How crazy is it to keep the AAV in service until 2030????

Thanks to Beowulf75 for reminding me of this...he said...

If the AAV hangs around as long as they are planning on won't that be about the same as if we had used WW2 Sherman tanks in the first gulf war, if another conflict comes up before their service life ends anyway, which is likely. 

That's exactly right!

The better analogy would be that if we use the AAV for as long as is currently planned it will be like having kept the LVT in service through WW2, Korea, Vietnam and finally retiring it after service in the first Gulf War.

Additionally we will be operating an armored vehicle that will serve in frontline combat longer than we (the USMC) has operated ANY vehicle in its history.

I think I'm merging two blog posts by accident, but William asked in my blurb about the AAV Program Office letting the cat out the bag....

Can anyone provide a logical explanation for why full production cannot begin until 2018 with initial operating capability in 2019? Is it really that hard of an engineering task to add armor, put on a 30mm gun, add blast seats, ect? I would guess that a good team of mechanics and engineers could do that in months if allowed free reign to do so.

The dirty secret that HQMC, F-35 program office, the Commandant's office, F-35 supporters and the DoD don't want you to know is that this program and others are all being held hostage by that airplane.

The Marine Corps is still trying to stagger purchases so that they can properly budget things.  The delays with the F-35 have already bitten hard, jumbled things and will continue to do so into the future.

IOC for that airplane is 2015.  They plan on increasing production (ie buying more of them) in 2016, 17 and 18.  That means that the Marine Corps won't have funds free to buy more armor...or even upgrade.

This is why the JLTV program is being delayed.  Its also why the US Army couldn't go forward with the GCV.  If you examine the program, nothing being proposed was risky.  It was all proven tech that was simply going to be used in heavy armor.  Additionally the controversy about weight was a canard.  To get the type of blast protection required, a vehicle weighing as much as an Abrams was a given.  Additionally it wasn't expected that this would be a strategic...the Army had Strykers for that mission.

Its also a major reason why the ACV/MPC program has been in such disarray.  It was never about the engineering.  It was always about the funding.