I've been twisted in knots trying to fully express why the ship to shore connector solution that Amos is pushing is so wrong for the Marine Corps. Luckily commenter "Trons Away" got my back and states it quite clearly...
I'm a bit confused regarding the JHSV idea. If we're concerned about a contested anti-access environment:That about sums it up.
1. How close to shore is the drop-off point where the ACV departs the JSHV? Anything within 15 miles is line of sight, and certainly within the envelope of even current short range ASCMs.
2. JHSV is built of aluminum, to commercial shipping standards. Why is JHSV considered more survivable as a connector, than the USN L-class amphibs that must remain somewhere beyond 65NM due to the missile threats. Ostensibly, USN warships should be able to withstand magnitudes more damage.
3. JHSV is a USNS asset, and manned by civilian Merchant Mariners. Are we really going to have Navy Sailors in ships of war stay out in the protected bluewater, while we have civilian Mariners take the Marines ashore in cargo vessels. Maybe administrivia, but the union might have something to say, and as a Sailor, I would be professionally embarrassed.
4. Forty knots capable and $214M per copy, JHSV is fast and relatively inexpensive compared to conventional amphibs. It's also lightly armed (crew served), and thin skinned. Aren't these the same characteristics of the much maligned LCS? JHSV is less armed or armored than LCS, how it it more "survivable" in a front line combat role?
5. Will ACVs swim out of the belly of the amphib, then onto the ramp of the JHSV, transit, then down the ramp and ashore. I'm not an amphibious ops expert, but that seems to make a very hard mission even more difficult. Don't LCACs load internally?
In short: if the Fleet can't come in close to shore, and the LCS can't survive in the modern threat environment, then neither can JHSV (nor helos or Ospreys). If we're going to put substantial combat power ashore in a well defended area, it will be a sequential operation preceded by SEAD, OCA, deep strikes on mil C2, heavy shore bombardment, etc. - the old number 7. Only then do we put Marines and Sailors in the boats. IMHO.
HQMC is not thinking. They're pulling ideas out of their ass without doing even simple analysis.
This points to a larger problem.
Dunford will not only have to clean up the procurement mess but he's also going to have to shake up Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the other in house USMC think tanks.
One reader of this blog was able to crystallize the problem with Amos' latest gambit. That should send chills up the spine of everyone at HQMC..want to know whats even more frightening? How did the USMC become an organization that lurches from concept to concept, throwing money at problems without first thinking them through? Our very culture is under attack. The days of doing more with less---making Army hand me downs work ---improvising and adapting appear to be a thing of the past.
