This is the first of several "briefing" slides that I'll present to bolster my argument that Expeditionary Force 21 is an example of the USMC looking backwards....
More to the point it illustrates how Amos is steering the Corps towards a future that will see it unprepared to engage in conventional combat against peer or near peer opponents.
Read it carefully, compare it to EF21 and take in the implications.
Small units dispersed over a large area just waiting to be fixed and destroyed by even primitive but organized opposition. We've seen it in Afghanistan and if this concept isn't challenged we'll see it again.
I'll leave the wisdom of this move to people who have (and do) fought on front lines.
ReplyDeleteOn another note though I find this document interesting historically. The Austro-Hungarian and German forces near the WWI were praised for coming up with what the generals of WWII would refer to as small unit tactics. As opposed to the mass formations and charges against static defenses. This is to this day considered one of the great shifts in war fare.
Does this shift appear to you, as it does to me, to just be a further evolution of that trend? The move toward ever smaller and more independent forces. Forces who even further embrace and live up the "organized chaos" American troops are famous for.
how small do you go before you say this is craziness? they're talking about a company landing team which i say is too small to be effective. by your statement why not a squad landing team? they'd be much easier to supply, much easier to rapidly deploy. the problem is the same with the company landing team. 200 men on the ground hundreds of miles from other allied ground forces and many minutes away from air support is just asking to be picked off.
ReplyDeletelook at some of the most tragic situations that evolved in Vietnam and Iraq and AFghanistan. what do they have in common? small units at FOBs or on patrol that were isolated surrounded and attacked.
assistance came but it was always preyed upon and many more died because the forces that were initially engaged were just too damn light.
everyone romances small units but the reality is stark. small units are easy targets. the more sophisticated the enemy the easier they are to attack and destroy. thats the facts. theory be damned. look at the history.
Your comments are far more snarkey than considered and informed. The Company Landing Team concept long predates EF-21. Like all concepts, ECO it is but one arrow in the quiver of commander options to be used as circumstances dictate and make advantageous. Not every action warrents a BLT operation and if we need only occupy an advanced island or base the MAGTF full monty is a waste of resources. ECO is a viable and effective option, especially when the limited size of the force is augmented by seabased fires and logistical support. It is good that SNAFU provides a forum for reasoned debate about concepts and equipment, but this is a clear case of ready-fire-aim that will contribute to your blog becoming a self discrediting entity. Don't go there.
ReplyDeletemy comments aren't snarky. they're spot on. additionally i've said myself that the ECO predates EF21..its the daddy of EF21 and that concept simply builds on the work done to validate the ECO. my contention is that the ECO was discredited and found unworkable at tests at 29 Palms.
ReplyDeletesea based fires and logistical support is barely mentioned in the planning that i've seen (i mean really? utilizing M777 from aboard ship??? seriously?) and the logistical support/medical evacuation that you speak of is barely mentioned and is clearly an after thought ....additionally name one time that the "full monty" of the MEU was a waste of resources. the MEU is the premier unit of the Marine Corps and this move to make the USMC heliborne (or should i say MV-22 borne) to the exclusion of all else is at best distasteful at worst an embarrassment.
you talk ready - aim- fire? lets talk the humanitarian effort in the Philippines. you know and i know that was badly bungled. HQMC was determined to show that the SPMAGTF-CR could do the work of the MEU and fell flat on its face. now they have former generals asking for more ships when the 31st MEU was readily available to take on the mission and was on route before they were called away. even more damning? Paxton talks about lives lost because of a lack of ships but ignores that sad fact.
but back to the ECO. too light to fight. too small to survive and designed to fight the 100 years war against terrorism. everyone else is shifting to fight peer and near peer threats. so why is the USMC stuck in the past?
save your condescension for those that don't know the real deal. i do and i'm not impressed by what i'm seeing.
Check the date on the ECO cover sheet. 2009 Your comments are as late as they are misdirected.
ReplyDeleteSolomon,
ReplyDeleteThe "small units on small fobs" fiascos have always taken place with either isolated platoons or Cavalry Troops which have about the manpower of a plussed up Infantry Platoon. The FOB/COPs in question were either initial builds or scheduled for turnover to the Afghans or for abandonment. That mix of units and facilities is what went wrong at Keating, Wanat, etc. But I've seen insurgents breach the wire on major FOBs as well, such as Salerno. Heck, how many Harriers did the USMC lose to having a megafob breached?
The TOE we discussed is much larger than a Cavalry Troop, and an initial seizure mission with 3 to 7 days of independence isn't enough time to give the enemy for an effective counter attack if the company in question is improving their position and maintaining active security measures. So unless their higher HQ abandons them with no support, I see nothing tactically wrong with the TOE.
I would like to see the Company element not used on its lonesome though, because there is no real way to get around "more boots on the ground means more combat power."
AM!
Deleteyou know and i know that these CLT are at best used against irregular forces. additionally look at the mission sets! seizure of airfields, naval bases, establishing FOBs, etc...these are flash and dash missions these are hardcore kick in the door and wait for reinforcement type mission sets and the timescale should send shudders down the back of all watching this.
3 to 7 days.
that is an eternity...or can be. even if surprise is achieved you still give the enemy an opportunity to get inside your OODA loop and play games.
this is aimed at Africa, and not at a peer/near peer...so the question must be asked. why? why is the stated DoD policy being thrown out the window and the Marine Corps going its own way.