Do you remember this story by David over at War is Boring Blog?
If you don't then follow the above link, but here's a quick run down. The US Army sent a unit to JRTC at Ft. Polk, LA and the Red Force proceeded to kick major league ass. It was so bad that an Air Force Lt. Colonel said the following....
The Opposing Force quickly gained the advantage. “The Army got it handed to them,” Waring said. “No other way to put it.” Opfor “killed” the entire Army force twice, forcing it to “regenerate”—like getting extra lives in a video game.I have huge respect for my bro's in the Army (one team, one fight and we all suck mud) so I was surprised to hear that one performed so poorly.
Honestly I was stumped, so I sent an e-mail to JRTC to find out exactly what happened. Well after dealing with "Big Army" I'm becoming a bit less proud of the way that the Big Green does business. My request got bounced around a couple of offices until it landed on the desk of Ft. Polk Public Affairs.
This is when sunshine turned to shit.
This is the response I got back...
Apologies that you had to wait a week for a reply. I am Fort Polk's media relations officer; your email should have been directed to me.Are you kidding me?
JRTC rotations are designed for training joint forces to prepare for any challenges that lie ahead. Part of that training consists of after-action reviews so joint forces can learn from their mistakes, if mistakes have been made. That's what makes a JRTC rotation one of the most valuable tools a member of our armed forces can undergo.
It's not our policy to release specific details of any given rotation.
You are, of course, welcome to file a Freedom of Information Act request.
Seriously?
Really?
A USAF Lt. Colonel is out in public basically chest thumping and high five-ing his squadron...while at the same time telling the whole world that without A-10's flying support the US Army is lost and they don't want to get there side of the story out?
I'll jump through the hoop.
I'll fill out the Freedom of Information Request.
I'll get my hands on the After Action Reports to the Units and the Brigade/Division along with the lessons learned. But this points to something that should worry everyone. From what we know, the Blue Force ran into a moderately technologically capable force that had helicopters in support. Facing this threat they were easily defeated.
China is a high tech, mechanized, heavily armored force that has the backing of air assets that would make the Red Force look like Boy Scouts.
Maybe the erosion of conventional warfare capabilities has already taken hold?
Irony... maybe they fight against insurgents and terrorist so long that they forget how to fight against heavy combat force of equal power.
ReplyDeletewhat we're seeing is what happens when politicians in uniform are placed in charge of our military. the Commandant of the Marine Corps can only see counter insurgency ops and humanitarian assistance. thats why needed improvements to Marine Corps armor is being shelved and the air wing is taking over.
Deletethey're all sold on this bill of goods and no one is thinking.
we're seeing it in the Army but i would bet that this problem affects all the services. they're trained and equipped to fight the last war. a conventional fight will see body bags filled.
quite honestly if i was China i would take the Spratly's right after the November elections. Obama will be at his weakest, the opposition in the COngress will be at its strongest and the effects of sequestration will have hit full force. yeah 2015 or 2016 will be the golden hour for the Chinese to launch a conventional strike.
And here i was thinking that the A-10 had internal support from at least the Army if not the Air Force. Maybe the Army knows that if the Airforce doesnt want to keep the A-10's they will find a sneaky way to hand them off......including the costs and logistical headace to the Army with its own limited budget and personnel cutting.
DeleteFortunately the U.S. Army knows the basics of soldiering and ground leadership. Or do they? http://elpdefensenews.blogspot.com.au/2014/05/has-us-army-improved-since-2012.html
ReplyDeleteI am Brazilian and I would like the U.S. against a well trained and equipped army receiving heavy fire from everywhere my God, forgive my English do not speak the language
ReplyDeleteWithout getting into the ins and outs of the whole A-10 debate, I think what you're seeing there is the result of several converging evolutions, one of them being, as you mentioned, the fact that you got politicians in uniform being put in charge of developing tomorrow's armed forces, as well as the tactical and strategic framework they have to operate in. But when you have politicians in charge, rather than genuine military leaders, you gonna pay for it sooner or later unfortunately.
ReplyDeleteAnother other thing that has been mentioned as well: you're only as good as your last fight, i.e. 10 years or so of COIN, humanitarian interventions and nation building has shaped a mental approach to combat that is far away from what you would encounter in an operation against a manoeuvering, armored force with even medium level of air support.
You might even compare this to the IDF's experience against hezbollah in 2006. Mental preparedness, tactical nous, manoeuvering capabilities, etc., all dropped to the level which was necessary against palestinian militias/terrorists.
Now there are ways to curb this trend, but this reality check has to be taken into consideration, and not ignored. Measures taken by Tsahal after the Lebanon failure could be of use.
totally agree, and i'm looking to fight the Israeli version of a lessons learned from the 2006 invasion of Lebanon. not busting sunshine on ya but you're 100 percent right. the worry though is that these counter insurgency zealots are so wedded to the idea that they refuse to change direction even when evidence is produced to show them the error of their ways.
DeleteThing is, it's probably gonna take more than just abysmal results at JRTC or JMRC for people in charge to realize they live in "lalaland" ... Judging by what other armed forces have experienced in similar conditions, it usually takes some major FUBAR kinda situation for reality to sink into the brains of what we call "plasma warriors/leaders".
DeleteIn the case of US forces, you also have to add in two extra elements into the equation: 1. the dogma of total "air supremacy" and 2. the high digital connectivity of US forces. Because if you take one of these components away, you then have to regain tactical superiority on the ground with land forces only, which is difficult to achieve if you're not properly trained and prepared for it, and/or you may have to revert to analogue or manual communication and coordination systems, which can also generate confusion and paralysis of your manoeuvering capability.
"Back to Basics" is the key word in my opinion, i.e. tactical skills and combined arms expertise at operational units level, with focus on ground forces training and equipment. At least, that's what I have seen happening in "other" forces, when confronted to what you're describing.
I just want to restate that JRTC is a training event for a unit. They get to go through lots of mission iterations really quickly against a highly skilled opponent. It is not unusual for an entire unit to get "killed off" during the rotation. The OPFOR is there to make sure they find where you are weak, and exploit it ruthlessly so that you can get better.
ReplyDeleteIf the OPFOR get killed, they get put back into the fight as well through their reconstitution process, otherwise you are just blowing 17 million dollars to hang out in the woods and swamps at Fort Polk.
There is a lot to be learned by hitting a lot of objectives in rapid succession, getting feedback, then going at it again and then conducting an AAR.
Odds are when you get the FOIA request fulfilled it will list all the events that the OPFOR presented the BLUFOR and how many responses the BLUFOR presented, plus a list of all the operations the BLUFOR did on their own proactively. It is rather dull reading, but you'll see that some units respond to IDF with aircraft, and some with artillery (counterfire), and some units respond to small arms fire with QRF and some with mortars. If you leave JRTC as a more effective unit than when you came, that's a win.
oh i copied you the first time.
Deletethat isn't in doubt. what is in doubt is how the USAF characterized things. with that in mind why would Ft. Polk public affairs make me jump through hoops of what is simply a training exercise?
it doesn't make any sense and points to something a bit more systemic in my mind. originally i was going to get the information from JRTC and then if some of its was in a bad light, i was going to post your original response as a reason why its no big deal and the AF is chest thumping for no reason.
now? i'm not so sure and i'm going to dig to see exactly what skeletons they're hiding.
The only reason I can think of is that some of the AAR comments can be "brutally honest" and not very flattering. A few years ago one of the comments was, "Your brigade will deploy, it doesn't have to deploy with you as their commander." according to the rumint going around JBLM.
DeleteAlso the list of events and responses can let an adversary know that a unit isn't particularly good at a particular skill, tactic, or response. For a deploying unit that is a real security concern. More than one role playing contractor has been prosecuted for espionage because they would send things like that (plus the bios of commanders and senior enlisted leaders, deployment dates, etc) back to Iraq/Afghanistan from the CTCs.
i get the security part of the equation but why would they wargame the red force having attack helicopters if they're training for that scenario? additionally from the little info that is available it seems like the red force was well coordinated.
Deletethat sounds more like a peer opponent, not at all like the counter insurgency ops they've been running for years.
that brutally honest part of it is probably something they'd want left out and my request to the PAO did ask for the AAR, Brigade and Division assessments so that's got be it. they're considering it a personnel matter and don't want one of their commanders embarrassed.
still a little redacting goes a long way.