I've been twisted in knots trying to fully express why the ship to shore connector solution that Amos is pushing is so wrong for the Marine Corps. Luckily commenter "Trons Away" got my back and states it quite clearly...
I'm a bit confused regarding the JHSV idea. If we're concerned about a contested anti-access environment:That about sums it up.
1. How close to shore is the drop-off point where the ACV departs the JSHV? Anything within 15 miles is line of sight, and certainly within the envelope of even current short range ASCMs.
2. JHSV is built of aluminum, to commercial shipping standards. Why is JHSV considered more survivable as a connector, than the USN L-class amphibs that must remain somewhere beyond 65NM due to the missile threats. Ostensibly, USN warships should be able to withstand magnitudes more damage.
3. JHSV is a USNS asset, and manned by civilian Merchant Mariners. Are we really going to have Navy Sailors in ships of war stay out in the protected bluewater, while we have civilian Mariners take the Marines ashore in cargo vessels. Maybe administrivia, but the union might have something to say, and as a Sailor, I would be professionally embarrassed.
4. Forty knots capable and $214M per copy, JHSV is fast and relatively inexpensive compared to conventional amphibs. It's also lightly armed (crew served), and thin skinned. Aren't these the same characteristics of the much maligned LCS? JHSV is less armed or armored than LCS, how it it more "survivable" in a front line combat role?
5. Will ACVs swim out of the belly of the amphib, then onto the ramp of the JHSV, transit, then down the ramp and ashore. I'm not an amphibious ops expert, but that seems to make a very hard mission even more difficult. Don't LCACs load internally?
In short: if the Fleet can't come in close to shore, and the LCS can't survive in the modern threat environment, then neither can JHSV (nor helos or Ospreys). If we're going to put substantial combat power ashore in a well defended area, it will be a sequential operation preceded by SEAD, OCA, deep strikes on mil C2, heavy shore bombardment, etc. - the old number 7. Only then do we put Marines and Sailors in the boats. IMHO.
HQMC is not thinking. They're pulling ideas out of their ass without doing even simple analysis.
This points to a larger problem.
Dunford will not only have to clean up the procurement mess but he's also going to have to shake up Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and the other in house USMC think tanks.
One reader of this blog was able to crystallize the problem with Amos' latest gambit. That should send chills up the spine of everyone at HQMC..want to know whats even more frightening? How did the USMC become an organization that lurches from concept to concept, throwing money at problems without first thinking them through? Our very culture is under attack. The days of doing more with less---making Army hand me downs work ---improvising and adapting appear to be a thing of the past.
Thats what the LCSs and air cover is supposedly for, regarding ASMs, coastal batteries often have far higher stand-off range of the amphibious assault ships, and it isnt coastal batteries I would be concerned of, it is large stand-off missile attacks that nations with huge fleets of fighter-planes are capable off.
ReplyDeleteIts all a bunch of balony, they need to go back to the drawing board and rethink how things are done, i.e. more RoRos for mass deployment/redeployment using offshore bases/MLPs, those floating docks to load onto connectors, better LCS's, longer-range land based aviation to support landings and air-control, more strategic bombers of higher quality akin to B1R (for supporting air-control and dropping long range supersonic HARMs, taking out installations). And Arm the RoRos and amphibs with atleast MICA, and CIWS.
The RoRos are extremely good value for money, they could even consider designing some with internal bays for connectors, and top decks for helo/cannons instead of containers. What counts here is numbers, you need the numbers to seize control of the sky and sea, and hold it while troops are disembarked.
its worse than that.
DeleteThat is why you need the LCS and the air-cover, and you need to arm them with MICA (which have teir own guidance systems) as well as CIWS, and probably in all seriousness they should look at some sort of submarine defence. It would be a massive operation to force a beachhead against a major power.
DeleteAnd I would have the improved RoRos, which would cost much more to build after all the extra systems are added in, operate in tandem with the mainstay ampibious assault ships. The whole idea is to be able to move as much ground units as you can, as quickly as possible onto the beacheads, and to have the capabilities, to do so safely.
What about another blast from the past:
ReplyDeletehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-90_Orlyonok
Put the AAV-7 on top of such a craft. Drop of the wing section at shore and move on. The section with the pilot moves back to the ship for the second wave.
OK, this sounds less feasible than the EFV due to NIH.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/53/Wig18.gif
JHSV's are fast and relatively stealthy so they are by no means easy targets for any anti-ship outdated missiles that an American landing would likely face. The Ageis shield of the fleet offshore would also help to take out any fire from shore batteries but at the end of the day nothing is invincible, you can't land on a heavily defended beach without casualties.
ReplyDeleteI doubt you could torpedo one of these, their top speed normally is about the same as the top speed of a torpedo so it should be able to outrun a torpedo by running up the engines a little past 100%
exactly how is a JHSV stealthy? exactly how is the AEGIS gonna protect these ships when they've supposedly moved further offshore because they need the standoff distance to protect them from the same anti-ship missiles that will be going after the JHSV? additionally are you going to waste some of your anti-missile missiles on hellfire and other smaller shore batteries that will be within range of the JHSV once it gets to within 10 miles of shore? hell even laser guided 2.75 in rockets will be added to the mix against these ships.
Deleteadditionally we still haven't talked about shore based MLRS systems that will be firing away and enemy helicopters that will be making runs, much less fighters.
the issues are the same and the JHSV doesn't solve the problem.,
The Spearhead-class has a top speed of 43 knots empty! There is no additional power hidden somewhere within the JHSV. The official top speed for torpedoes are about 50 kn.
DeleteThe JHSV could outrun a torpedo. A DM2A4 torpedo can travel for 25 NM at top speed. The run is therefore for a half hour. According to speed difference a torpedo fired from behind the ship within 3.5 NM could reach the JHSV. The assumptions favor the JHSV: the JHSV did detect the torpedo, the torpedo was fired from behind and enough space left to outrun the torpedo. Head on and ...
Air torpedoes are much faster: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IDAS_%28missile%29
The war head is far smaller compared with a normal torpedo but a mission kill is still posible, e.g. a hit on the bridge of a JHSV.
http://www.diehl.com/fileadmin/diehl-defence/user_upload/flyer/IDAS_07_2008.pdf
The US Navy should clean the area of submarines before a JHSV enters the area.
Based on solely my own understanding of amphibious assault, we will never again deliberately conduct a massive amphibious assault on a well defended beach. In WWII, Korea, and Vietnam we had an essentially endless supply of recruits via the draft, and we just don't have that resource any more. So the number one concern in the beginning of a war is, "how do we get to the end of the war with enough combat power to win it?"
ReplyDeleteSo you have to change the equation, you have to win the air to air battle first so that a defended beach can be pounded from the air, from the ships, and possibly even from behind if we can get paratroopers/SF/Rangers to do that once the risk of parachute operations drops to acceptable.
The current Army or USMC cannot handle Vietnam level casualties with an all volunteer force, and I'm not talking about just the dead, but every casualty medically evacuated from theater or removed to a hospital in country. We definitely could not handle WWII levels of casualties for all but the shortest of engagements.
Think about it this way, if we need 2 support for every one wounded, we will run out of support personnel much faster than combat personnel as the US Army and USMC reorganized to be "tooth heavy tail lean" during the downsizing after the Cold War. If you mobilized every Combat Support Hospital and put them into theater you are looking at less than 400 beds per hospital, so it becomes very apparent very quickly that theater evacuation becomes a high priority, getting casualties to permanent hospital facilities back in the rear for long term care.
Now I do not know if the 350,000 medical casualties in Vietnam statistic is true, but if it were that averages out to 35,000 medical evacuations per year, or about 10 Army Brigade Combat Teams. Last I checked the Army was looking at having 28 BCTs altogether, with the USMC being even smaller.
So that is why everyone is hemming and hawing about what they need to do forced entry operations. That is where we lose the most people, and people become a very precious commodity when there is no draft to replace your losses (even if people rushed to the recruiting station on day one of a conflict, they would still have to get through basic training before ever getting to a unit, so there is that built in time lag).
So yes, expect the JHSV to float right up to the beach. The beach will be undefended at that point because with the loss of the draft, the US military lost the ability to do large scale amphibious assaults against a defended beach.
i can't argue with any of your points but thats the rub. if we're going to be able to float a JHSV right up to the beach then we can get an amphib close enough to launch our ACV's. that frees up the JHSVs to carry those Stryker Brigades to exploit the landing. i just don't see much thought going into this concept. its assuming a "go it alone" USMC attempting to dodge enemy defenses that are still intact.
Deleteif i didn't know better i'd swear it was a money grab because they just haven't put forward any evidence to back there claims. even more telling is the fact that they haven't done any experiments to prove the concept.
its really like they're throwing shit at the walls to see what sticks.
Rephrase the question then, "What does the USMC need to bring to the table to get into the fight on day one of a future conflict given the restrictions on manpower replacements?"
DeleteI think with that question in mind, it becomes clear that the skillset of conducting an amphibious assault becomes more important than the technical capabilities of the systems. On day one of a conflict you'll go to war with the Corps you have, not the Corps you want, just like the Army will jump with the parachutes we have in the inventory, even if they aren't the parachutes we'd like to have.
So whether the distance is over the horizon, a short swim from the littoral, or driving off the ramp of an LCU or JHSV onto a beach, doesn't matter too much as long as the USMC can do it and do it well.
After all, whether it is "Airborne" or "Air Assault" or "Amphibious Assault" is just a fancy term for "how we get to work today." Getting into the fight is important, so if the USMC has to land a little further away from the action to get ashore instead of landing directly in the thick of things, which I expect to happen as a matter of tactical necessity then that is what will have to happen if dictated by the technical capabilities of the equipment.
I think that the smart money would be to give up on the idea that the USMC should be able to float into a well defended area and conduct breakout operations as a core competency simply because the technical capabilities of a peer defender make that an insurmountable goal.