Thanks for the article Lee!
Why do many human endeavours fail?
In my opinion its because we complicate the simple, and then go on to focus on minor instead of major issues.
The ACV is a point in case. First read James Hasik's take on the issue here.
My take is much, much simpler.
The Marine Corps needs a vehicle to transport Marines from ship to shore and then onto the objective. It will spend the majority of its operational life on land but we must remember that the sea phase of the trip is as dangerous as an IED strewn battlefield. We need it to be protected, networked, robust and capable of mounting different weapon systems.
We also need to understand that the USMC is part of the Dept of the Navy.
James laid out his scheme but failed to note one important issue. Most of the issues that must be solved are for the Navy. Rolling back beach defenses, clearing corridors for the landing force etc...
THE IDEA THAT THE USMC IS DOING THIS ALONE IS CAUSING INDECISION AND THAT IS THE ROOT OF THE FAILURE.
The EFV concept looked to take away the role of the Navy at clearing away the danger for the landing force. That's why it didn't work.
What should be done is to buy a company's worth of whatever vehicle scored the best in the MPC program and put them in the fleet with contractor support to see how they do in direct comparison to the AAV.
If they perform up to snuff then buy them.
If not then get a redesign and modernized AAV, produce new builds and be done with this nonsense.
Its past time for decisive action on this issue.
Why do many human endeavours fail?
In my opinion its because we complicate the simple, and then go on to focus on minor instead of major issues.
The ACV is a point in case. First read James Hasik's take on the issue here.
My take is much, much simpler.
The Marine Corps needs a vehicle to transport Marines from ship to shore and then onto the objective. It will spend the majority of its operational life on land but we must remember that the sea phase of the trip is as dangerous as an IED strewn battlefield. We need it to be protected, networked, robust and capable of mounting different weapon systems.
We also need to understand that the USMC is part of the Dept of the Navy.
James laid out his scheme but failed to note one important issue. Most of the issues that must be solved are for the Navy. Rolling back beach defenses, clearing corridors for the landing force etc...
THE IDEA THAT THE USMC IS DOING THIS ALONE IS CAUSING INDECISION AND THAT IS THE ROOT OF THE FAILURE.
The EFV concept looked to take away the role of the Navy at clearing away the danger for the landing force. That's why it didn't work.
What should be done is to buy a company's worth of whatever vehicle scored the best in the MPC program and put them in the fleet with contractor support to see how they do in direct comparison to the AAV.
If they perform up to snuff then buy them.
If not then get a redesign and modernized AAV, produce new builds and be done with this nonsense.
Its past time for decisive action on this issue.
To mind (and the minds of lots of others too) EFV was far too complicated and did too much.
ReplyDeleteI think the speed was far too high, I would have aimed for 12kts (hoped for 15kts in good water) and gone for less PAX (that is the real kicker not speed too shore.)
All that cleverness in the design showed that a simpler vehicle would have been achievable.
Somewhere between the Chinese ZBD2000 (which appears to be more compact for the weight as the AAV)) and the large USMC AAV (but the same weight appox. as the ZBD2000) there is an ideal.
I just don't know why a solution couldn't be found. Is designing something with a big trim vane assisted by perhaps a ballast tank or two difficult for graduate engineers? Must be. We live in age where trucks can have the tyre pressures altered remotely but buoyancy bags are too complicated. (Saying that I would see bags as an adjunct too and not the main source of buoyancy which should be the hull obviously).
FWIW I always think BTRS appear to swim well. Perhaps it is their "triangular" cross section and the that axles are in two distinct pairs make it look less top heavy and sort of "planted"?
http://www.militaryimages.net/photopost/data/504/Marines9.jpg
Sorry if it is a ramble. Not awake yet.
I am proudly a Gator Sailor. I humbly submit that the day of the "assault swimmer" is OVER.
ReplyDeleteOf course the Marines have to get their tactical vehicles safely ashore.
Of course ANY vessel moving from ship to shore can and WILL be attacked by modern GRAMMs.
One has to assess the risk and probably of how any landing craft can survive while still getting the Marines and their gear safely ashore.
Does the rooster tail from an EFV, or the hot exhaust from an LCAC jet, or the smoke for LCU diesels; or the size of a say L-Cat make those landing craft (I hate the connector term because it is so generic) any more or less susceptible to be sunk?
IS speed a absolute rqmt of new landing craft as many think it reduces exposure?
The question is why cannot the Marine vehicles and cargo be lift on different Navy landing craft some of which are NOT fully amphibious? Does more than the first wave have to get their fast?
The REALITY is if the Marines want a new assault swimmer with high end rqmts, it WILL become and unaffordable exquisite system and probably end up like the EFV?
Snafu I think the USN is woefully inadequate when ti comes to protecting the AOA. Amphibs will be far offshore, and there are not enough a/c to fly CAP. They too becomes targets and have have a risk assessed.
Genuine question here. Why not just transport a IFV (or whatever) to shore. Seems then one could optimize for land and one for water. I understand you'd lose some well space. Any other reason?
ReplyDelete*could optimize one vehicle for land and one for water
DeleteI believe that is from what some brave Marine general called a "two part system?
Delete- 1. It would seem that the USNI PROCEEDINGS article on "LCU-F" in the July-13 issue (pp.60-64) covered that ground fairly well. (see also http://hallman.nfshost.com/bolger/LCU-F.pdf)
ReplyDelete- 2. In light of accelerating capabilities and proliferation of shore-defense systems, few ARG commanders will ever put their vessels at risk in any setting (10-15nm inshore) where amphibious APCs would have any assault-value beyond crossing tidal streams or a modest bay behind barrier-islands.
- 3. In the context of item 2. ongoing this suggests much greater Stand-Off distances of beyond 50nm soon, which makes any such vehicle-type pointless to invest in. The EFV would have been running on 'fumes' at that mile-marker, with little utility to engage in combat - unless a cooperative gas-station would be found somewhere.
- 4. Protecting the ARG is primary, with ship-to-shore Connectors then carrying USMC wheel and tracked assault vehicles, from HMMWVs to MBTs.
- 5. A plausible Connector-approach is at the heart of the USMC's accelerating reassertion of unambiguous amphibious capabilities.
20/20,
Delete1. IF you want EVEN fewer and less capable landing craft? then you can opt for the whiz-bang transformer which LCU-F is. Where is the Navy going to park those LONGER landing craft? The number of l/c spots available is NOT going up!
2. agreed, and of course to transit from further offshore one needs speed, right???
3.I believe Stand-Off is now planned for 25 nmi.? But your point is well taken
4. Look at how poorly the amphibs are now at least in organic weapons. The Navy needs to go back to an ESG with escorts and DDG along to protect the Gators, and maybe even some Marines~
5. I do not believe either Navy SSC or SSC-R(X) are plausible in terms of numbers and cost? I don't see, but SNAFU can jump in here. any Marine assault vehicles go much towards successful amphibious operations?
The USMC should be looking to roll up the AAV, LAV, and M1A1 tasks onto one platform. If they managed the first two it would be a win.
ReplyDeleteUnder what rationale ??
ReplyDeleteYikes....