Professor Robert Farley wrote an article that gained alot of attention. Basically he called for disbanding the USAF and giving its missions to the US Army and Navy. Part of his rationale? The USAF thinks only about airpower and isn't a true joint player (I'm paraphrasing).
One of the biggest complaints hurled at the Jr Service?
It doesn't and doesn't want to do Close Air Support.
I speculated that one of the airpower advocates that I know would step into the ring and attempt to knock Farley back. Well I didn't have to wait long. It appears that the good professor coaxed SMSgt Mac (Elements of Power) out of a blogging break and he penned an article on the USAF, Close Air Support and the A-10. Its a must read and you can check it out here.
I hope Farley is paying attention. I want to read his counter punch.
Somehow I have a feeling the USAF's current disdain for the A-10 is more for budget reasons than anything else. The A-10 is cheap and paid for. As long as the USAF keeps flying it, their operating budget static. By replacing the A-10 with a much more complicated and expensive F-35, they will be in the position where they can demand a much higher operating budget to do the same job.
ReplyDeleteWhy send in a cheap A-10 shooting 30mm when you can send in a F-35 shooting JDAMs for 10x the cost?
It should say a lot that the USAF's highest priorities right now are the F-35, KC-46, and the Next Generation Bomber. Three VERY expensive programs.
Rather than gutting the air force, I propose a more sensible approach. Reshape the service into a strategic force. AF turns over CAS (along with tactical mobility) to Army. In return, she receives GMD or related long range missile defense. AF will be the ONLY operator for space based assets, while other services reduce their role in space related activity (from partial operator/end user to pure end user). Offensive cyber should be another domain exclusively assigned to the AF due to inherent synergy between physical space operation and virtual cyber space operation.
ReplyDeleteOnce the AF get rid herself of “low end” mission profiles, she can become a better advocate for high end stuff: air dominance, cyber, long range strike/nuke, missile defense, strategic mobility, etc. It fits AF leadership mindset perfectly. After all, that’s what they really want to have anyway.
ReplyDeleteThe root problem is how the Department of Defense was created in 1947. The intent (that the Army and nascent Air Force supported) was for actual unification and efficiency by combining the War and Navy Departments and permitting "services" subordinate to them analogous to how the Navy and Marines were subordinate services to the Navy Department. Instead, all the bureaucrats won and created a "super department" of Defense over the existing War (divided into separate Army and USAF) Departments plus the Navy Department. So two departments that were supposed to combine into one instead morphed into four! So of course we've been screwed up since World War Two with twice the bureaucracy. It's been great for staff officer and civil service job creation, though.
ReplyDeleteWhy not revisit the Key West agreements and petition to allow the army to operate single and twin engine turboprops. The army can make the arguement that the AF isn't fielding any single or twin engine prop planes for any roles other then training. This will allow the army buy aircraft similiar to its sherpas, and CAS turboprops like Super Tucanos or armed Texans.
ReplyDeleteNot a good ideal. AF and Navy's primary trainers are turboprops. Do they have to ask Army's permission for training pilots?
Deleteadaptus primus, I don't know where you are coming from with that statement, allowing the Army to run turboprops won't stop the AF and Navy from running turboprops. The same way all services run helicopters without asking permission from the Army.
ReplyDelete