Tuesday, October 29, 2013

Amos' history explains his failure as Commandant.

This is a copy of a comment Paralus made about my question regarding MV-22 survivability in and around the landing zone (approach and departure).
Back in 2001, everyone thought that Brig. Gen. Amos would be forced to retire after he was caught telling lies about V-22 readiness and conspiring to hide V-22 failures from civilian leaders. The Inspector General even seized his computer. "

"The commander of the first Osprey squadron was taped ordering his maintenance crews to lie about the V-22's mission capable rates in the interests of obtaining approval for full-rate production. Last Nov. 21, Marine Brig. Gen. James Amos e-mailed a 'close hold' memo to Lt. Gen. Frederick McCorkle, stating his fear that a report of low mission capable rates of 26.7 percent for early November 'isn't going to help' in regard to the upcoming production decision. Significantly, the only non-Marines on the address list for the memo were the president of Bell Textron and a vice president of Boeing. Then, on Dec. 1, during a news conference convened expressly to explain why the V-22 was ready for full-rate production, Amos claimed that its mission capable rate for the first 13 days of November had been 73.2 percent."General Amos was not forced to retire, but was rewarded with three more promotions and is now the top Marine - the Commandant! He continues to spin lies about the V-22's readiness, safety record, performance, and the need to keep Futenma open."
No wonder this guy is an ethically challenged Commandant; he was an ethically challenged GOWS. This guy is a straight up Courtney Massengale.
Once a douche, always a douche.... 
Well said.

The issue with the MV-22 is bringing many disturbing questions to the fore.

1.  How can the Marine Corps afford a helicopter that costs as much as a 4th gen fighter?
2.  What are the REAL availability rates for this machine?
3.  What are the REAL maintenance costs for this machine?

The Commandant and Asst. Commandant can both talk about how needed this airplanes are (including the F-35) but will we be able to afford to keep them in the air?  The USAF has a HUGE support infrastructure for its stealth aircraft and things appear to be heading in a direction where the F-35 AND the MV-22 will be gobbling up not only procurement but maintenance dollars.

Amos is a disease.

He has be shown to be without integrity on at least two highly documented occasions and he's fired subordinates and wanted Marines "crushed" for less.

He has to go.

USMC 0802 offered up this link and its Required reading.  G2mil.com

13 comments :

  1. Great post, "Don". ;)

    It's just a cut-and-paste from G2mil's article. My comments were related to the Commandant's douche status.

    ReplyDelete
  2. The legacy lives on, the legend persists.
    DoD IG Report, Oct 23, 2013
    Joint Warfighting and Readiness
    MV-22 Squadrons Could Improve Reporting of Mission Capability Rates and Readiness (Project No. D2011-D000LH-0170.000)
    The report is Classified. To request a copy, file a Freedom of Information Act request. Federal Government requesters: please click here.
    DODIG-2014-001

    What We Found
    From FY 2009 through FY 2011, MV-22 squadron commanders computed the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program MCR for five of the six squadrons using erroneous aircraft inventory reports and work orders. Squadron maintenance personnel:

    improperly recorded MV-22 aircraft status information 167 of 200 times on aircraft inventory reports for out-of-reporting periods; and
    did not adequately prepare 112 of 907 work orders that we reviewed.

    In addition, MV-22 squadron commanders submitted incomplete or inaccurate readiness reports for the six squadrons. For example, squadron operations personnel provided incomplete or inaccurate R-level information for 199 of 265 readiness reports. Furthermore, 5 squadrons did not provide complete C-level information for 127 of 265 readiness reports.

    This occurred because MV-22 squadron commanders did not:

    adequately train MV-22 maintenance personnel to prepare aircraft inventory reports and work orders nor MV-22 operations personnel on readiness reports;
    verify the accuracy of aircraft inventory reports, work orders, and readiness reports; or
    place a continued emphasis on the reliability of data critical to the MCR.

    As a result, the MCRs were unreliable, and senior DoD and Marine Corps officials could have deployed MV-22 squadrons that were not prepared for missions.

    http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/report_summary.cfm?id=5353

    ReplyDelete
  3. Capt. Ulsh gave Breaking Defense this response:
    “Naval Aviation relies on multiple data sources and reporting systems for readiness metrics. As such, the human interface can create inaccuracies through input error or improper procedures; minimizing such errors and ensuring procedural correctness is paramount and requires constant emphasis and oversight to ensure safety and operational readiness reporting that is useful to commanders.”

    “At the heart of readiness reporting is safety; operational effectiveness and safety are inseparable. Over the course of the past six years, over 18 MV-22 deployments and contingency operations have been executed on time with properly trained and equipped combat ready Marines and mission capable aircraft.”

    Inaccuracies from the human interface? So what. It's not like anything bad might happen--

    Stripes
    Marines: Osprey damaged beyond repair in Nevada crash
    Sep 4, 2013 – The Marine Corps said Wednesday that an MV-22 Osprey crash in Nevada last month resulted in the complete loss of the aircraft but the investigation into the cause of the incident remains ongoing.

    The crash has been labeled a Class A mishap, which is the most severe rating given to air incidents and means the overall damage exceeded $2 million, according to the public affairs office at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar in California, where the Osprey was based.
    http://www.stripes.com/news/marine-corps/marines-osprey-damaged-beyond-repair-in-nevada-crash-1.239322

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Right -- make that about $85 million over $2 million.

      Delete
    2. I have a hard time believing that much paperwork and records were done improperly. OR some people need to lose their jobs and/or rank...or someone way above has issued an "order" to confuse and/or do some shoddy book keeping to make the V22 look better than it is. When I was in Army aviation, we would get chewed out for not writing up stuff not even remotely as important as this stuff, no way this is done with the higher ranks not looking the other way and/or being complicit.

      Delete
    3. Sure looks like whatever money they can find will go towards F35 and screw everything else:

      http://finance.yahoo.com/news/pentagon-sees-sufficient-progress-boost-fiscal-2015-f-001520984--finance.html

      Delete
  4. Now that is some good data, Don.

    I always wondered how the problems with the Osprey were ironed out so quick and now we know why. Deliberate obfuscation concealing that they never did work to begin with.

    And now they are doing the same shit with the F35. What do you bet we never get to see the real availability rates from the F35?

    ReplyDelete
  5. The MV-22 costs ~20% MORE than a Gen 4.5 fighter (Super Hornet) ~66M for MV-22, ~54M for F/A-18E/F

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Yes, I was working with V-22 at $87m but I see your figure is better. Here it is at $68 million.

      http://www.aircraftcompare.com/helicopter-airplane/Bell-V-22-Osprey/201

      Delete
  6. The cost of fudged records.

    wiki
    The V-22 Osprey had 7 hull-loss accidents with a total of 36 fatalities. During testing from 1991 to 2000 there were four crashes resulting in 30 fatalities.Since becoming operational in 2007, the V-22 has had three crashes resulting in six fatalities including one combat-zone crash, and several minor incidents. A dozen V-22s have allegedly been scrapped after unreported mishaps.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accidents_and_incidents_involving_the_V-22_Osprey

    ReplyDelete
  7. There's something on survivability and flight envelope in this handbook, pp 52-53.

    2010 Guidebook
    http://www.boeing.com/ospreynews/2011/issue_01/final_8jun2010_179638.pdf

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. Can anybody tell me what "Satisfactory" means?
      Page 7 - "From Concept to Reality".
      KPP: Survivability: Ballistic Tolerance 12.7mm @ 90% velocity
      Reality: Satisfactory (BLRIP-LFT&E)

      Page 51: " Cockpit seats are armored to withstand a 7.62mm small arms round."

      Don't shoot the aircraft, just shoot the pilot?

      Delete

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