What does it take to build a proper armored vehicle these days? If Goure from the Lexington Institute is right then the US Army doesn't have a clue...
The Army’s inability to deliver on a new armored fighting vehicle may also reflect a bigger problem: its ever-changing concept of future land warfare. The Army has radically changed its views on land warfare at least three times over the past decade. Instability of strategic thought doesn’t provide a secure basis on which to build a force structure or define the requirements for a new armored fighting vehicle.Changing theories of warfare?
Yeah. That and a series of SECDef's that had changing priorities practically doomed any effort by the US Army.
Consider this.
*Rumsfeld wanted a high tech, light weight force that could fight outnumbered and win against larger, heavier forces. This vehicle was to use information warfare and advanced munitions to make up for deficiencies in traditional armor.
*Gates wanted a force that was designed to fight a generational war on terror. Roadside bombs were the main issue and he demanded a vehicle that was capable of protecting a squad of infantry not only from the biggest bombs so far seen but also defeat RPGs and small arms fire.
*Hagel. This one is a bit confusing. He hasn't exactly spelled out any theory, just stated that we're pivoting to the Pacific and the Army is attempting to figure out the intent of the SECDef and get its house in order.
Is it any wonder that Army vehicle plans have been jacked up?
Sidenote: Shinseki showed how to do vehicle procurement in this day and age. First line up Congressional support for funding. Decide on how much you have to spend. Pick the vehicle you want. Label it interim and JUST FREAKING DO IT! No long solicitation. No messing around with competitions. Just get it done.
Since army and marines have proven incapble of developing anything new, buying OTS is the only viable solution. No more nightmare development cycle, just select the best possible candidate and get it over with. Once the pieces are in place, then you can apply incremental improvement.
ReplyDeleteadaptus primus actually has a good point I think. I'm sure as a former Marine you'd agree it's the men in the fighting vehicle that will win a fight, not the vehicle itself. After all, everyone says "Boots on the ground" not "Tracks & Wheels on the ground"
ReplyDeleteSpeaking of OTS there are a reported 20,000 M113 in storage (per BlacktailDefense) and just maybe they could be converted into something better than the (gasp) Bradley, as seen here.
ReplyDeletehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jsA78ptkZU4
(h/t EricPalmer)
the AIFV still carries too few men, has no ATGM capability, has a nice flat IED friendly floor, and has light armor.
DeleteIt's DOA.
"Interim fighting vehicle"?
ReplyDeleteHaven't you already tried that, and ended up with the Stryker?
Nope, the Stryker was built to get troops out of big soft cargo trucks.
Delete"Interim" means "as long as it takes to get something better" which in the current reality of the Army, means "a damn long time."
ReplyDeleteEven with scrapping 10 brigades, the Army is upping the number of Stryker units to 8, including the PANG.
Another big hurdle is that we are at the point of diminishing returns as new armored vehicles aren't going to be "fundamentally better" than existing vehicles. What we are seeing is "revolutionary prices" for "evolutionary advancements" in protection, mobility, or firepower (F-35 price tag over the ASH to use an aviation exmple, or the Apache price tag over the Super Cobra).
Then again, all of this could have been avoided had the Bradley program ended up with two extra seats for dismounts.
That diagnosis is right on the money. The Army has an identity crisis and it also has a Congress looking at all the dollars spent on defense, asking "why do we need the Army again?"
ReplyDeletemeanwhile, Big Army and their collective mediocrity has their head's up their asses. They don't have the intellectual ability or credibility to voice what the Army can do and should do. and now those morons are about to see the big, dumb machine they created taken apart.
Look, the Big Army just spent a decade fighting in the middle East. Afghanistan used the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (light infantry) as the main "assault" formation. Iraq used the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT, now called Armor Brigade Combat Team, ABCT) as the main assault formation.
ReplyDeleteBoth Iraq and Afghanistan were effectively invaded. What we didn't have in the works was a formation that did all the COIN/Peacekeeping/MOOTW without massive revamping of both training pipelines and equipment.
Let me put this into a broader historical context that includes the Army experience in Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia, Somalia, and other hotspots where the Army was called on to act in a COIN/Peacekeeping/MOOTW role. Following me here? Two major wars, and a metric crap ton of deployments. Because other nations have used their Army to serve as a constabulary force (notably the Brits) this has become the defacto "deploy the Army" answer for some UN/Nato deployments.
So you have three very distinct operational requirements that do NOT complement each other.
1, fight a traditional invasion against a parity or inferior force, why we have ABCT and IBCTs (depending on terrain and enemy).
2, deploy for MOOTW reasons to support national aims with the international community. (I see this as IBCT and SBCT oriented)
3, stay relevant in the "pivot to the Pacific" because the last time we did a Pivot to the Pacific it wasn't just the USMC out there Island hopping towards Japan under GEN MacArthur. (IBCT and SBCT)
So when you say, the Heavy Mech Treadheads need a new Armored Fighting Vehicle, you have to understand that the rest of the Army is going to ask, "How does that help us out in the Pacific or MOOTW?" and look to allocate funding dollars to something that is a different priority. Personally the Bradley may be getting a little long in the tooth, but there is nothing out there COTS that is fundamentally better than the Brad, so there is no point spending the R&D money to end up with something that only gives you back the functionality of a Bradley.
Then again, maybe what leadership wants isn't an Army but three separate Armies, one for War, one for the Pacific, and one for everything else....