In mathematics, the point at which everything changes is called the inflection point (that’s a very loose definition that I’m taking great liberties with). Amphibious assault doctrine is struggling to find its inflection point – the point or distance from shore at which an assault has a reasonable chance of success but beyond which, or nearer than, the assault will fail. Where is that optimum inflection point?A reader named Trons Away has had me spinning because this is the very issue we've been discussing, but to Navy Matters I simply say that he's short changing the Squids on this one.
The Navy would place it 50+ miles from shore – perhaps hundreds of miles.
The Marines would place it 25 miles or closer – the closer, the better; much, much closer being preferred.
Why would an assault fail if it is beyond the optimum inflection point? It would fail because the amphibious fleet lacks a ship-to-shore connector that can transport sufficient quantities of personnel and equipment in fighting condition to sustain an assault. The distance reduces the number of trips per day that the connector can make and, worse, renders the delivered Marines unfit for combat. The distance also invalidates Navy gun support. The standard 5” gun can’t even reach the shore from the distances the Navy wants to operate at.
Why would an assault fail if it is closer than the optimum inflection point? It would fail because the Navy’s ships can’t survive against land launched anti-ship cruise missiles at that range (that’s the Navy’s stated position not ComNavOps’ opinion).
The US Navy has been bending over backwards to accomodate the USMC.
Why do I say that???
Check this tick tock....
1. The Marine Corps wanted the Marine Landing Platform. The Navy got it. What happened? The Marine Corps isn't sure how they're going to use it and the majority of them will instead be used for Afloat Forward Staging Bases (AFSB) by SOCOM.
2. The USMC wanted improved LCACs. The Navy got them. What happened? The USMC is now saying that it needs a new generation with even greater range.
3. The USMC wanted dedicated gun ships to support landing ops. The Navy got them. What happened? The DDG-1000 is about to hit the water and now we hear that bigger guns with greater range is needed.
4. The USMC wanted an aviation dedicated LHA. The Navy got them. What happened? The USMC reversed itself and now says it wants well decks back on the America class LHAs!
5. The USMC screamed that small boat swarms are a danger. The Navy said ok. It developed the LCS and now we're watching it morph to handle additional missions and the costs balloon.
6. The USMC said it wanted out of the Riverine Mission. The Navy said ok, and it set up the NECC.
Additionally the Navy is working on several things to enable Marines to more easily assault a beach...Lasers, Rail Guns, UAVs (X-47), improvements to the Super Hornet, improvements to AEGIS, etc...
The Navy has been doing its work.
The problem is that the Marine Corps, once a decisive service that had solid concepts is now struggling mightily to come up with a plan of action for the future.
So while I admire the work that Navy Matters Blog does, on this one he gets it wrong. The problem isn't the Navy. The problem is a vacillating, indecisive, morally bankrupt, stick a finger in the wind, feminist, liberal leader in Marine Corps green that somehow kissed ass into the Commandant's chair called Amos. When Amos leaves you'll see this and other issues worked out.
