via Jerusalem Online.
Operation "Protective Edge" is not officially over, however it can already be said that one of the current rotation of fighting's bolt characteristics is the large number of deaths and injuries which the commando battalions of the infantry corps suffered.This story is remarkably light on details but I recommend you read it anyway.
In comparison, the number of dead warriors from the division commando battalions during "Protective Edge" out of the total IDF soldiers killed is four times larger than the same ratio is he Second Lebanon War. When looking at absolute numbers, in spite of the fact that the number of warriors killed in the Second Lebanon War is almost twice the number of those killed in the current operation, the number of losses which the commando battalions suffered now is larger.
According to an officer of one of the brigade commando units, who participated in combat, this isn’t a coincidence. The large number of deaths derives from the characteristics of the combat in Operation "Protective Edge".
My takeaway?
SOCOM better pay attention. The enemy has studied the US playbook and is adapting. The Raid, Raid and nothing but Raids mentality has been teaching and the terrorists have been learning.
I've feared a false target that would draw SOCOM into doing a big raid and nothing being there but terrorists with heavy guns/missiles/RPGs/mortars spoiling for a fight...if they're smart enough and can do it in a place where fear of civilian casualties push a restrictive ROE then it could be a blood bath with Rangers/MARSOC/Special Forces/SEALs going in too light to fight and unable to call in supporting fires.
Its gonna happen. I hope not but I really believe it will.
Any more info about in what situation they taken such heavy losses? I mean, they were used as ordinary infantry that specops are not and that's why they take losses or what?
ReplyDeletei don't know. i'll wait for my Israeli readers....Mordechai, TTMedical and others to weigh in on that. i really don't understand how they classify special ops in Israel. I saw a whole bunch of conventional infantry missions being performed by them.
DeleteThe Commando Units that you're mentioning, Solomon, have nothing to do with any SOCOM units of the US armed forces. They're basically 'special' units within our Infrantry brigades, i.e. tasked with particular missions (mostly recon) and are equipped accordingly. They can't compare to SEALS, Rangers or similar special forces.
DeleteRegarding the casualties, it's a known fact that combat in urban environment with dense civil population and building structures, or recon missions in underground tunnel systems for example, tend to erase mismatch in quality of forces present. That might be an explanation for the number of losses.
finally regarding your prediction about SOCOM units being drawn into ambush, nothing new there ... mogadiscio 1993 was already exactly that.
dude really?
Deleteyou really believe that i don't know that IDF Special Operations doesn't have a thing to do with SOCOM? also saying that they can't compare to SEALs, Rangers or similar special ops is a misnomer. i've heard and read that Shayetet 13 compares nicely. i've also heard good things about Sayeret Matkal. the unit based outfits are from the outside looking in similar to maybe recon and with the big two infantry (Givanti and Golani) maybe Force Recon....i don't know...i'm on the outside looking in.
the BlackHawk down fiasco reads more to me as a meeting engagement mixed with a bit of arrogant planning, if you want to talk about a planned ambush then you would do better to look to the ambush of French Commandos in Mali....but the info on that is sketchy.
I dont believe anything, as i have no idea what you know or don't know about Tsahal. I was making the point that you may not be able to read too much into israeli infantry experience during "Protective Edge" and the prospective dangers facing SOCOM units. Besides, the "palsar" units of the givati, golani, nahal and paratrooper brigades are no special forces, that's what i'm saying: you cant compare apples with oranges.
DeleteShayetet 13, on the other hand, is definitely comparable in terms of quality and mission statement with SEALS, but the main SF unit is Sayeret Matkal, it's the best all round force we got. Might also mention the 'Shaldag' commando (Air Force) and Unit 212 (Maglan - operating under direct supervision of General Staff), probably less known but on par with with Matkal and Shayetet. So if you want to look at lessons SOCOM might learn from IDF experience and failures, you might want to look into these units operational history. You'll find some examples of what you're possibly foreseing (and want to avoid) for SOCOM.
Regarding Mogadiscio, i wasnt talking about the Black Hawk Down fiasco, but the operation of July 12th, which was based on intel fed to US forces by Aidid's men. It was meant to be an ambush type situation and only didn't succeed as such because of huge firepower of US gunships.
Not really sure to what ambush you're referring regarding the French in Mali. They have suffered one falality when a patrol was ambushed in march 2013. They also fought a number skirmishes when securing the Amattetaï valley, suffering 3 casualties from gunshot and one from IED. Maybe you actually mean another ambush in the same area during the same operation, but that one was aimed at Tchadian Forces. Info isn't sketchy, just it hasn't been publicized a lot as it would have been bad press ... The Tchadian force involved (presidential guard and national antiterrorist unit) lost 24 men and 3 armored vehicles in that ambush.
Gentlemen, it's all about semantics. The so called commando in these cases where heavy losses occurred, including the last action with Lt.Goldin, involved what Hecate call Palsar units. The Hebrew term for Reconnaissance Company, organic to each Infantry Regiment. The usual infantry basic traing lasts 8 monthys, and when a soldier is selected for the Recon Company, he will be in basic traing for 12 (or 14 ?) months. This is not the same training that "real" commando units get.
DeleteCommando units usually work in covert insertions and getting intelligence, covert demolitions, forward air control and not the usual Hollywood style actions. The less you hear about their combat actions, the better.
If and when they succeed eliminating Hamas Military Chief Mohammad Def, we MAY hear about. Or not.
Can only agree with that ttmed, and with the translation issue noted by Moti: the whole discussion is a bit confusing due to wrong semantics. The JP article's headline is quite misleading in that regard. There's another dimension that adds to difficult understanding of what's what, and that is the fact that the Special Ops community and structure in Israel works in totally different way than in US for example. We don't have a unified command of special operations forces like SOCOM (or UKSF in the UK, COS in France, KSK in Germany). That's why it may be confusing to outsiders in what way some units are SpecOps or not.
DeleteAs I wrote Solomon yesterday, there's not much to be learnt from Gaza engagement for SOCOM. Looking into the Shayetet catastrophe of 97 (which would be textbook case for what Sol fears might happen with a SOCOM unit) or even the Mavi Marmara fiasco, which could be a new kind of challenge lying ahead for SOCOM (with implications on diplomatic level going far beyond an ambush by a terrorist group) can be of far more interest to Special Ops units all around the world. But from a strictly military point of view, Gaza is an engagement against a "non state militia organisation" (guess that's the politically correct slur) in an urban environment ... Bit like Fallujah 2004, only on a much larger scale and with slightly different operational constraints.
Hecate has a point commando units unlike SAS ,SEALs are much more into large scale raid type of actions involving hundrets of men (could be on battalion strenght) ,armor and support and are if you class them as special forces lets say considered third tier special forces ,much closer to 75th Ranger than to Seal team 6 .Commandos are elite units but elite is a broad term.
ReplyDeleteWhen your only tool is a hammer, eventually even the stupidest enemy will learn to wire a really attractive nail to a pressure fuse, and wait for you to come knocking.
ReplyDeleteThe "commando" battalions of IDF infantry brigades comprise engineer, recon, and anti-tank companies. Given the nature of tunnel hunting/destroying in an IED-infested urban area, I wouldn't be surprised if the brigade engineers account for much of this statistic.
ReplyDeleteAs I pointed out in a previous thread, and has been said here, the infantry brigades do NOT have 'commando' units. That's a mistranslation and misunderstanding, and shame on the Jerusalem Online for perpetuating it. They should know better. Although the same Hebrew word or title is used, Sayeret, it does not inherently mean 'commando'. In fact careful Hebrew speakers often make a subtle distinction by calling the special ops units 'sayeret' and calling the brigade recon patrols 'siyur'. It is a correct distinction which gets lost when the translators come along.
ReplyDeleteAlso, as noted above by another commenter, the notion of 'siyur' has been expanded. It used to be that a brigade had a reconnaissance company and that was the entire 'siyur. Now there are battalions, with companies focussing on anti-tank, recon, engineering; and the whole battalion is called 'siyur'.
[This is very different from the 'siyur' battalions that existed in small numbers in tank brigades, where the 'siyur' battalion was about half mounted infantry. That model was used in '67 and '73; but by the 80s (my time) we were pretty much back to the company-sized infantry-based model for siyur/recon even for armored brigades.]
Now, it is true that the young men in siyur are considered the best of the brigade in many ways. They also train for special tasks, and are expected to be the very pointy tip of the spear. So it is no surprise that they took big casualties, especially in a dense urban environment and tunnels, and fighting with ROEs that had at least one hand tied behind their back. But they are NOT special ops, and so limited lessons can be applied from them to American SOCOM. As others noted, Israel does have genuine special operations units; but that isn't what is talked about in the article.
As others have mentioned, its not Special Forces like SEALS or SAS, its pathfinder / recon / scout sniper sort of guys
ReplyDeleteWith added combat engineers and the like
Its the "light" part of the light infantry
Losses amongst them were lower in Lebanon because the Lebanon war was a much more armour oriented conflict, higher now because the fighting has been fought by the lighter units.
Mordechai
Perhaps "Specialist" forces would be a better translation?
TrT - as you likely know, siyur translates as 'patrol'. It used to be pretty straight reconnaissance and infantry tasks. Now that they've moved from platoon and company models to battalions, it is harder to describe with the addition of engineering/eod, anti-tank, and others.
DeleteSpecial Forces, btw, has very specific meaning to the (few informed) US public; especially when written with capital letters. Special Forces in the US Army refers specifically to the guys with the green berets. They have a unique mission and skill set. They are part of the special operations community; but not all special operations units are Special Forces. I think the best generic terms to use are 'reconnaissance' for the light, advance force guys; and 'special operations' for the high-speed characters like Rangers, SEALs, SF, MARSOC, SAS, Sayeret Matkal, Maglan, 669, etc.