Thanks for the article Lee!
You ever have knowledge of certain systems but for reasons unknown you fail to apply that knowledge to current problems?
Colonel Killebrew took a look at the Army's issues with the tilt to the Pacific and basically "bitch slapped" us all. He reminded me, and you, that this is another problem thats already been solved. His entire article is a must read but a tidbit.
No need to redesign the Army so it can move fast to hotspots. That issue has been addressed. We don't need to design compromised vehicles to fit aircraft. We can make vehicles that can accomplish the mission.
This is why legacy, tribal knowledge and experience is important. The silly and uninformed design new solutions to old problems instead of making sure that its a problem in the first place.
It appears that for the US Army, Rapid Deployment of Medium and Heavy Brigades was done a couple of decades ago...they simply forgot. Read the entire article here.
You ever have knowledge of certain systems but for reasons unknown you fail to apply that knowledge to current problems?
Colonel Killebrew took a look at the Army's issues with the tilt to the Pacific and basically "bitch slapped" us all. He reminded me, and you, that this is another problem thats already been solved. His entire article is a must read but a tidbit.
For deployment by air, the Army has long maintained the 82nd Airborne Division and other parts of XVIII Airborne Corps to respond to trip-wire emergencies overseas. The Corps, and particularly the 82nd itself, are masters at using airlift to move combat-ready forces anywhere on little or no notice. The 82nd’s lift of a brigade task force from Fort Bragg to Saudi Arabia demonstrates the global reach of the Army-Air Force team.Uh wow.
Army units know less, though, about the other deployment muscles available. In the 1980s, the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force resulted in the purchase of 8 super-fast sealift ships (FSS), with sustained speeds in excess of 30 knots, for Army use. (These were the ships that carried the 24th’s spearheads to the Gulf, and in their subsequent service in the sea bridge they consistently “lapped” other, slower cargo ships.) After Desert Storm, the Army, through Congress, successfully pressured the Navy to buy 19 Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-On, Roll-Off (LMSR) ships for Army use as well. Eight went into maritime prepositioning at Diego Garcia, leaving eleven big ships split between the east and west coasts, ready to operate with standby crews on board, and a rate of advance (speed) of about 22 knots. These are big ships; one LMSR can carry an entire U.S. Army Task Force, including 58 tanks, 48 other tracked vehicles, plus more than 900 trucks and other wheeled vehicles. So the Army has available a fleet of 19 fast cargo ships to carry heavy equipment – and since a normal merchant ship from the East Coast closes European ports in two weeks or less, the Mediterranean littoral should be about a week and a half steaming time. So much for 45 days!
No need to redesign the Army so it can move fast to hotspots. That issue has been addressed. We don't need to design compromised vehicles to fit aircraft. We can make vehicles that can accomplish the mission.
This is why legacy, tribal knowledge and experience is important. The silly and uninformed design new solutions to old problems instead of making sure that its a problem in the first place.
It appears that for the US Army, Rapid Deployment of Medium and Heavy Brigades was done a couple of decades ago...they simply forgot. Read the entire article here.
And, I presume, he's just a Colonel instead of General. Because he's got the brains.
ReplyDeleteI think COL Killebrew painted a rosier picture than reality. He assumes units are ready to go, and that receiving ports are permissive.
ReplyDeleteIt takes at least 7 days to get a Task Force of Abrams and Bradleys from Fort Riley to port in Beaumont NOT including unit packout time. Then you add 10 days of sailing, to another port. Then you have another overland journey to get to the fight.
If you "kick off the fight" with Airborne forces and Armor forces at the same time, those Airborne Brigades, all 6 of them (soon to be 5 as the 82nd loses 1), would have to fight on their own without heavy armor support for over two weeks.
That is why smart planning means you already have the Armor on the way before you tell the Paratroopers to pack their rucks.
The preposition stocks in Europe, Diego Garcia, and Kuwait make a lot of sense, as now there is no shipping involved, you just put the tankers and grunts on planes and get them to equipment much closer to the fight.
45 days to get the Army into Syria makes sense when you factor in the time needed to set up port operations and port security to get that "endless conveyor belt" of logistics running. Having a transport ship sitting in the Med while waiting for a place to go is something THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq, and it wasn't just equipment, it was elements of the entire 4th Infantry Division. CENTCOM was able to use that as a deception operation by feeding false intelligence to an Iraqi Spy that Jordan was in negotiations to open up a port for US to use to create a Western Front.
I've done "congrats, you've been alerted, you are going to war" before, and it takes time to get a unit to pack up, pack out, and on a boat. It isn't something we regularly do as our training events in CONUS take place where we rail load to (or simply road convoy to).