I've been deep diving in the blogosphere to find Pacific area writers to get a local view of events there.
One of the blogs I ran across is RHK111. His latest is quite good and gives some info on the Perry class that I never knew. These warships, in their prime, were simply world class. Enough of me, read his stuff here.
What's happening is that the people in the Philippines are trying to push the US to give them a Perry class FFG. What they don't realize, is that the Philippine navy doesn't have any Recent experience in operating Frigates and operating weapons and systems that are common on a Multi Role frigates. The Philippine navy lacks skills and experience in operating complex multi Role frigates, and if the US were to hand one over to them. The learning curve is going to be extremely steep for them. The operating cost is going to drain their budget within one year.
ReplyDeleteThat's why I have advocated that the Philippines take baby steps and buy the remaining Hamilton class Cutters. Upgrade and arm them to light frigate standards that is similar to the Colombian navy's Almirante Padilla-class frigate and Malaysia Navy's Kasturi-class frigate. They need to learn all they can from operating the Hamilton class cutters before they go an buy an advance Multi Role frigate.
The experience they get from operating the Hamilton class Cutters will help them when they do get a Multi Role Frigate in the future. For now, they need to play catch up with the rest of the Asian Pacific nations.
Maybe a middle step would be for the USN to forward deploy one or two Reserve OHP frigates in the PI.
ReplyDeleteThe USN could station a mix of Active Duty and Activated Reserve personnel who could serve as "training" crew. Total personnel stationed in the PI would be the equivalent of a full complement for each ship, however they could be split among blue and gold teams with the PI Navy providing half of the personnel to fill out each team. Rotation would include periods of short week-long cruises, operational and rapid "getting underway" type drills and hands-on ship maintenance and INSURV training. These could then be alternated with periods of onshore duty that would include classroom, maybe some simulation training and of course extensive training in providing home port support for advanced multi-role frigate squadrons. These frigates might also be able to provide some of the teething assistance so desperately needed for the LCS's being deployed in Singapore.
Obviously, for this to work we would need experienced sailors to volunteer for this duty. However given the number of USN sailors with family ties to the PI and the ability of many to speak Tagalog as well as Spanish, I think we would have enough capable volunteers for this special duty.
Obviously, we all know the tired old arguments of this kind of involvement in South East Asia, however I see many potential (and maybe less obvious) benefits from this kind of arrangement...
First, it would provide a strong training potential for our own sailors in joint operations that could greatly benefit us in other theaters as well. We have operated with small detachments of sailors onboard foreign vessels and vice-versa, however this level of integration with joint crews could serve to build the leadership skills of both Navies.
Second, the US could reassert some full-time presence in the South East Asian Seas while not necessarily committing to a full full-time battle group. This could also provide a complement to the proposed US Marine Stationing in the PI. However, because the ships would be jointly operated and eventually transferred to the Philippine Navy, it would be easier for their government to politically defend US Forces being stationed in-country.
Third, because the Philippines would be gaining ships and training, the US could request some cost sharing even if that payment was in the form of manpower. The USN would at the minimum be able to reduce personnel and support costs for the frigate squadron or could ask for considerations in terms of broader fleet support.
Fourth, this operation would help to rebuild the homeporting services in the Philippines that could then provide valuable port, replenishment and possibly even repair services to both the PI and allied Navies in a vital region. Philippine shore support training for the OHP class would allow them to provide an away port with expert support for Taiwan, Australian, and potential Thai OHP frigates.
Fifth, the ongoing "training" operation is desperately needed by all countries in the region to counter Chinese aggression and by the US to maintain relevancy. The full-time joint nature of this OP would also give the US a much needed ability to daily monitor the activities in the region.
Finally, these vessels when combined with the other OHP frigates in the region would form a very capable joint-squadron force that with the LCS's in Singapore could hold the line until the 7th Fleet arrived.