via POGO
The Air Force is so blinded by the allure of the multi-mission F-35 that it cannot, or will not, understand the nature of close air support (CAS) on today’s battlefield; how very close our young troops are to the enemy and the special equipment, controllers, and pilots it takes to perform CAS.The truth is rather stark.
Until recently, without the knowledge of Congress, the Air Force was moving fast on a secret plan to help fund the F-35 by abolishing the A-10 fleet. Thanks to some closet patriots contacting the Hill, the cat is now out of the bag, but the damage has already been done.
A-10 training hours have been cut back and the last class of A-10 pilots is going through training. Three A-10 units have been deactivated or are in the process of being deactivated. Next year there will be no A-10 class at the Weapons School. Each step has increased the unit costs of the remaining A-10s and soon the fleet will be too expensive to keep. By the time Congress is aware of the plot, there will be no A-10s.
The plan to get rid of the A-10 has been on the desk of General Mark A. Welsh III, Air Force Chief of Staff. His decision will be one of the most important of his career, because this is not about losing an aircraft; it is about losing the CAS mission. There is no other aircraft in the Air Force inventory that can do what the A-10 does. The stories from the battlefield are countless. One will suffice.
In Afghanistan a Special Forces team attacked the compound of a Taliban leader. The Taliban reacted with heavy fire and the Air Force combat controller with the team was severely wounded. A Predator was overhead but could not get a shot. Nor could an F-16 which ran low on gas and departed. When two A-10s arrived, the gravely wounded controller called for them to make their gun runs “danger close.” The pilots fired high explosive cannon shells that impacted a mere 65 feet from the team. The A-10s broke up the attack and provided cover so the friendlies could leave the kill zone.
Every member survived. Every member returned to base. The combat controller, who had almost bled to death on the battlefield, survived and was awarded the Air Force Cross.
Few aircraft in history have so directly saved the lives of so many combat troops and civilians as has the A-10.
Pentagon insiders report that the Air Force fears the efficacy of the A-10 so much that today combat controllers are not allowed to call for the aircraft. Rather they are ordered to radio the results they desire and headquarters will dispatch the appropriate aircraft. Today when troops are in contact and the enemy is close, controllers call for an aircraft with two-hour loiter time and more than ten combat trigger pulls, attributes possessed only by the A-10.
The Air Force says the F-35 can perform CAS. That would mean using GPS coordinates and standing off at high altitude to fire missiles or drop bombs. No $160-million F-35 is going to get down in the weeds where a single bullet can take it out. A host of small arms fire hitting an A-10 can be fixed with what amounts to duct tape. No F-35 can maneuver under an 800-foot ceiling with two-mile visibility as can an A-10. No F-35 has more than three combat trigger pulls before running out of ammo. The A-10 has twenty. No F-35 has the battlefield survivability of the A-10.
But the Air Force has staked 60 per cent of its aircraft budget on the claimed multi-mission versatility of the F-35, and that is what General Welsh wants to protect.
By all accounts, General Welsh is a highly-respected leader and a fine man. But he has been on the job only a year and is facing so many issues, some strategic and immediate, that he has not had time to conduct due diligence regarding the A-10. If he allows the A-10 to wither away by the end of 2015, he will have broken faith with the young men and women on the ground in faraway places. He will have deceived Congress about the force structure of the Air Force. He will have violated his doctrinal obligation to protect America’s ground troops.
He will probably get his F-35. But he will have paid for it with the blood of brave young warriors.
For a small ulta high tech air arm, we're abandoning our people on the ground. How much is the payout on SGLI? I guess a squad of Soldiers or Marines is still cheaper than losing a F-35. I imagine Rummy would be proud of the metrics done in that type of analysis.
Actually the F-35 has no gun capability because no one, 12 years after contract award, has shown proof of being able to gun a target: air-to-air, or air-to-ground.
ReplyDeleteHow many shells does the F-35 carry? A couple of hundred if that?
DeleteWhy you guys don't make a petition on the White House's site "We the people..." asking for keep the A-10? The prank petition for build a Death Star got 34435 signatures, I think that you guys and your relatives and friends can get a much higher number than that. Complain is fine, but some activism sounds better.
ReplyDeletemilitary activisim is different from social activism.
Deletethey protest in the streets. that's not the military way.
they write petitions. thats not the military way.
we engage in discussions, read papers, listen to lectures and refute it on boards through writings etc...its less vocal, but more effective in my opinion.
additionally military people pay attention to the debates. it might not seem like it but despite my critics you'd be surprised by the people that actually glance at my blog. believe me. the USAF is getting the message loud and clear. just ask Elements of Power.
I've been trying to track down F-35 unit cost, as well as F-135 engine unit cost. It's nearly mission impossible because the project office and even the IG and the GAO don't report it. (I've had NO luck on the engine cost.)
ReplyDeleteSo finally after a long search I went to the FY 2014 DOD Budget Request.
http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2014/amendment/fy2014_p1a.pdf
p. N-3 Navy Aircraft procurement
(dollars in thousands)
JSF STOVL 6 a/c $1,426,589 = $237m
JSF CV 7 a/c $1,656,382 = $236m
For the total Marine Corps F-35 fleets that unit cost (which has been rising) works out --
STOVL (B) - 340 @ $236m = $80.2B
CV (C) - 80 @ $237m = $19.0B
= $99.2B total procurement cost at those unit costs- let's call it $100 billion
--that's plus retrofit, spares, etc.
--that compares with the MC annual budget of about $25 billion
oops -- mixed up the 236 & 237, but it's in the noise & CEFGW
DeleteJust for fun, what would you buy instead of the F-35 for the money? Can you imagine equipping the Marines with $99.2B worth of goodies. Every patrol could have their own personal A-10 etc. What are we really gaining? What is the mission/enemy that the F-35 is essential to have for?? I'm sorry, I know you have covered all this before but I can't wrap my head around no A-10s. Why not just replace all the Abrams with Strykers and Arleigh Burkes with the LCS. My head hurts.
ReplyDeleteI forgot to add a Bravo Zulu to Don for ferreting-out those numbers.
ReplyDelete