Task Force 58.
It is a footnote in the history of the war in Afghanistan but its caught the attention of the Commandant, the Air Wing, Think Tanks, Opinion Makers and Marine Corps futurist.
And they're all wrong.
A down and dirty....Task Force 58 was composed of Marines from the 15th MEU (Battalion Landing Team 1/1) flew into Afghanistan across Pakistan from the sea, in essence conducting the longest heliborne assault in our nations history. They were also the first conventional forces in theater (although they earned the Special Operations Capable designation) and they were led by General Mattis. Long story short, it was a successful operation and the Marines were relieved in place by the 101st Airborne (Air Assault).
SIDNOTE: Many people confuse the fact that the 26th MEU linked up with the 15th AFTER the initial assault and believe it was a combined op. Technically it was but as I stated earlier. The initial assault was conducted by the 15th MEU and BLT 1/1. Information is spotty on the net but a fairly brief and not well written account of the action can be found on Wikipedia under Camp Rhino (click here to read it for yourself).
Procurement is not matching doctrine.
Marine Corps leadership is currently infatuated with the idea of an "Airborne Marine Corps". I found an article written by Major General McKenzie, the USMC representative to the Quadrennial Defense Review is quoted by Foreign Policy as saying....
"I think the best example of what being amphibious means to the Marine Corps is Task Force 58. I think it's Brigadier General Jim Mattis launching off the Pakistan coast, striking deep into southern Afghanistan. No amphibious vehicles crossed a beach in that operation," said McKenzieUnfortunately for Marine leadership, the premise of that type thinking was based on a perpetual war on terror. US involvement in hotspots all over the globe and no "pivot to the Pacific".
Its been said that the Pentagon is like an aircraft carrier at sea. It changes slowly. I'd say its more like a crack addict waiting on a fix. If certain "mafia" organizations inside that five sided building can tailor a particular administrations thinking to fit their worldview then they latch onto it like a bulldog on a bone. That's what the Marine Corps did in pushing this "Airborne Marine Corps Concept," in attempting to tailor its "Sea Base" to the current administration's emphasis on humanitarian assistance and protecting populations worldwide but NOT in its pivot to the Pacific.
And that's where the Airborne Marine Corps falls apart.
In a A2/AD world, a heliborne USMC is far more vulnerable both in the assault and follow on assault phases. Additionally the number of personnel available to conduct either a raid or more ominously a deliberate assault will be so small and so dependent on aerial support as to make cutting them off and destroying them in place a real possibility.
The main problem is simple.
An Airborne Marine Corps does not fit with the Air Sea Battle Doctrine (as I read it anyway). If AOL Defense is correct in the US Army actually seeking a seat at the table (read it here) then the "airborne" portion of the equation is actually covered. What is needed is a robust, sea going, combined arms force capable of carrying out missions across the spectrum.
The real answer is painfully simple.
Enhance the capabilities of the MEU. Practice real contingency operations with the MEU/Army Airborne & Stryker Brigades, integrate Army Air Defense Artillery (and other capabilities found in their ground formations) into MEU's and MEB's through detachments that can fly in and are trained in how "Marines operate"...and develop interoperability across the services (you can toss the USAF a bone by getting their Red Horse Group some sea legs and have them follow the same type planning as with Army units detached to Marines). Not in the ponderous COIN model, but in a fluid-high intensity warfare model that will highlight strained communications, intense small unit actions against capable foes, increased reliance on artillery instead of air assets etc.
Remember the pic below? I wondered aloud where the CH-53's were. Now I think my suspicions have been confirmed. I think a dry run was being practiced to see whether or not the Marine Corps should/could transition to an all MV-22 force.
An all MV-22 based force would be a mistake.
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, heliborne assault was the wave of the future. Helicopters would rule the battlefield and if our vehicles were air transportable then they were no good out the box. What did we get for that type thinking?
Above you see the Mighty Mite. It was designed to be lifted by the UH-34. It was rendered obsolete when regular helicopters could easily transport the standard jeep. Below the pic of the Mighty Mite you see the Ontos AntiTank Vehicle. It was designed to be air transportable and provide antiarmor punch and infantry support for air transported Marines.
Both had extremely short service lives because they were narrowly tailored weapon systems designed around a need that had no doctrinal basis.
We'd be repeating the mistakes of those futurist before that wanted to transform the Marine Corps into something it was never meant to be. If America needed another Air Assault Division the Army would marinize some UH-60M's and teach its soldiers how to swim. The future of the Marine Corps is found in its past. Most ready when the nation is least. Shock Troops. Teufel Hounds.
Aviation centric thinking at the highest level of the Marine Corps is leading to basic mistakes. The desire to "leave his stamp" on the Marine Corps is leading to bigger mistakes. I don't know how to do it, but the "Airborne Marine Corps" talk must be crushed (Like how I did that?)
... hence the significant opportunities of fast heavy-lift LCU-Fs for instance...preferably from am ARG- secure distance of between 100-200+nm...
ReplyDeleteHaul the AH/UH on their afterdecks to just near shore before launch to allow solid full-load combat-radius.
Have as many of those in the theater as possible via retention of all just-SLEP'd 8-vessel LSD-41 440-foot well-deck ships, with each fit to carry 6x LCU-F i.e. pushing 6x 200tons of GCE-gear to shore.
And instead of more LPD-17-based amphibs, building anew for about 50-60% this well-proven and just updated LSD-41 class would allow 4-ship MEUs with thus up to 18 LCU-Fs plus 3x LCACs in LHDs. Utterly unprecedented amphibious assault capability.
Then:
- Take two of these LCU-Fs and load them up with either 2x MLRS for 48-barrel shore-bombardment plus at least 6 reloads each for 288 shots.
- Or instead of one of the two MLRS, slide in a twin mount of ex-M110 39-cal 203mm barrels - now stabilized - for more punch. For significant additional range pull the barrels out of 52-cal or even 62-cal. Two such 203mm barrels with at least 400 rounds plus the MLRS system would result in a very agile 420-tons MEU-based Inshore Fire Support system via 4x 203mm barrels and 24 launch-tubes, none of which are ready targetable with the usual counter-battery systems since LCU-F (IFS) would constantly be moving, but leveraging its range over any other known system by staying close inshore, just out of mortar, tank-gun, etc. reach.
So you're down to 16 LCU-Fs.
Take another two as combat-tankers hauling 55,000gals of fuel each, initially to serve as AH/UH inshore refueling/rearming/re-crewing platforms.
At 14 LCU-Fs - plus 3 LCACs - you are in a fine position to bring a well-equipped GCE to shore in one First Wave in up to 17 concurrent surface-borne insertion-points.
This is essential to a USMC reemphasizing its unique amphibious skill-set. Nobody could claim ARMY #2 language to chisel at its budget. In fact, USMC may take from USA the budget-percentages it needs to boost US's global capabilities, including for HA/DR missions to produce premium-value PR.
All those rockets and shells make that landingship a giant floating bomb.
DeletePlus, the MLRS system isn't certified to operate on a ship and would probably rust out very quickly. You can't just weld weapons to ships and get good results.
Oh, and I am sure a Exocet or C-802 would LOVE the nice fat radar target those ships provide.
And where praytell would these ships be used?
Certainly not against a competent adversary with a few dozen ASMs, or a halfway decent AF, which eliminates almost all potential US adversaries outside of sub-Saharan Africa.
but wait! the F-35 is suppose to not only be a superior multi-role airplane but stealthy plus its suppose to have the added benefit of sensor fusion! they can locate anti-ship batteries ashore but with our massive fleet of F-35's worldwide, all that opposition will be swept away in a glorious and wonderful fight that sees peace justice and the American way win every time.
Deleteunder those conditions we can conduct an amphibious assault. and if we can't do amphibious then we DAMN sure can't do heliborne or airborne!!! so i guess that makes the 82nd and 101st obsolete too right?????
but realistically and if you're not trying to be a pain, what you would do is systematically roll back enemy defenses...that is what Air Sea Battle is all about A2/AD!!!!! stay focused!!!!!
Admiral General McSpadden would argue that HIMARS is that different from MLRS ?
DeleteNobody would be welding anything, particularly with both barrel- and tube artillery just modules to be slid inside and locked down in any generic LCU-F's cargo-bays, i.e. typically dry and well maintainable with the techs warm and cozy, until the roof-hatches open up for a few, launchers and barrels get elevated and stabilized to respective resolutions and the buttons get pushed.
If you go and study LCU-F, you'd find it's 9-10-foot air-draft may not be so easy to hit between the swells. Low-tech coatings would reduce any remaining signal-returns further.
Work the stuff ! Use it. Don't dismiss this early in the 'game'.
Great post. I think that Air Sea Battle has not been talked about nearly enough.
ReplyDeleteAfter all it is the purpose of the F-35B.
I agree with many of your points about the limitations of air assaulted forces. It is also somewhat inexplicable how the USMC botched considerations of heavy weapons for MV22-centric forces (if you constrain the MV-22 based off the AH-1/CH=53 it loses it range/speed advantages but if you don't the troops land with nothing heavier than a man can carry for direct fire).
ReplyDeleteAir assault forces however do hold an advantage in that an investment in air assault equipment retains its full capability in any ground war, regardless of whether geography (A-stan) or just strategy (Iraq, twice, and almost all of Vietnam) preclude amphibious landings. You have to go all the way back to Inchon to find a significant amphibious landing that needed the heavy, over the beach capabilities you're talking about with LSDs, LCUs etc. Even Inchon was only one op in a three year war: all the rest of the time the USMC just fought as infantry. I'm not suggesting that the USMC give up on regular amphibious assault, just that if you look at how the USMC has actually been fighting, vertical lift investments have paid off a lot more than amphibious ones.
Other point is that the Ontos actually performed well when used as intended. While it was very vulnerable to mines it did a lot of very good fire support work in Vietnam and, with its light weight and wide tracks, could go a lot of places tanks couldn't. The Ontos in Vietnam were basically used until they wore out, even the Army taking the last few from the USMC and running them until spare parts were exhausted before digging them in as bunkers.
i think that the utility of heliborne transported troops is completely overblown. think back to the initial invasion into Iraq in Gulf War 2. think about the air raid (i don't know what the Army calls it) that Apaches attempted and got chewed up by Republican Guards. no one talks about it but that unit was COMBAT INEFFECTIVE after that incident. they had an airborne regiment(?) filled with holes and they were of no further use in the conflict until replacements or repairs could be done.
Deleteadditionally no one talks about the helicopter shootdowns in Iraq or Afghanistan but i know for a fact that rumors were flying that the insurgents got ahold of some MANPADS and urgent operational requests for DIRCM was flying out of Corps Headquarters like their was no tomorrow. 1st MEF almost had that trash FEDEX'ed into country they were so desperate for them.
lastly we're talking about Air Sea Battle and the situation that is predicted isn't pretty even if we take HQMC's view that we'll be fighting insurgents and criminals with advanced weapons. if we take the JCS' view then we'll be fighting either a peer or a peer competitors weapons and tactics that mirror our own. either view means that we will be facing not only MANPADS but either fully or partially integrated antiair weapon systems. that means doom on heliborne assaults of the type done in Afghanistan.
Again, don't disagree with many of your points. Just like airborne troops years ago, we've found out that assaulting directly into the enemy only works when you have surprise and they have lousy air defenses. Otherwise you have to go to where the enemy isn't and then move, which takes us right back to one of the problems with an MV-22 based force . . . that aircraft was just not built to carry anything except people.
DeleteAs for Air-Sea battle, even if you accept it as a strategy, there is no place in it for either airborne, air assault, or amphibious assault. You cannot do any of those three without absolute air superiority and massive suppression/disruption of enemy missile defenses (SAM for the former, anti-ship missiles for the latter). In other words, all three methods are irrelevant until after the 'peer vs peer air-sea battle' has been decisively won. Even then, it's possible to get into big trouble very quickly.
Mostly the Army just brings a few missiles to the party, useful for defending territory you already have but little else. The rest is show for PR and budget reasons (just like Air-Sea battle itself).
totally disagree. Air Sea Battle has a natural place for both Marine and Army operations. those operations can be in support of naval/air objectives (think Iwo Jima, not for the landing but for what it allowed...). my bigger point is that the Marines should be looking at ways to work with the USAF and USN to establish local air superiority...not air dominance but superiority. a corridor could be established that would allow for successful amphibious assaults. but you ask. if you can set up local conditions for an amphibious assault then why not heliborne assaults! i answer because surface assaults using AAVs, LCACs etc allow for a more rapid and heavier buildup for forces. additionally those forces can be used in the Iwo Jima model to establish forward air bases (primitive though they may be) that can be assembly areas for later use by Marine, Army Airborne or Army Air Assault units to strike deeper into the enemy's rear. we would simply expand the bubble of local air superiority with one added caveat. in addition to Burke's and USAF/USN/USMC airpower securing the skies we would also have Army patriot batteries, maybe a Stryker Brigade for base security and another to do screening of enemy locations for deliberate attacks by MEU/MEB/MEF units. i still need to get the grasp of Air Sea battle but i believe it has room for all of the above. i just want to tweak it so that the Marine Corps isn't pushed down the Air Assault path to destruction.
DeleteI think the world helo-heavy-lift record is somewhere around 25metric tons held by a Russian Mil-Mi 26, with several hundred flying, though none in the US (?!).
DeleteSikorski CH-53K will offer under 16 tons of max lift, I think.
Puts a lot around 'Vertical Envelopment' into perspective...
Heliborne assault is fantastically useful.
ReplyDeleteThe problem is, its even more fantastically expensive.
For the cost of maintaining a helicopter assault ship, a marine infantry battalion, the 20-25 V22s required to land them in one drop*, you could, well, I have absolutely no idea what you could afford.
Three battalions landed by LSD, LST and LCU? Who would be landed heavier and with better ongoing mobility.
I'm afraid interrogating the DoD isnt one of my strong points, so I'll leave the shopping list to others
*http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ia_Drang
stay focused. we're talking about its utility in the Air Sea Battle in a A2/AD environment. the battle of Ia Drang isn't illuminating in this. air superiority was achieved across the board. the only element of that battle that is telling is the number of forces needed...the SLOW buildup of forces in the landing zone..the vulnerability of those forces while the buildup occured...the inability of air power to nullify the threat from enemy forces that would allow helicopter reinforcements to land...the difficulty of keeping this unit supplied and in the aftermath the necessity for that heliborne force to be relieved in place by a mechanized infantry unit.
DeleteHEROES with stones the size of a mountain fought that fight but as a concept, it proved to me how fragile heliborne assault actually is. if it wasn't for the leadership displayed by the Commanding Officer of that unit...the SgtMajor of that unit and numerous small unit leaders/NCOs that command would have been decimated. Warriors saved that battleplan. NOT TECHNOLOGY.
It was just a side note to explain why I think its an absolute requirement to drop a unit in one wave*. (Many) Supporters of Heliborne Assault are quick to try and stack the deck by argueing it can be done much cheaper, that it can be done with a third of the (minimum) lift I argue it needs.
DeleteLa Drang was a bloody victory that could easily have been the total loss of a battalion, mostly through dumb luck (I fully accept that there was a small group of men there who could beat bears to death with their cocks, but that they were there to salvage the situation was luck).
Had the entire battalion dropped in the first wave, its unlikely I'd have heard of it.
It would have been a hard fought battle no doubt
*It applies equally to forces deploying by sea, you'll frequently find me complaining about the paucity LCUs within the Royal Marines. It took more than a week to land the first wave of the British forces and we had our own disaster at bluff cove.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluff_Cove_Air_Attacks
Sorry for further off topicing
no you're right and TWENTYTWENTY would whole heartedly agree with you (although his answer to whether catamarans are advantageous for combat vessels left me wondering about his academic credentials)...the Marine Corps is talking out of both sides of its neck on the issue.
Deletethe USMC beats the Navy upside the head about not having enough amphibious shipping but when it comes to actually getting the ASSAULT WAVE ashore, nothing is said. i imagine if you assembled every available LCAC and AAV you could achieve the type of buildup possible, but with a heliborne assault you would need every helo in the Marine Corps AND every helo in the 101st with probably an assist from a couple of other Army Combat Aviation Brigades to get the job done.
even with that you wouldn't have the combat power ashore that you could with a realistic surface/heliborne assault in the finest Marine Corps tradition. oh and be advised when i talk about needing to assemble every LCAC in the fleet and AAV i'm talking about doing a landing with a MEF sized force....of course you'd still end up leaving grunts on the ships but thats what the assault follow on is for...they'd exploit the openings of the assault wave.
i know this sounds so WW2, but if you think about it, every form of forcible entry that is realistic is of WW2. i'm still not sold on a pure heliborne forcible entry but airborne and amphibious???? yeah, it'll take some hard work but it could be done...even today...despite what the rabid anti-Marine Corps critics say.
Methinks that TrT and Solomon may have gotten that LCU-F-bug beginning to course through their veins ?
ReplyDeleteAnd there's no inoculations available !!
'Brilliant concepts' burn themselves into memory. Until we find they won't work too well after all, that is... though not likely here in light of the overall simplicity of basic geometries and otherwise plain-vanilla Diesel-based COTS drivetrain. No exotic stuff apparently in need of invention first.
If TrT and others would go back to the posting by Sol on July 5th re the PROCEEDINGS piece on that proposal, we'd see a productive arc of discussion in pursuit of boosting USMC's amphibious capabilities.
And with the QDR next year possibly more important than ever, due to the serious fiscal constraints, USMC's future may see serious utility in looking at such modern ship-to-shore hardware. We'll see.
In the meantime, doing war-games here based on for instance those numbers right on top should make for intriguing times in the longer evenings coming up.
Then figure an MEB scenario. Then... Gets the mind humming. Courtesy of Sol recognizing a good thing when he saw it.
Sol, how'd you set up such a 'war-gaming' format here ?
I guess, just letting thing evolve in the regular flow with everybody's thinking-'helmet' on might be just perfect.
You'd likely start out with the usual (funky) 'topographic maps' of Realistania as the 'eye-&-brain catcher, assign an ARG/MEU as the game's baseline and "Bob's your uncle". (Somehow sounds creepy, that...)
At any rate...
No doubt in my mind that USMC is going to be reduced to air assault missions with maybe some very light armor. Easy, just follow the money!
ReplyDeleteNew F35B, new MV22s, newish UH/H1s, new CH53K....and all the ground stuff is getting "postponed" or cancelled. What does that leave the Marine Corps with? A couple of M1s that will be easy to give back to the Army, they are too "heavy" for air assault and some beat up AAVs that will be replaced with some "Marine" Striker/LAV and voila, Marine Corps is ready for nation building and peace keeping, maybe taking a Somali village if DoD or White House doesn't warn the Somalis first....forget all that stuff fighting China, game's over, we have already given up, most people just don't know it yet.
It's not even a question of capability or technology, it's a question of moral, when you see the idiots we have in Washington and the other idiots that keep reelecting the same idiots, this country has lost the will to fight. Now, I have to go watch "Honey boo-boo"...*sarcasm*
not in my lifetime if i can help it. i'm one tiny voice but i'll be screaming at the top of my lungs. but i do believe you'll see the destruction of many favored organizations and possibly even the country if we keep acting as we do.
DeleteWell, Sol, you do your thing and I'll do my LCU-F end of it - and we'll make it happen.
DeleteWho knew - comrades in a common cause ?!
Actually, should never have been unexpected.
Sol,
ReplyDeleteYou probably read Douglas Macgregor's article earlier in the year where he describes the Marine Corps and the XVIII Corps as niche forces. He also wrote that the LPD and LHA need to go and we need to focus on the LSD-41 and LCACs. He's an armor guy. I liked the article and wonder if instead of becoming a middle weight force with expensive tilt rotors and F-35B, the Corps instead becomes a type of ACR.
as soon as the Marine Corps starts replicating forces found in the Army (and I mean on a large scale like becoming a 101st...or an ACR) then they become obsolete.
DeleteMcGregor is a charlatain. he made a concept that is based on the Marine Corps organization and then he basically puts forth concepts that will lead to its destruction. i'm NOT a fan of his. he had his time in the sun but i believe in the end Divisions will be the warfighting force that they once were. brigades structures in a force as large as the Army causes too much additional overhead.
MacGregor's perspective is one of the many almost inevitable but highly dubious intellectual consequences of living for too long under the dictate of the 'missing link' in amphibious assault hardware and thus doctrine - the absence of heavy-lift fast ship-to-shore Connectors available in adequate numbers in the ARG.
DeleteMacGregor is not alone in this short-circuiting of logic, based on what USMC physically can indeed not do right now. But with a solution plausibly at hand via LCU-F, MacGregor et. al. would all fall backwards off their perch-of-wisdom into the muck of they own myopic assumptions cultivated across years of public commentary. And that would designate them as 'superannuated', or worse 'incoherent'. But by then, who would notice... ?
If he were current on this option, how would he deal with this new opportunity ?
Flip 180 ?
Shrink with searing embarrassment and move to 'a quiet place' somewhere ?
Instead of figuring a technical and thus doctrinal solution, he is one of quite a few who cover that incapacity with hand-waving postulations about the irrelevance of amphibious assault and thus much of the Marines' raison-d'etre.
Well, NOT.
USMC is a unique capability in need to be boosted massively in its amphibious capabilities. And one effective low-tech and thus affordable options appears to be on the table.
What makes the Marines different?
ReplyDeleteArmy has Mech and they ride AFV/APC
Army has Air assault/Airborne they ride choppers or Hercy birds.
Army has Infantry they hump it. never flying or riding.
The Army troops in Mech rarely ride choppers, the Heloborne rarely ride Mech and leg Infantry (if they exist anymore) walks or rides trucks.
Army specializes it's soldiers for the unit they belong too.
A Marine Rifleman rides an Assault transport, hops into a Mike boat, AmTrac or LCAC, to the beach or rides a helo or tilt rotor across the beach, and hops into a LAV then makes a ramp insertion and humps it to an AmTrac for a mission that ends up taking a Helo back to the Ship.
The Average Marine operates as Mech, Air Assault, or truck mounted Infantry with interchangeability.
That is what makes Marine operation's so lethal and so different.
Zebra Dun, I've rolled in Strykers and MRAPs, flown in Blackhawks and Chinooks, jumped from C-130s and C-17s and have never truly experienced this "specialization" of which you speak. Heck, even the 75th Ranger Regiment, the Crown Jewel of Army Light Infantry chose to roll in Strykers in Iraq. 11B is the same MOS from 1st Armor to 82nd Airborne. We do expect units to train to excellence with the delivery method they are slotted for, but I listened to a DCG-M brag that he'd task organized a Field Artillery Battery from his heavy mech unit into an Aerial Reaction Force (ARF) and conducte dover 110 air assaults in southern Iraq. I have a lot of respect for Marines, but they don't get to claim the Army is inherently more specialized. We train to have a global ready brigade, and while that is normally something from the 82nd, that mission has also gone to Stryker and Leg units.
ReplyDeleteThat's you Bubba, majority stay in Mech and never see a helo, as do AA which stays airmobile air cav and never get in an APC.
DeleteWhere a Marine can transition from one mode to another and back all in a days work with very little work up for either.
Marines can take a helo out to the mission area, ride an AmTrac to the FEBA paddle quietly up the river in a rubber boat, complete the mission ride a LAV to the beach and go back to the LPD/LSD in a Navy mike boat all with just the training received at their home base CLNC.
I've seen it done.
Not knocking Army there Dude I got friends and relatives in the Army and consider them fine young lads.
Even the Amphib Army is specialized as Amphibious Engineers.
lately with the missions called for I can see the Army sent redlegs to straight leg jobs and stuck 101st in Strykers, I know cause an Airborne cousin of mine rode them in Iraq.
Every military mission is in flux, sometimes mess cooks shoot rifles sometimes paratroops ride Bradley's but regular ToE means Mech is Mech, Rotors are Rotors, Cav is Cav and Jarheads are Jarheads.
Say, AM, Thanks Buddy for the service you did and the sacrifice Ya'll done good and we old guys are proud of every peapickin' one of you!
Semper Fidelis and Hooah.
AM!
Deletei'm with Zebra on this one. no one is slamming Army infantry. they do their thing and they do it well, but i've had more than a few conversations with buddies talking about spending their entire career in Mech Infantry and then being slammed into the 10th Mountain! suddenly all the expertise, tribal knowledge etc gets lost. he found himself having to do a massive catch up.
additionally everything you need to know regarding Army specialization vs. Marine Corps generalization can be found in the initial invasion into Iraq.
the Army units were smoking Marines in the race to Baghdad....why? because the Army's mech units were tailored to that mission. conducting a mechanized assault over that distance strained the Marines. additionally if you're talking about pumping people into a LZ then the 101st could do a better job of it than the getting the same number of Marine infantry to the same place by air.
small units? we can get their faster. Battalion or Brigade sized units? the Army Air Assault team wins everytime.
that's what i mean by specialization. the Army can afford to be that way because they're larger and as Krulak says, they're made to win the nations Wars. the Marines are made to win its battles.
In the last two months I've been part of the planning for a 1st Cav heavy mech company air assault, and also supporting a Field Artillery Battery reorganized as DIV Aerial Reaction Force (ARF). Before that I've done air assaults with Stryker infantry. I've watched SEALs and SF teams roll around in MRAPs. In peace time specialization is possible, in wartime everyone trains to be able to operate with a vehicular focus and air assault capability.
ReplyDeleteAs far as 2/3 Spartans taking Baghdad, as an Infantryman I have to credit that speed to the Armor community. Tanks led the way, and BFV's followed. It doesn't hurt that the Army has over 20 times the tanks of the USMC so we get more practice integrating tanks into fighting formation, but saying that the Spartans were specialized infantry because they have brads is ignoring the truth that Armor won that battle. A few years later we started shaking up the mix even more, integrating Strykers into BFV and Abrams formations to get more dismounts into the fight while supported by big guns. The 11B's in the back of the vehicles, whether it be BFV, Stryker, or MRAP, all know what to do when they hit an objective, get out the truck and start fighting.