.
ReplyDeleteIn the near(er than most think) future, a section of F-35s will have shacked the 'insurgents' with SDBs on the first couple of passes from way up in the cheap seats, no 'show of force' necessary.
Still, "Kudos!" to the Hog drivers and maintainers for working with and getting the most out of the tools they have in hand.
i have to ask how is dropping bombs from the cheap seats effective close air support in anything except full scale combat and relaxed rules of engagement? if we continue to operate the way that we do and do it with F-35's instead of A-10s then do you see them doing gun runs on the enemy? do you see them getting low and doing shows of force?
Deleteand if we do operate the way that you say we will then isn't a UAV that can provide do the same thing with near the same accuracy just as good? and if thats the case then how do you justify the F-35?
In a permissive environment very cheap to purchase and operate UAV's are an order of magnitude more cost effective while actually also being more effective due to far more persistence. In other scenarios' if the mission is bomb truck from 20,000+ft I'd suggest it's extremely difficult to find any platform less cost effective than a strike fighter. Trying to justify the F-35 in terms of CAS is in fact illogical. It's a perfectly justifiable aircraft for a whole range of missions but it's not exactly a cost effective attack aircraft.
DeleteCAS can often be accomplished by any aircraft dropping a smart bomb from 20,000+ft. That's not the full CAS requirement, however, and there are times the low and slow eyes on profile is in fact what is required to accomplish the mission. Replacing cheap to purchase and operate A-10's with the F-35 for all missions is idiotic. Letting the USAF give up on a proper COIN aircraft was also idiotic. The fighter mafia loves fast jets and the AF institutionally would rather CAS just went away, however motivated some individuals and units are for the mission. This isn't exactly a news flash but simply the historic reality.
LOL! Lane: Pointing out that one does not have to fly low and slow to hit a CAS target is hardly trying to 'justify' the F-35 "in terms of CAS". Get some critical reading skills.
DeleteThe key requirements of a CAS mission are responsiveness and precision. The key elements of responsiveness and precision are 1) Getting to the target area quickly, 2) Identifying the target quickly, 3) getting ordnance on the target accurately and quickly. 'Persistence' comes into play only if you can't perform items 1-3 quickly. A B-1 wit a Sniper Pod probably has quicker target locating capability at 20K feet than an A-10 trolling with an eyeball. The F-35's sensors, data, and comm systems will provide even better capability. I used the SDB as the example ordnance for two reasons. First, the SDB CEP is publically cited as 5-8 meters. That is smaller than the 'mils' accuracy of the A-10's 'Fire hose'. Second, there are efforts underway to further improve the SDBs accuracy and reduce collateral effects. Strafing runs when they are unnecessary are for suckers. I'm willing to bump my 'CAS Myths' series to reopen them for comments at my place if you REALLY want to get into dicing the details. I'll look to the future, you can bet teary-eyed about the past.
Safe frag distance for an $SDB is 50-100meters. The economics of that statement are vacant.
ReplyDelete1. 'Danger Close' for SDB is 200m, for guns (including GAU-8) it's only 95m.
ReplyDelete2. JSF's EOTS is based on the same sensors all jets (including A-10s) carry in targeting pods, so how will JSF be magically able to find people hiding under trees better? DAS?
3. Today's A-10 is far more advanced than Hawgs of even just 6 or 7 years ago. They carry LGBs and JDAMs (and low-yield versions too), they have lasers and data links, these guys even have helmet-mounted displays, so if you don't understand why this flight chose to employ WP rockets and 30mm gun it is not because they're old-fashioned or archaic, it is because you do not understand the reality of the modern CAS battlefield.
4. This article needs to be read aloud before every budget hearing and force structure meeting in the DoD and EVERY service.
Brave Sir Anonymous,
DeleteRe: Danger Close differences.
"Danger Close" is a rather arbitrary determination without hard definitions but with ESTIMATES of risk, based upon CEPs and Mil Accuracies with allowance factors for errant munitions deliveries. it is a risk management tool, not an arbiter of effectiveness or usefulness.
I'm paid a very generous salary to develop and field bleeding-edge combat technology AND advise the US military how to best use it. People have lived and died employing my concepts. The fact that they were the RIGHT people living and dying keeps bringing my Customers back for more. Your first mistake was thinking you know something relevant about the A-10 or CAS that I don't. Your second mistake is thinking in terms of the past and present (such as in relation to accuracies and sensors) and not in terms of today and the future as well as failure to understand the implications of the manifest superiority of next generation capabilities.
You earn only 1/2 of a retired Senior NCO 'Pfffft' for the feeble effort to engage.
SMSgt Mac: One of the reasons we lack the resources to provide air support for all ground missions beyond the wire is that "infantry of today" have seldom experienced the quality of air support we provided during past wars where we were permitted to win with aircraft like the AD and OV-10 or even the P-47. There will never be enough B-1/JSF category aircraft to cover even 10% of the ground combat missions in a WAR. Infantry I have surveyed have clearly expressed a desire for PIE in the Sky (Presence of Intelligent Eyes), aircraft flown by specialists (JFACS) who understand the commander's intent and are provideing advice/information/fires such that the unit can maintain their momentum vice having to dig-in and wait for some remote "voice" to favor them with air assistance. And, when in trouble, they want "immediate" fires vice "negotiations" with the chain of command. You are not helping!
ReplyDeleteChuck Myers from another era of WARfare.
Mr. Meyers
DeleteFrom your statements I believe you to be a reasoning man: exactly the audience for which I targeted my "Debunking The Close Air Support Myths" series I posted a little over two years ago. I believe our differences are more firmly rooted in philosophy and I assert: that is to say we view the requirements and means to fulfill those requirements differently. Please read my 6 part series (with 2 sidebar posts).
Part 1: The “Big Two” Close Air Support (CAS) Myths
Part 2: Those "not so good old days”
Part 3: Vietnam and the Rise of the “No-CAS Air Force” Myth
Part 5: Defining a New CAS Platform: the Evolution of the A-10
Part 6: A-10s 'Forever' ?
CAS Myths Sidebar: The A-10 and the 'Cult of the Gun'
CAS Myths Sidebar: Army-Air Force Views on CAS and Airpower
In it, I believe I more than adequately demonstrate and support my conclusions:
1. The Air Force supports the CAS mission better now than when it was part of the Army.
2. The Army was the primary antagonist in creating inter-service friction over CAS post-WWII and in it's Army-Centric way of war it continues to generate friction to this day.
3. CAS is a mission NOT a platform.
Much, if not most, of the evidence I uncovered in the course of my research on this topic I wasn't looking for, and was quite surprised at how easy it was to find, if only someone just looked.
If after reading the series you still believe any of what you typed above to still be accurate, feel free to email me with cogent counter-arguments, and I will be happy to add a part 7 to the series to address any and all issues you might raise.
There is this article by an F-16/A-10 pilot saying that the A-10 is NOT replaceble by faster/more expensive jets...
Deletehttp://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/sum03/ireton.html
Sir,your argument also does not explain why Russia insists in keeping their SU-25s...
Its the hammer in the USAF arsenal...killing it will only weken the Air force