"The hard mix is figuring out how to support our treaty commitments with a reduced force in a budget constrained environment with an aging ground fighting force designed to combat a threat that passed away in 1989."...via American Mercenary
thanks for the heads up. i read the article but i want to make sure we aren't being spoofed here. 100 knots is zooming. thats equal to 115 mph ...underwater! i have to see that to believe it. the previous speed king was the Akula class but they were noisy as fuck!
Sounds crazy, there's plenty of cars and planes that can't go that fast and they only have to move through air, 100kt sounds fast as fuck for a torpedo never mind a whole sub...
The AAV-7 shown in this photo as the primary 3 + 25 amphibious infantry-carrier may share its purposeful face for a good while longer.
Assuming the two USN ship-to-shore 'Connector'-projects will allow the ARG to stay way Over-The-Horizon i.e. beyond-shore-defenses 50, 100 or 150nm, then any idea of using any combat vehicle to travel than distance by itself would be as dubious a proposition - as in "impossible" - as the EFV was a techno-philic rush with neither remotely adequate range nor affordability.
'Slow-poke' AAV-7 would instead ride to shore and would only get wet from below crossing creeks, tidal streams, rivers, ponds and lakes. And in this current fiscal reality, it is very good that they are already well paid for.
This should allow USN/USMC to focus on heavy-lift (say up to 3x MBT @ up to 20kts) OTH-capable Connectors in at best 100 in numbers at perhaps less than twice the projected EFV unit-cost.
Now that's value, possibly hauling per such Connector up to 3x M1As for the cost of two thin-skinned EFVs...or 4x AAV7s...or 10x armored HMMWVs etc. etc.
For more on this see LCU-F in the July-issue of the PROCEEDINGS of the US Naval Institute at usni.org or http://hallman.nfshost.com/bolger/LCU-F.pdf
might be jumping the gun. i'm hearing proposals to send tanks to the Reserves....there is even talk of taking them off MEU's and making them a MEB asset.
time will tell but we need to solve a myriad array of issues before we tackle a new ship to shore platform.
The idea to send the best-armored vehicles 'to the reserve' would reflect a radical dismissal of all that Marines have learned/suffered through in the last 12 years.
Whether as an MEU or an MEB asset, you'd still have to get them and other heavy-weights to the shore.
And pulling up to some perfectly-controlled harbor facilities in one's best RoRo may be as optimistic as proposing to do without any heavy-armor capability.
Reasserting unambiguous amphibious capability ought to be high on any Marine's to-do list.
either you haven't been paying attention or you're too involved in the design to be objective but the point remains. the ACV is supposedly the Marine Corps top acquisition priority after the F-35. the Navy is looking at doomsday scenarios of cutting its carrier force down to 8 or 9 ships...has to get the LCS program going, is trying to put into service the DDG-1000 and is also having to purchase F-35's.
so where is the money to buy ship to shore connectors? the LCAC SLEP will do just fine for the foreseeable future.
It would be worthwhile to really think through what that LCU-F proposal actually means - from amphibious assault, - over MASH-duty, - Bingo-platform, - IFS-platform, - piracy-interdiction, - MCM-platform - all the way to MarSOC utility, all with or without amphib-support.
How would SLEP-LCACs handle these missions ?
Then consider how much that range of functions would save on perhaps not having to yearn after make-shift or specialty-projects for which there may indeed be no money anytime soon.
And why would you compare something as modest as any LCU-flavor with two-and three-digit billion-bills for DDG-1000, F-35, and LCS ?
After losing $3 Billion on EFV, any fast heavy-lift LCU program would be a sober proposition of outright and politically-very-responsible miserliness for its immediate and durable tactical and political effectiveness, serving across decades of endless heavy-lift mission-module adaptability in the Model of CNO Greenert's multi-mission capable 'pick-up truck'.
And again, reassertion of post-Iraq and Post-Afghanistan effective unambiguous amphibious war-fighting capability is of no relevance in this Blog ?
Along the lines outlined above, such a potent LCU may yet be one of the 'sexiest' USMC matters yet - quite apart from its inherent affordability.
Serious issues and details to indeed pay attention to. Between the zero-budget for AAV-7s and this high-performance-&-low-cost LCU-option the future of serious combat-capable amphibious wherewithal may indeed be secure.
once again you attempt to denigrate the AAV. but the real truth is much more stark. the AAV serves as more than a ship to shore connector. it also serves as the Marine Corps Battle Taxi.
your LCU would end its mission at the beach. the AAV continues on. as a matter of fact it turns into an adhoc base caamp for the infantry.
and you're right. budget issues mean that you have to get bang for the buck. i'm not worried about what MARSOC and SOCOM need. they're well taken care of. the issue is that we're seeing the Marine Corps core competencies put in danger because we have a weak Commandant, a silly President and a procurement system that is beyond broken.
Honored as venerable and stalwart AAV-7 will live longer than many of us here... by not being picked-off one by one because a few insist on grand voyages at 6-7kts.
Whom would you expect to bring the AAV-7 anywhere as close to shore as that speed and its limited seaworthiness require ?
ARG commanders have a professional obligation to protect their ships, crews and combat-effectiveness. And few would venture to follow your personal lead that will forever (it seems) arbitrarily require planting three large vessels right in full beach-view and thus sight of even the most primitive defenses, only one of which needs to leak through. No future in this for neither USN nor USMC.
One burning and listing Amphib on CNN and you might be done with much of any 'amphibious' ambitions. There's plenty of highly-quotable naval analysts that will argue against anything except the most peaceful amphibious proposals the UN could actually run. And that would mean what for USMC ?!
While you are concerned with the quaint 'Water-Taxi' visuals, you might want to mind the interests of USN amphib-chiefs actually 'taxying' the MEU into the theater.
And there is of course the increasingly impatient tax-payers' interest in not unnecessarily burning up lives and treasure in pursuit of exactly what approach here ?
The position you are devils-advocating here is just too weak - a good sporting fish-in-the-barrel proposition though. Compared to it however, even your worst bogey-men are extraordinarily able.
you keep ignoring the real issue so i'll keep on repeating it.
the AAV is more than a ship to shore connector. its also the Marine Corps APC. if the Navy can't roll back enemy defense then they have bigger issues than losing an amphib.
they're gonna lose a fleet. anti-ship missiles are supersonic and have ranges of hundreds of miles (the bigger ones anyway). what does that mean? that even the sea base you're thumping your chest about is even in range of shore based artillery.
you can keep talking shit but the fact remains. we need an APC that swims more than your glittery little toy.
sorry if the truth hurts....wait. no i'm not. its reality. deal with it.
Nobody is arguing that the AAV-7 is not an APC that can move at very limited speed across limited bodies of water, and at quite reasonable speeds on land.
But you are devil's-advocating serious internal challenges with this argument:
- Does your vision of apparently any and all Marines amphibious movements always require the full might of a full-fledge Carrier Strike Group ? B-2 squadrons perhaps ? That business-model would not seem to match a broad range of past and projected Marines duties and contingencies.
- That "rolling back enemy defense" remark could have been glibly thrown at USMC after taking major losses in recent war-fighting challenges.
- Your response to longer-range supersonic missiles is to come in extra-close ? Are you expecting their targeting logic to not quite be warmed up by mile-marker 12 ?
- Go and list the weapons that could in fact reach out to OTH 100, 150 or 200nm ?
- And then who might have them in what numbers and state of reliability.
- In contrast, go and find weapons that will not find you at 12nm ! Any 60s-era barely-post-colonial medium-bore artillery sitting in a barn could take your eye out.
- 'Sea-base' ? It's just an ARG hauling the MEU.
- No APC will ever haul 200 tons at 19kts across 1500nm - or so the article outlines.
- However the AAV-7 could take a 'glitter-coat' - if that's your thing and you find that camo is ever so retro.
- The way you casually prognosticate that "they're gonna lose a fleet" is rather dubious perspective for a Marine expecting 'them' to haul you towards, support you in and then drag you out of trouble ?! I gather someone has your bar-code.
Good thing that 'they' will decided where when and at what risk ? And it ain't a democracy aboard these ships. They are typically good at keeping from getting hurt and keeping some in their charge from hurting themselves...
you're throwing up so many straw men that it boggles the mind. the reality is this.
1. we need an AAV replacement more than we need an LCU. 2. Amphibs are vulnerable to anti-ship missiles fired from over 100 miles away. all bets are off with the safe stand off zone from the shore. either we roll back the defense or nothing gets through. 3. previous Marine Corps actions ARE worth noting. we need a vehicle that can our men ashore and then continue on to objective. not simply deposit them on the beach and turn around. 4. if you're reading Marine Corps journals then you know that the LCU replacement program is on no ones radar. its a nice to have once we get a ton of other stuff.
again. the truth hurts but there is no momentum or desire on the part of anyone in either the Marine Corps or the Navy to push the LCU-R program to the top of the heap. It will die or be postponed before it takes precedence over a whole host of projects.
check back in 2030. we might have the money to talk about it then.
The kidding seems mostly on your end... but I could not resist the COSMO reference on 'camo'.
1. Whatever it takes, re-reading the article or any other piece on LCUs will drive home the basics. When in doubt - i.e. 'combat' - no ARG in full view mode ! You may feel comfortable hoping - and who's to deny hope (?)- but any serious engagement - i.e. well off from Club Med beaches - will commence from as far offshore as physically possible to protect the ARG and thus every Marine on it. LCUs have been used to that end since Day One. LCU-F would only do so from survivable distances.
2. So, no data then on OTH-100-through-200 relative vulnerabilities from shore-defenses - versus your preferred <12 mile dictate for another 40 years of AAV-8 use ?? Not likely...
So, how do you 'roll back' without the CSG showing the flag to protect your AAV-7 lumbering about in the surf-zone. Suddenly money is no object after all ?
Wait, while things are going haywire onshore, you'll hold the MEU back until one of, what(?), three/four active/moving CSGs comes from thousands of miles away ? Better send out that memo to ex-pats and allies alike !
3. Well, that is why they do those top-secret B-52, CH-53 and now also MV-22 'Ground-Driving Schools' - with the Final Exam doing the loop around the Organic Farmers Market without spilling or cracking a single solitary mid-night-laid organic egg ?!
4. That is likely since the Navy mags tend to not get too worked up on USMC in-house discussions on which HMMWV replacement - not-to-mention worrying about the apparently emerging - "You heard it here first !" - 'glitter-option' - or not. Navy tends to do Navy-stuff, Army discusses Army-stuff, etc., etc.
Your casual throwing about vast moneys (tens/hundreds of Billions) for the very-big-ticket programs, and promptly equating them with a very moderate LCU-X program seems to lack convincing punch. 1200lbs-Pumkins-&-and-Oranges ?! Yes, both are round and neither quite yellow nor very red. Just don't claim you can eat both in one sitting.
And as seemingly now routine daily ritual, one moment most leaders in USMC and USN (?) are designated all sorts of undesirables in your words - and yet pronto, you have a hand on their very pulse and can read their...
What may indeed tragically be happening is that without serious/viable amphibious protocols and matching hardware, you might have astonishing shrinkage of USMC by 2020. And no amphibious combat-power without fast-&-heavy-lift LCU-X types.
i tried to keep this civil but that isn't working so let me speak plainly.
you don't know what the hell you're talking about. MEU's will be used only in Raids. against a heavily defended beach head then its all hands on deck. second. no one in the Marine Corps gives a rats ass about the LCU-R. we have bigger fish to fry. third. learn the mission sets of MEU, MEB and MEF. if its an assault against a heavily defended shore then its automatically a case of a MEB or larger being used and that means all hands on deck to include the carrier force.
you have a point of view because you're trying to sell a product. i fucked up by opening the door to your nonsense by posting on your jacked up little boat and i seriously wonder why you don't pester Proceedings or Sea Power with your idiocy if its such a winner. as a matter of fact i'll find the article and post some of the responses on it here. your over the top advocacy will cost..
Just add up the total of LCACs and LCUs the MEB would have access to ! How long would it take to even get a fraction of just the MEU GCE to shore, never mind all available combat-gear. No CSG will help you move that gear.
What about asymmetric warriors waiting their turn to reach out for particularly plum targets ? More talk of 'Daisy-Cutters' perhaps - or worse to wipe out potential adversaries 'just in case' ?
A broad range of threads begin by postulating stark perceived deficiencies due to other folks 'incompetence' and or outright ill-will etc. Here, several authors incl. active-duty USN folks propose one apparently well-seasoned solution to an intolerable disconnect between amphibious operations and the direct tactical challenges to ARG and MEU alike how to evade shore-defenses large and modest.
And for whatever reasons you find that initiative very upsetting and yet utterly pointless at the same time, suggesting there to be no problem that both another APC and the apparently ever-present CSG won't fix. Very puzzling.
No selling of any products - since none is at hand. Online folks selling to the Pentagon - not a terribly promising approach, I'd say.
However, here as anywhere else, ideas do matter. And once understood - some won't - all sorts of previously dearly-held notions may begin to shift some. And that can be disturbing to some, intriguing to others. Progress! Some of it unstoppable.
We'll see, where those of that article will lead. It seems a potent group of authors. Looking from the non-decision-making outside into this issue on the table, what has been proposed could well be a win-win at modest investment.
In-house USN and perhaps USMC deliberation will go where they may. Nobody hopping up and down here online will affect any of that one way or the other. Only convincing concepts may change the course of such decisions. At least, they may be more likely to...
And boosting amphibious capabilities of the 21st-century USMC, which only next-generation amphibious assets can do, seems a very laudable proposition. I for one am glad that that concept is accessible to all Marines, Sailors and civilians.
you need to go back to ground zero. rethink the way that you're trying to sell this idea, consider doing a bit of research on how the Marine Corps MEU's operate and get a full understanding of how a 200 ton ship to shore connector isn't needed for anything less than an MEB Reinforced. once you've done that then take into account and be prepared to defend without drama or bullshit why we need this LCU-F and why we just can't make do with what we have.
if you can successfully do all of the above then your concept has a chance. i don't think you can but you never know.
It is never a "single system solution" that truly solves a problem. The only people who believe in a "silver bullet" solution are the ones trying to sell it to the DOD. When you think about how Expeditionary units are deployed, they are part of a Carrier group for a reason. I'll come back to this in at the end.
Getting fighting power off the ship and deep inland requires vehicles that transition from the ship to the objective. AAV's are the only thing that fit the bill for the USMC right now. I think that a case could be made for the FOX vehicle to get added to the inventory to deploy a smaller squad sized element that can also do "routine patroling" for "security operations" or "civil support" once it reaches shore.
But really the issue resolves around whether or not the Navy has enough air power to set the right conditions for a beachhead operation to even begin. The USMC keeps the Cobra around because you can get a bunch more Cobras for the price of one Apache. Even though the establishment viewed the Apache as the superior gunship (carries more boom) it is not a cost effective solution for the USMC mission set.
My prediction, AAVs and Cobra gunships will continue to be the two main vehicle solutions used to establish a beachhead. They are in the inventory, they currently do the job, and they have no viable cost effective replacements in the pipeline due to continuing budget cuts. The only thing that the F35 vtol would bring to the USMC is a stealth capability for taking out enemy IADS but that is a job the Navy already has as a core competency.
However, with the spread of beyond the horizont radar systems, the fight for the beachhead really starts well beyond 100 miles. The carrier version of the F35 for the Navy would provide a decent IADS platform. However the current use of the Growler EW bird gives me plenty of warm and fuzzy feelings that the current mix of Hornets in the fleet are capable of accomplishing that mission to set conditions for for the Marines to establish a beachhead.
So there you have it, we don't need a huge over the horizon effort because you are going to have to fight to get to that position anyways, long before dropping Marines off into the water to make their way to the fight. Hornets, Growlers and Tomahawks are the right mix to take out the IADS and enemy arty that would prevent the establishment of a Beachhead. Which means that without a carrier, beachhead operations will only be established against low threat objectives. The Navy should be looking really really hard at tactics and possible upgrades to carrier survivability.
Response Part 1. of 2.: “It is never a "single system solution" that truly solves a problem….” Nobody has proposed any ‘Silver Bullets’. Solomon however likes to whittle fresh oak stakes to drive through the heart of programs and several highest-ranking elected and appointed offices – both civilian and military. In comparison to these daily preoccupations in an otherwise very interesting blog, the reemerging topic here is just the rather modest idea to examine a better LCU, in most amphibious circles understood for the last about 70 years as essential to deliver the full weight and power of what we now call MEU or MEB GCEs. Just a modest LCU ! No dramatics. No call for upheaval. No end-time ruminations.
We are just talking about a significant upgrade to one essential tool for amphibious warfare. We are talking about an opportunity to likely at long last allow adjusting doctrine to more recent emerging threats, something so far seemingly lost on both of you. Most of your rhetorical reflexes here are based on certain assumptions some of which have gone unchallenged for decades, such as the limited and shrinking capability of the 50s-era LCU as currently the only option to do heavy-lift to the beach. -------- “Getting fighting power off the ship and deep inland requires vehicles that transition from the ship to the objective…” This persistent notion that you really need an offshore-capable longer-range infantry-carrier that can do ocean, mud, and highway alike seems out of sync with the very expensive experience with the failed EFV idea. Nobody in the Army proposes to fly-&-drive their heavier armored vehicles in order to do a ‘transition’. Would the Airforce argue for a fly-&-float project because float-planes were once quite useful ? (Perhaps they should actually…) APCs to cross rivers and lakes – yes. To do extended ocean-passages – why ?
Whatever your assumptions here about 10-12-15nm ship-to-shore distances, outside of peace-time conditions and simulations, it seems very unlikely that you’d actually see ARGs exposing Sailors and MEU-Marines (and very large high-value objects/targets) in such exposed proximity. All because you insist on there not being any safer way to deliver the GCE ? I am all for romance and nostalgia – but what’s it with the slow-&-exposed combat-model you seem to cling to ? The Pacific experience was bad enough despite carriers, battleship, cruisers etc. helping out. But then there indeed were no alternatives.
Neither one of you are addressing asymmetric warfare threats and systems for both slowly-arriving peace-meal fashion ground-combat elements. And you seem to casually dismiss the risk to the ships from, say, simultaneously-launched swarm of very low-tech Kassams swamping ship-defenses ? Just a little luck for the adversary to get a leaker through to rattle the ARG’s CO a bit. You should be hopping mad about what de facto lack of ship-to-shore transport capability you’ve been stuck with for too many generations of Sailors and Marines trying hard to overcome these very challenging hardware and thus doctrinal deficiencies - instead of taking issue with me supporting the proposal offered in that article to at long last get into the 21st century on heavy-lift systems.
Whatever old or new APC, not being able to deliver them in least time and maximum numbers due to the reflexive and persistent flat-out dismissal as ‘irrelevant’ of potent higher-speed heavy-lift LCU-geometries is even more of a sign of fractured reasoning.
Neither one of you seem to mind that due to their foot-print inside the ARG’s/ESG’s well-decks these LCUs are available in only very limited numbers, thus requiring ‘Hybrid Warriors’ to just damage a couple to have your ‘landing’ grind to an even slower pace if not outright halt. And thin-skinned LCACs are of little challenge to most portable systems available to agile adversaries. Then what ?
Response Part 2 of 2.: Not only are you proposing to arrive in weak numbers. But you don’t seem to mind to put ARG/MEU at massive risk. Both of you appear to navigate by 50-year old hardware-dictated doctrinal reference-assumptions that sure do not hold up under both our recent war-fighting-experience nor under our projected fiscal realities with, for instance, reduced CSG availability and unlikely emergence of any new ‘magic’ systems that will make all those worries go away. ---------- “But really the issue resolves around whether or not the Navy has enough air power to set the right conditions for a beachhead operation to even begin..." So every hallway serious engagement beyond Human Assistance/Disaster Relief requires a Carrier Strike Group in order for a MEU to engage the challenge ? ---------- “My prediction, AAVs and Cobra gunships will continue to be the two main vehicle solutions used to establish a beachhead..." Certain very serious USMC folks have yanked the term ‘Beach-head’ out of their vocabulary a good while back. ---------- “However, with the spread of beyond the horizon radar systems, the fight for the beachhead really starts well beyond 100 miles..." So you assume onshore presence of top-level OTH-radar-capability – but propose to plant the ARG/MEU right in the adversary’s face ?! Because of the need to do the slow APC-ride for whatever apparently personal reasons ? ---------- “So there you have it, we don't need a huge over the horizon effort because you are going to have to fight to get to that position anyways, long before dropping Marines off into the water to make their way to the fight..." So what you are proposing is the USMC’s perpetual utter dependency upon a CSG for every maneuver above HA/DR ?!
“Shaping” the beach plus 20nm by cleansing it of any threats via massive air-power ??
How would zapping everything of perceived risk/value work in civil wars ?
To summarize, you both propose: - Always bring a CSG. - Somehow cleanse inshore-waters, beach, uplands and perhaps the rest of the province of perceived threats via massive air-power, - Plant the ARG/MEU well within reach of even low-tech defenses. - Plant stakes, beacons, and vehicle-lane demarcations in preparation for the Beach-Head construction. - Proceed to bring your armored vehicles to shore slow and peace-meal via very few and vulnerable ship-to-shore transports. - Amass in said Beach-Head your combat and supply assets. - Proceed to pacify... - Hope-&-Pray that no one has learned and developed further asymmetric ‘tricks’ and hybrid-warrior skill-sets.
How are you going to pay for it? There ain't no such thing as a free lunch.
Now, there are a gajillion ways to skin a cat, or establish a beachhead. You can do it with light forces in Zodiacs, heavy forces supported by air, hell, even a scuba assault by SEALs if you want. So your "emerging assymetric" threats are nothing but hollow rhetoric. Right now we have a "good mix" of capabilities that can come into play to do the job.
The impetus for change needs to be practical reality, NOT some theoretical justification for large scale purchases, or you end up with stuff like the LCS or the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle program. The GCV is a straight up cockup that tacitly admits they cocked up the Bradley program from the start. The Army is looking for a single vehicle solution, once again, to "do it all" and that will never happen. Tracked vehicles suck for routine patrols. Wheeled vehicles are too light to be the backbone of a heavy armor formation.
And really, what would the GCV look like? A bradley that can hold 9 dismounts. Sure what we have now is not "optimal" but it is a good "mix" between Brads, Strykers, Abrams, and MRAPs. Look at the total fight, not just the transition point you care so much about. You can get a way with a light ground assault force if you have total air superiority. You can get away with not having total air superiority if you have a good ADA capability. Winning wars is always about having the right mix.
BREAKING: China claims to have developed
ReplyDeleterevolutionary Nuclear submarine
with high speed of 100 knots. (Source-CHINA DAILY MAIL)
thanks for the heads up. i read the article but i want to make sure we aren't being spoofed here. 100 knots is zooming. thats equal to 115 mph ...underwater! i have to see that to believe it. the previous speed king was the Akula class but they were noisy as fuck!
DeleteSounds crazy, there's plenty of cars and planes that can't go that fast and they only have to move through air, 100kt sounds fast as fuck for a torpedo never mind a whole sub...
DeleteThe AAV-7 shown in this photo as the primary 3 + 25 amphibious infantry-carrier may share its purposeful face for a good while longer.
ReplyDeleteAssuming the two USN ship-to-shore 'Connector'-projects will allow the ARG to stay way Over-The-Horizon i.e. beyond-shore-defenses 50, 100 or 150nm, then any idea of using any combat vehicle to travel than distance by itself would be as dubious a proposition - as in "impossible" - as the EFV was a techno-philic rush with neither remotely adequate range nor affordability.
'Slow-poke' AAV-7 would instead ride to shore and would only get wet from below crossing creeks, tidal streams, rivers, ponds and lakes. And in this current fiscal reality, it is very good that they are already well paid for.
This should allow USN/USMC to focus on heavy-lift (say up to 3x MBT @ up to 20kts) OTH-capable Connectors in at best 100 in numbers at perhaps less than twice the projected EFV unit-cost.
Now that's value, possibly hauling per such Connector up to 3x M1As for the cost of two thin-skinned EFVs...or 4x AAV7s...or 10x armored HMMWVs etc. etc.
For more on this see LCU-F in the July-issue of the PROCEEDINGS of the US Naval Institute at usni.org
or
http://hallman.nfshost.com/bolger/LCU-F.pdf
might be jumping the gun. i'm hearing proposals to send tanks to the Reserves....there is even talk of taking them off MEU's and making them a MEB asset.
Deletetime will tell but we need to solve a myriad array of issues before we tackle a new ship to shore platform.
The Navy is on track on both 'Connectors'.
ReplyDeleteThe idea to send the best-armored vehicles 'to the reserve' would reflect a radical dismissal of all that Marines have learned/suffered through in the last 12 years.
Whether as an MEU or an MEB asset, you'd still have to get them and other heavy-weights to the shore.
And pulling up to some perfectly-controlled harbor facilities in one's best RoRo may be as optimistic as proposing to do without any heavy-armor capability.
Reasserting unambiguous amphibious capability ought to be high on any Marine's to-do list.
either you haven't been paying attention or you're too involved in the design to be objective but the point remains. the ACV is supposedly the Marine Corps top acquisition priority after the F-35. the Navy is looking at doomsday scenarios of cutting its carrier force down to 8 or 9 ships...has to get the LCS program going, is trying to put into service the DDG-1000 and is also having to purchase F-35's.
Deleteso where is the money to buy ship to shore connectors? the LCAC SLEP will do just fine for the foreseeable future.
It would be worthwhile to really think through what that LCU-F proposal actually means
ReplyDelete- from amphibious assault,
- over MASH-duty,
- Bingo-platform,
- IFS-platform,
- piracy-interdiction,
- MCM-platform
- all the way to MarSOC utility,
all with or without amphib-support.
How would SLEP-LCACs handle these missions ?
Then consider how much that range of functions would save on perhaps not having to yearn after make-shift or specialty-projects for which there may indeed be no money anytime soon.
And why would you compare something as modest as any LCU-flavor with two-and three-digit billion-bills for DDG-1000, F-35, and LCS ?
After losing $3 Billion on EFV, any fast heavy-lift LCU program would be a sober proposition of outright and politically-very-responsible miserliness for its immediate and durable tactical and political effectiveness, serving across decades of endless heavy-lift mission-module adaptability in the Model of CNO Greenert's multi-mission capable 'pick-up truck'.
And again, reassertion of post-Iraq and Post-Afghanistan effective unambiguous amphibious war-fighting capability is of no relevance in this Blog ?
Along the lines outlined above, such a potent LCU may yet be one of the 'sexiest' USMC matters yet - quite apart from its inherent affordability.
Serious issues and details to indeed pay attention to. Between the zero-budget for AAV-7s and this high-performance-&-low-cost LCU-option the future of serious combat-capable amphibious wherewithal may indeed be secure.
once again you attempt to denigrate the AAV. but the real truth is much more stark. the AAV serves as more than a ship to shore connector. it also serves as the Marine Corps Battle Taxi.
Deleteyour LCU would end its mission at the beach. the AAV continues on. as a matter of fact it turns into an adhoc base caamp for the infantry.
and you're right. budget issues mean that you have to get bang for the buck. i'm not worried about what MARSOC and SOCOM need. they're well taken care of. the issue is that we're seeing the Marine Corps core competencies put in danger because we have a weak Commandant, a silly President and a procurement system that is beyond broken.
Honored as venerable and stalwart AAV-7 will live longer than many of us here... by not being picked-off one by one because a few insist on grand voyages at 6-7kts.
ReplyDeleteWhom would you expect to bring the AAV-7 anywhere as close to shore as that speed and its limited seaworthiness require ?
ARG commanders have a professional obligation to protect their ships, crews and combat-effectiveness. And few would venture to follow your personal lead that will forever (it seems) arbitrarily require planting three large vessels right in full beach-view and thus sight of even the most primitive defenses, only one of which needs to leak through. No future in this for neither USN nor USMC.
One burning and listing Amphib on CNN and you might be done with much of any 'amphibious' ambitions. There's plenty of highly-quotable naval analysts that will argue against anything except the most peaceful amphibious proposals the UN could actually run. And that would mean what for USMC ?!
While you are concerned with the quaint 'Water-Taxi' visuals, you might want to mind the interests of USN amphib-chiefs actually 'taxying' the MEU into the theater.
And there is of course the increasingly impatient tax-payers' interest in not unnecessarily burning up lives and treasure in pursuit of exactly what approach here ?
The position you are devils-advocating here is just too weak - a good sporting fish-in-the-barrel proposition though. Compared to it however, even your worst bogey-men are extraordinarily able.
you keep ignoring the real issue so i'll keep on repeating it.
Deletethe AAV is more than a ship to shore connector. its also the Marine Corps APC. if the Navy can't roll back enemy defense then they have bigger issues than losing an amphib.
they're gonna lose a fleet. anti-ship missiles are supersonic and have ranges of hundreds of miles (the bigger ones anyway). what does that mean? that even the sea base you're thumping your chest about is even in range of shore based artillery.
you can keep talking shit but the fact remains. we need an APC that swims more than your glittery little toy.
sorry if the truth hurts....wait. no i'm not. its reality. deal with it.
So what 'truth' are you postulating here ?
ReplyDeleteNobody is arguing that the AAV-7 is not an APC that can move at very limited speed across limited bodies of water, and at quite reasonable speeds on land.
But you are devil's-advocating serious internal challenges with this argument:
- Does your vision of apparently any and all Marines amphibious movements always require the full might of a full-fledge Carrier Strike Group ? B-2 squadrons perhaps ? That business-model would not seem to match a broad range of past and projected Marines duties and contingencies.
- That "rolling back enemy defense" remark could have been glibly thrown at USMC after taking major losses in recent war-fighting challenges.
- Your response to longer-range supersonic missiles is to come in extra-close ?
Are you expecting their targeting logic to not quite be warmed up by mile-marker 12 ?
- Go and list the weapons that could in fact reach out to OTH 100, 150 or 200nm ?
- And then who might have them in what numbers and state of reliability.
- In contrast, go and find weapons that will not find you at 12nm ! Any 60s-era barely-post-colonial medium-bore artillery sitting in a barn could take your eye out.
- 'Sea-base' ? It's just an ARG hauling the MEU.
- No APC will ever haul 200 tons at 19kts across 1500nm - or so the article outlines.
- However the AAV-7 could take a 'glitter-coat' - if that's your thing and you find that camo is ever so retro.
- The way you casually prognosticate that "they're gonna lose a fleet" is rather dubious perspective for a Marine expecting 'them' to haul you towards, support you in and then drag you out of trouble ?! I gather someone has your bar-code.
Good thing that 'they' will decided where when and at what risk ? And it ain't a democracy aboard these ships. They are typically good at keeping from getting hurt and keeping some in their charge from hurting themselves...
you have got to be kidding me!
Deleteyou're throwing up so many straw men that it boggles the mind. the reality is this.
1. we need an AAV replacement more than we need an LCU.
2. Amphibs are vulnerable to anti-ship missiles fired from over 100 miles away. all bets are off with the safe stand off zone from the shore. either we roll back the defense or nothing gets through.
3. previous Marine Corps actions ARE worth noting. we need a vehicle that can our men ashore and then continue on to objective. not simply deposit them on the beach and turn around.
4. if you're reading Marine Corps journals then you know that the LCU replacement program is on no ones radar. its a nice to have once we get a ton of other stuff.
again. the truth hurts but there is no momentum or desire on the part of anyone in either the Marine Corps or the Navy to push the LCU-R program to the top of the heap. It will die or be postponed before it takes precedence over a whole host of projects.
check back in 2030. we might have the money to talk about it then.
The kidding seems mostly on your end... but I could not resist the COSMO reference on 'camo'.
ReplyDelete1. Whatever it takes, re-reading the article or any other piece on LCUs will drive home the basics. When in doubt - i.e. 'combat' - no ARG in full view mode ! You may feel comfortable hoping - and who's to deny hope (?)- but any serious engagement - i.e. well off from Club Med beaches - will commence from as far offshore as physically possible to protect the ARG and thus every Marine on it. LCUs have been used to that end since Day One. LCU-F would only do so from survivable distances.
2. So, no data then on OTH-100-through-200 relative vulnerabilities from shore-defenses - versus your preferred <12 mile dictate for another 40 years of AAV-8 use ?? Not likely...
So, how do you 'roll back' without the CSG showing the flag to protect your AAV-7 lumbering about in the surf-zone. Suddenly money is no object after all ?
Wait, while things are going haywire onshore, you'll hold the MEU back until one of, what(?), three/four active/moving CSGs comes from thousands of miles away ?
Better send out that memo to ex-pats and allies alike !
3. Well, that is why they do those top-secret B-52, CH-53 and now also MV-22 'Ground-Driving Schools' - with the Final Exam doing the loop around the Organic Farmers Market without spilling or cracking a single solitary mid-night-laid organic egg ?!
4. That is likely since the Navy mags tend to not get too worked up on USMC in-house discussions on which HMMWV replacement - not-to-mention worrying about the apparently emerging - "You heard it here first !" - 'glitter-option' - or not. Navy tends to do Navy-stuff, Army discusses Army-stuff, etc., etc.
Your casual throwing about vast moneys (tens/hundreds of Billions) for the very-big-ticket programs, and promptly equating them with a very moderate LCU-X program seems to lack convincing punch. 1200lbs-Pumkins-&-and-Oranges ?! Yes, both are round and neither quite yellow nor very red. Just don't claim you can eat both in one sitting.
And as seemingly now routine daily ritual, one moment most leaders in USMC and USN (?) are designated all sorts of undesirables in your words - and yet pronto, you have a hand on their very pulse and can read their...
What may indeed tragically be happening is that without serious/viable amphibious protocols and matching hardware, you might have astonishing shrinkage of USMC by 2020. And no amphibious combat-power without fast-&-heavy-lift LCU-X types.
i tried to keep this civil but that isn't working so let me speak plainly.
Deleteyou don't know what the hell you're talking about. MEU's will be used only in Raids. against a heavily defended beach head then its all hands on deck. second. no one in the Marine Corps gives a rats ass about the LCU-R. we have bigger fish to fry. third. learn the mission sets of MEU, MEB and MEF. if its an assault against a heavily defended shore then its automatically a case of a MEB or larger being used and that means all hands on deck to include the carrier force.
you have a point of view because you're trying to sell a product. i fucked up by opening the door to your nonsense by posting on your jacked up little boat and i seriously wonder why you don't pester Proceedings or Sea Power with your idiocy if its such a winner. as a matter of fact i'll find the article and post some of the responses on it here. your over the top advocacy will cost..
Long argument - and yet still a short temper ?!
ReplyDeleteJust add up the total of LCACs and LCUs the MEB would have access to !
How long would it take to even get a fraction of just the MEU GCE to shore, never mind all available combat-gear. No CSG will help you move that gear.
What about asymmetric warriors waiting their turn to reach out for particularly plum targets ? More talk of 'Daisy-Cutters' perhaps - or worse to wipe out potential adversaries 'just in case' ?
A broad range of threads begin by postulating stark perceived deficiencies due to other folks 'incompetence' and or outright ill-will etc. Here, several authors incl. active-duty USN folks propose one apparently well-seasoned solution to an intolerable disconnect between amphibious operations and the direct tactical challenges to ARG and MEU alike how to evade shore-defenses large and modest.
And for whatever reasons you find that initiative very upsetting and yet utterly pointless at the same time, suggesting there to be no problem that both another APC and the apparently ever-present CSG won't fix. Very puzzling.
No selling of any products - since none is at hand. Online folks selling to the Pentagon - not a terribly promising approach, I'd say.
However, here as anywhere else, ideas do matter. And once understood - some won't - all sorts of previously dearly-held notions may begin to shift some. And that can be disturbing to some, intriguing to others. Progress! Some of it unstoppable.
We'll see, where those of that article will lead. It seems a potent group of authors. Looking from the non-decision-making outside into this issue on the table, what has been proposed could well be a win-win at modest investment.
In-house USN and perhaps USMC deliberation will go where they may. Nobody hopping up and down here online will affect any of that one way or the other. Only convincing concepts may change the course of such decisions. At least, they may be more likely to...
And boosting amphibious capabilities of the 21st-century USMC, which only next-generation amphibious assets can do, seems a very laudable proposition. I for one am glad that that concept is accessible to all Marines, Sailors and civilians.
That article was in the PROCEEDINGS, July'13 issue, pp. 60-64.
DeleteNot sure how well USNI responds to folks who 'pester' them.
you need to go back to ground zero. rethink the way that you're trying to sell this idea, consider doing a bit of research on how the Marine Corps MEU's operate and get a full understanding of how a 200 ton ship to shore connector isn't needed for anything less than an MEB Reinforced. once you've done that then take into account and be prepared to defend without drama or bullshit why we need this LCU-F and why we just can't make do with what we have.
Deleteif you can successfully do all of the above then your concept has a chance. i don't think you can but you never know.
It is never a "single system solution" that truly solves a problem. The only people who believe in a "silver bullet" solution are the ones trying to sell it to the DOD. When you think about how Expeditionary units are deployed, they are part of a Carrier group for a reason. I'll come back to this in at the end.
ReplyDeleteGetting fighting power off the ship and deep inland requires vehicles that transition from the ship to the objective. AAV's are the only thing that fit the bill for the USMC right now. I think that a case could be made for the FOX vehicle to get added to the inventory to deploy a smaller squad sized element that can also do "routine patroling" for "security operations" or "civil support" once it reaches shore.
But really the issue resolves around whether or not the Navy has enough air power to set the right conditions for a beachhead operation to even begin. The USMC keeps the Cobra around because you can get a bunch more Cobras for the price of one Apache. Even though the establishment viewed the Apache as the superior gunship (carries more boom) it is not a cost effective solution for the USMC mission set.
My prediction, AAVs and Cobra gunships will continue to be the two main vehicle solutions used to establish a beachhead. They are in the inventory, they currently do the job, and they have no viable cost effective replacements in the pipeline due to continuing budget cuts. The only thing that the F35 vtol would bring to the USMC is a stealth capability for taking out enemy IADS but that is a job the Navy already has as a core competency.
However, with the spread of beyond the horizont radar systems, the fight for the beachhead really starts well beyond 100 miles. The carrier version of the F35 for the Navy would provide a decent IADS platform. However the current use of the Growler EW bird gives me plenty of warm and fuzzy feelings that the current mix of Hornets in the fleet are capable of accomplishing that mission to set conditions for for the Marines to establish a beachhead.
So there you have it, we don't need a huge over the horizon effort because you are going to have to fight to get to that position anyways, long before dropping Marines off into the water to make their way to the fight. Hornets, Growlers and Tomahawks are the right mix to take out the IADS and enemy arty that would prevent the establishment of a Beachhead. Which means that without a carrier, beachhead operations will only be established against low threat objectives. The Navy should be looking really really hard at tactics and possible upgrades to carrier survivability.
Response Part 1. of 2.:
ReplyDelete“It is never a "single system solution" that truly solves a problem….”
Nobody has proposed any ‘Silver Bullets’. Solomon however likes to whittle fresh oak stakes to drive through the heart of programs and several highest-ranking elected and appointed offices – both civilian and military. In comparison to these daily preoccupations in an otherwise very interesting blog, the reemerging topic here is just the rather modest idea to examine a better LCU, in most amphibious circles understood for the last about 70 years as essential to deliver the full weight and power of what we now call MEU or MEB GCEs. Just a modest LCU ! No dramatics. No call for upheaval. No end-time ruminations.
We are just talking about a significant upgrade to one essential tool for amphibious warfare. We are talking about an opportunity to likely at long last allow adjusting doctrine to more recent emerging threats, something so far seemingly lost on both of you. Most of your rhetorical reflexes here are based on certain assumptions some of which have gone unchallenged for decades, such as the limited and shrinking capability of the 50s-era LCU as currently the only option to do heavy-lift to the beach.
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“Getting fighting power off the ship and deep inland requires vehicles that transition from the ship to the objective…”
This persistent notion that you really need an offshore-capable longer-range infantry-carrier that can do ocean, mud, and highway alike seems out of sync with the very expensive experience with the failed EFV idea. Nobody in the Army proposes to fly-&-drive their heavier armored vehicles in order to do a ‘transition’. Would the Airforce argue for a fly-&-float project because float-planes were once quite useful ? (Perhaps they should actually…) APCs to cross rivers and lakes – yes. To do extended ocean-passages – why ?
Whatever your assumptions here about 10-12-15nm ship-to-shore distances, outside of peace-time conditions and simulations, it seems very unlikely that you’d actually see ARGs exposing Sailors and MEU-Marines (and very large high-value objects/targets) in such exposed proximity. All because you insist on there not being any safer way to deliver the GCE ? I am all for romance and nostalgia – but what’s it with the slow-&-exposed combat-model you seem to cling to ? The Pacific experience was bad enough despite carriers, battleship, cruisers etc. helping out. But then there indeed were no alternatives.
Neither one of you are addressing asymmetric warfare threats and systems for both slowly-arriving peace-meal fashion ground-combat elements. And you seem to casually dismiss the risk to the ships from, say, simultaneously-launched swarm of very low-tech Kassams swamping ship-defenses ? Just a little luck for the adversary to get a leaker through to rattle the ARG’s CO a bit.
You should be hopping mad about what de facto lack of ship-to-shore transport capability you’ve been stuck with for too many generations of Sailors and Marines trying hard to overcome these very challenging hardware and thus doctrinal deficiencies - instead of taking issue with me supporting the proposal offered in that article to at long last get into the 21st century on heavy-lift systems.
Whatever old or new APC, not being able to deliver them in least time and maximum numbers due to the reflexive and persistent flat-out dismissal as ‘irrelevant’ of potent higher-speed heavy-lift LCU-geometries is even more of a sign of fractured reasoning.
Neither one of you seem to mind that due to their foot-print inside the ARG’s/ESG’s well-decks these LCUs are available in only very limited numbers, thus requiring ‘Hybrid Warriors’ to just damage a couple to have your ‘landing’ grind to an even slower pace if not outright halt. And thin-skinned LCACs are of little challenge to most portable systems available to agile adversaries. Then what ?
Response Part 2 of 2.:
ReplyDeleteNot only are you proposing to arrive in weak numbers. But you don’t seem to mind to put ARG/MEU at massive risk. Both of you appear to navigate by 50-year old hardware-dictated doctrinal reference-assumptions that sure do not hold up under both our recent war-fighting-experience nor under our projected fiscal realities with, for instance, reduced CSG availability and unlikely emergence of any new ‘magic’ systems that will make all those worries go away.
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“But really the issue resolves around whether or not the Navy has enough air power to set the right conditions for a beachhead operation to even begin..."
So every hallway serious engagement beyond Human Assistance/Disaster Relief requires a Carrier Strike Group in order for a MEU to engage the challenge ?
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“My prediction, AAVs and Cobra gunships will continue to be the two main vehicle solutions used to establish a beachhead..."
Certain very serious USMC folks have yanked the term ‘Beach-head’ out of their vocabulary a good while back.
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“However, with the spread of beyond the horizon radar systems, the fight for the beachhead really starts well beyond 100 miles..."
So you assume onshore presence of top-level OTH-radar-capability – but propose to plant the ARG/MEU right in the adversary’s face ?! Because of the need to do the slow APC-ride for whatever apparently personal reasons ?
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“So there you have it, we don't need a huge over the horizon effort because you are going to have to fight to get to that position anyways, long before dropping Marines off into the water to make their way to the fight..."
So what you are proposing is the USMC’s perpetual utter dependency upon a CSG for every maneuver above HA/DR ?!
“Shaping” the beach plus 20nm by cleansing it of any threats via massive air-power ??
How would zapping everything of perceived risk/value work in civil wars ?
To summarize, you both propose:
- Always bring a CSG.
- Somehow cleanse inshore-waters, beach, uplands and perhaps the rest of the province of perceived threats via massive air-power,
- Plant the ARG/MEU well within reach of even low-tech defenses.
- Plant stakes, beacons, and vehicle-lane demarcations in preparation for the Beach-Head construction.
- Proceed to bring your armored vehicles to shore slow and peace-meal via very few and vulnerable ship-to-shore transports.
- Amass in said Beach-Head your combat and supply assets.
- Proceed to pacify...
- Hope-&-Pray that no one has learned and developed further asymmetric ‘tricks’ and hybrid-warrior skill-sets.
Not likely.
Twenty Twenty.
ReplyDeleteResponse to everything you wrote.
How are you going to pay for it? There ain't no such thing as a free lunch.
Now, there are a gajillion ways to skin a cat, or establish a beachhead. You can do it with light forces in Zodiacs, heavy forces supported by air, hell, even a scuba assault by SEALs if you want. So your "emerging assymetric" threats are nothing but hollow rhetoric. Right now we have a "good mix" of capabilities that can come into play to do the job.
The impetus for change needs to be practical reality, NOT some theoretical justification for large scale purchases, or you end up with stuff like the LCS or the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle program. The GCV is a straight up cockup that tacitly admits they cocked up the Bradley program from the start. The Army is looking for a single vehicle solution, once again, to "do it all" and that will never happen. Tracked vehicles suck for routine patrols. Wheeled vehicles are too light to be the backbone of a heavy armor formation.
And really, what would the GCV look like? A bradley that can hold 9 dismounts. Sure what we have now is not "optimal" but it is a good "mix" between Brads, Strykers, Abrams, and MRAPs. Look at the total fight, not just the transition point you care so much about. You can get a way with a light ground assault force if you have total air superiority. You can get away with not having total air superiority if you have a good ADA capability. Winning wars is always about having the right mix.