I would reduce the rifle squad to fit inside of a single vehicle and possibly play around with adding a 4th squad to the platoon. So you would have 4 squads of 8 or 9 Marines each per platoon, or possibly a 4th Platoon with 3 squads per platoon. Additionally I would base each squad around a CSW either a M240 for a support squad or a SMAW for an assault squad. This would reverse the idea that the CSWs support the rifleman and have the rifleman support the CSW. The German idea of WWII with a rifle squad built around a Panzershrek or a MG42.My bitch with the statement? Here we go changing our operating concepts (if we run with this idea and make no mistake...if HQMC is serious about the MPC becoming the production ACV then they're already considering this) not because its tactically more efficient but because it "fits" the vehicle that we're buying!
I saw this based on my own experience in Afghanistan and reading where others have essentially recreated this same T/O. Many rifle companies in Afghanistan reduced their squads to 2 fire teams and added a 4th platoon. Additionally with all the weight most grunts carry squad sized firefights are typically conducted by the squad or platoon digging in and unleashing a torrent of well aimed fire back at the enemy. Bing West describes this style of fighting best in "A Million Steps."
If we bought the IFV version of the MPCs with a 25mm or 30mm main gun, it would give the squad leader a rifle fire team, a CSW fire team, and a vehicle mounting both a medium machine gun a high velocity cannon capable of firing PD, Delay, or programmable air burst ammo.
So a generic platoon would be 2 squads with M240, 1 squad with SMAW, all mechanized in 3 wheeled IFVs. You mechanize this force with M1A1 and you have serious ass kicking capability.
As for the idea of each squad leader having 3 rifle fire teams and a CSW team transported by 2 vehicles, I think that is too much for a squad leader to handle and still be in the thick of the fighting. Either the squad leader will have to pull back from the fight, more like a platoon commander, or he could be overwhelmed with 5 different maneuver elements. The platoon commander would still have 3 maneuver elements but that would include 6 vehicles and possible fighting between the squad leaders and platoon commander's over who owns the CSW teams.
Or you keep the MPC as a straight up APC that drops the grunts off 5 km from the objective in which case I think the 17 pax school bus is a better idea but you have to be very cautious too keep it out of harms way.
I think it would be worth taking a look at these ways of doing things and yes these are just ideas. It needs a real honest to God experiment ran on this with dedicated company and field grade officers that believe in their assigned idea. It needs to be judged and supervised by a General that is willing to run it as a true experiment and not have a dog in the fight on which of these succeeds or fails.
As for the dismounted troops that are transported by MV-22B or MTVR I would not touch them and leave the base platoon and company organization the same. Weapons company would probably have to be reworked if they were MV-22B transported.
But enough about my "gripes". What do you think. Should we change the size of the Marine Rifle Squad? Oh and before you say "yes this is the way to go!" understand that we are basically doing the "US Army" thing because we fucked up on the procurement of the AAV replacement...check out the pic below...that's a US Army Styker Brigade's Rifle Platoon.
I thought the historical reason for the large rifle squad was learned on the battlefield over continuous combat. Attrition, unit cohesion/integrity, More firepower in one place? ? ? ?
ReplyDeleteWhat are your feelings on having a corpsman organic to each squad?
ReplyDeleteIt would be nice but would dilute the effects of the squad and disperse the Corpsmen to far apart.
DeleteI remember when the section/squad was reduced to 7 men from 9, I do see the advantages in both more maneuver units and more robust ones, so I guess it is basically how you want to play the game, offensive (more sub-units maneuvering) or defensive (more men and more robust squad but less maneuverable). USMC's orbat will work, it's fairly common in some armies, but the old Marine orbat worked too, never heard of anyone complaining about it.
ReplyDeleteOff the topic though, Marines can deal with external enemies but what about internal ones. http://idrw.org/?p=47523#more-47523. Robin Raphel handed classified documents to Pakistan. http://freepressjournal.in/robin-raphel-fatal-attraction-for-pakistan-2/.
ReplyDeleteThe Hollywood term is code red.
DeleteThe actual term is classified.
Then 0802 can't see beyond the end of his fingers what happens when you make those understrength squads utterly dependent on the log/supply chain for several hundreds gallons of POL, pallets of ammunition and spare parts daily, and the rest of the tail needed to keep those vehicles in action, nor for how that works when Reality hits, and the TO&E is burdened by losses and leaves typical in combat formations that make his 8-man squads into 5-man squads.
ReplyDeleteWhen his 2-man vehicle team is the base of fire for his 4-man assault element, the last thing that will happen is a squad leader "being over-burdened with too many maneuver elements". Instead, your squad leader will be busy kicking the doors down himself, or they won't get kicked. And if they take another casualty in that assault, they'll be combat inop if they have to simply evac one wounded man. Ditto when they have to pull ordinary PM to keep their giant wheeled Tonkas running. And if one breaks down, the men assigned to it become detached for local security, rendering another squad hamstrung.
I don't even have to send his notional squads into combat to predict that resulting barrel of fail.
One broken part and he's now got a 13-man platoon. Lovely.
The current Marine infantry doctrine is based on real-world combat experience from Belleau Wood to Helmand Province, and everywhere in between, and the clear-headed experience that combat is always a human meatgrinder, turning a 13-man squad into a 10-man squad regularly. Starting at 8 or 9 is a recipe for faster disaster, before Murphy even has to get creative in showing up.
Less men in a squad means a lesser frontage they can hold in defense, and lesser mass they can concentrate in the attack. The pittance of daily logistics to support the other 4 or 5 guys is similarly trebled or more, on steroids, in the fodder required to keep their warpigs rolling, functional, and up-checked for continued combat.
You'll still need those other four men, except now they'll be in the S-4 shop and Force troops, trying desperately to keep the machines rolling, with fewer bayonets at the pointy end, and more ass trying to way that ever-more monstrous log tail.
Hell, why not just make it a one-man squad, and give the squad leader a motorcycle with sidecar to tote all the shit he'll need to pull off ridiculous missions, like the robot-fired minigun and tactical nuke launchers?
It wouldn't be much crazier than continually looking at shrinking the squad to conform to the vehicles we acquired.
The model for this is Starship Troopers. Unfortunately, without Heinlein's imaginary powered armor that'll let a guy vault entire grid squares and fire 1kT missiles "on the bounce", it lacks a certain real-world ability here in poor old 2014.
Next question.
Old Corps Rule of thumb was a unit that takes 25% casualties from all causes is combat ineffective.
DeleteWarsaw Pact forces would operate up to 50% losses before becoming combat ineffective.
Real world often saw Marine units go into operations already at 25% losses from all causes.
The idea was floated around that an MG with a fire team attached was in fact a squad in fire power and frontage covered in the defense or base of fire element.
Aesop, you do realize that the orbat he suggested is the basis of most mechanized forces in the world? Which means that you pretty much dissed every army in the whole world with your logic?
DeleteOr it may be high time to fire the person doing logistics for you. He obviously sucks.
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
DeleteAs for the squad leader being over worked that is if he has his squad spread across 2 MPCs. That is a total of squad reinforced, somewhere around a total of 20 Marines and 2 vehicles for that one Sgt. 3 Rifle fire teams, a CSW section, and 2 vehicles mounting 50cals. I am not doubting his capabilities to run this large of a squad. I am doubting his capability and run this squad and still be in the thick of the fighting.
DeleteThe current USMC squad doctrine only goes as far back as Vietnam time frame and also note i would leave the squad alone if you go into battle on a MV-22B or a 7-ton. If you are dismounted keep it with 3 rifle fire teams and attach the CSW section.
My only point was that something is going to has to give. Either we design a IFV or APC that can carry far more troops than anything else on the market and accept it being enormous, or we we are going to have to change our TO/E to fit inside the vehicles that exist. The most expensive route is that we insists on a vehicle that fits our TO/E, and we tried that with the EFV. It failed.
we can't do that! are you actually talking about task organizing Marine Rifle Squads depending on how they're transported into combat instead of optimizing it for ground operations? additionally the platoon leader will consider the time in the track (what will we call wheeled ACV's???? will they still be called tracks or trucks) as break time. you start making squads smaller and you're talking about distributed operations on the platoon level. that means we better have nothing but PT studs supreme...no more weight lifting just run like the wind cause thats whats gonna happen. you're going to have LT's sprinting over a 3 mile area every two hour 24 in a combat setting and then when contact is made he's gonna have to find the squad in trouble, hope that his other squads are left unmolested etc...
Deletei just see nothing but trouble with this setup. additionally try running this setup in a jungle environment. doing it in the desert is "less complex" but when you toss in jungle canopy, rain and night fall into the mix and suddenly shit gets real.
i should appologize though. you made a simple comment and i turned it into a blog post without prior notification. on hindsight that probably wasn't fair but it was so tantalizing that i had to run with it. if you want to give a full throated rebuttal to this i'm more than open and will give you top billing.
That is fine. I would not post on your blog if i did not expect for you to disagree every now and again. Who really likes an echo chamber? I would at least rather have the debate, lose to someone with more wisdom and learn something.
DeleteYes. I am talking about organizing the rifle squad for their mode of transport because I see that as the least bad option.
If you take the standard rifle company and break apart weapons platoon, distribute one section each of M240 and SMAW per platoon, which is standard, you have rifle platoons made up of the following:
-(3 Pax) 1 Platoon commander and 1 Platoon Sgt , 1 DOC
-(13 Pax) 1 Rifle squad, this is the standard, 9 rifles, 3 SAWs, 3 M203
-(13 Pax) 1 Rifle squad, this is the standard, 9 rifles, 3 SAWs, 3 M203
-(13 Pax) 1 Rifle squad, this is the standard, 9 rifles, 3 SAWs, 3 M203
-(7 Pax) 1 MG section, 2 M240, 3 rifle all the 7.62 linked rounds
-(7 Pax) 1 Assault section, 2 SMAW, 3 rifle and the extra SMAW rounds
This is 56 PAX, and how do you transport them in something resembling their chain of command?
3 AAV7 can carry 18 PAX each and that puts you at 54. With the classic of that a AAV can always carry one more you will carry that 56 PAX platoon. So I will give you that the AAV7 is a good answer. But we also know the limitations of that vehicle. Also this is the AAV7 without the new blast seats, what will be seating with the blast seats?
The classic APC is designed to transport troops through the enemy artillery fire ring, and dismount the troops just outside of the direct fire range then the APC makes another trips for more troops. Against a T-72 that is 2,000 meters and your infantry are dismounted for a 2,000m assault. I think this theory is sound and 2000 meters is not a crazy amount for your troops to cover.
However, with the latest ATGMs and even the main gun launched ATGMs that pushes but the direct fire threat ring close to 4000-5000 meters. I have seen numbers on the AT-14 in the 5000 meter range and some pushing out to 10,000 according to Wikipedia. That leaves your infantry covering 5000 meters through the assault which means they have not even gotten into 82mm mortar range yet. The great danger of the large APC like the AAV7 is that one missile from 4000 meters away and you have lost 21 Marines.
I would rather debate and test and try to find an answer and I do not think there are any great answers just the least bad answers.
i can live with that.
Deletebut it would have to be happen the way you said. an honest test with a general that has no dog in the fight over the whole thing. you can have advocates for wheels or tracks but an honest player at the top that will properly analyze the whole thing.
1) The current doctrine goes back to Vietnam, but the experience the decision was based on reflected the combat experience acquired in 3 decades of "small wars", WWI, WWII, and Korea.
DeleteThey didn't just pull it out of a bag in 1965.
2) As for this "dissing" the order of battle of "every army ", I could give two shits, not least of which for the fact that we beat most of those other countries at one time or another, some multiple times. Call me when most of those other countries beat us at something more vital to our national interest than soccer, and then try shilling their goods.
Last I looked, when it comes to making war, we're the big dog, and everyone else is sucking hind teat. Doing things the way "everyone else" does it sounds to me like a great way to drag our forces down to their level from the start.
The USMC is not primarily a mechanized force, nor should it be.
If somebody wants to fiddlefart around with the LAV/LIV Bn (or WTF they're calling themselves this month), it's rearranging deck chairs, with no ultimate difference.
Fornicating up the doctrinal squad, OTOH, makes a huge difference.
Making the CSW the nucleus makes a huge difference as well.
So you want to make a squad now 8 or 9 men?
Around an M240? So already, two+ guys are humping ammo for the pig, leaving at most 5-6 other shooters. And one or two of them are going to tote a SAW? And the rest ammo for that?
And all this while the spineless MoFos at Ranks Above Reality are slobbing SecDef's knob about integrating Combat Barbie and GI Jane into infantry combat like that's ever going to happen?
Sh'yeah, as if.
How about we start from the perspective that we regularly need more troops to accomplish the mission than what will fit in any battle taxi you can invent, and thus ignore that as any rational basis for planning doctrine?
And furthermore agree that if you can't hump the load, you can't walk the road, and start focusing on getting enough troops in the fight to do the job, who actually can do it, instead of worrying about which mostly superfluous taxi they ride to the show in, sometimes.
If it's going to take more than one taxi to get the right number of troops to the front, then buy more freakin' taxis. The taxis support the mission, they don't dictate it, so quit trying to let the size of the tail determine how many teeth you put in the dog.
Doing it the other way would have had us making a squad 6 guys on a hot day north of Da Nang; but we didn't do it that way, because that's retarded. If it takes two birds to lift the unit, you send two birds. You don't make the unit lifted smaller.
The same is true for trundling a squad around. If whatever big green bullet magnet you want won't hold a full squad, send more vehicles. If it's going to take three per squad instead of two, or nine per platoon instead of six, and so on up the chain, then that's the size of infantry support unit to plan for.
Doing it the other way around would be like deciding that the artillery couldn't be any heavier than a Hummer could tow, or require more men than it would hold. If we did that, we'd still be shooting 75mm pack howitzers. There's too big, and there's too small. We need to find the sweet spot in the middle (which I think 50 years' experience argues we've already done). Tying the fate of the infantry to the size of taxi we can come up with is a non-starter.
Otherwise it will be tested, just on the battlefield and that is the last place you want to be testing something.
DeleteThe AAV7 might still be the best answer and we could do just fine with it. We might be able to use terrain to our advantage carry the Marines in close and get them out of tracks fast enough. Or it might be more like in OIF where the tracks were hit but the infantry still usually climbed out in time.
The 2 MPCs carrying a squad might not overwhelm the squad leader after all but that still leaves the original problem you pointed out that is doubles the number of vehicles to carry the same number of infantry.
But all of this leads me to believe that we must fully test this idea before we send Marines into combat and give it a real test. Just having a bunch of senior Marines stand around and argue based on "my experience" should not be how TO/E is decided. That experience should be key in how test results are interpreted.
Im with Aesop on this actually, and I've argued blue in the face with my fellow comrades in the Army because we faced the same predicament when the 113 was phased out of service and the Bradley and Stryker, each holding fewer soldiers, became the principal infantry transport vehicles in service.
DeleteI dont see the wisdom in shrinking infantry squads (and compromising their capabilities) because we refuse to engineer a vehicle to hold a infantry squad. Or we are insistent on making compromises because we believe the next IFV/APC should weigh 40 tons and be resistant to 152mm HE-based IEDs. Nonsense.
So, Marine Corps, dont make the same fuckwitted mistake as the Army. And certainly dont do it because "everybody else" is doing it apparently. I personally couldn't give a baker's fuck less about what paper tiger NATO militaries are doing with their mechanized infantry.
But its good there is discussion in this manner. ;) I cannot wait until powered armor renders it moot.
BTW, the max squad size should not be the cap limit on your new vehicle if you are designing a new one, which chances are very high that you need to do because of the oversized squad. You almost always end up with "attached to squad" personnel. In exercises, it's the instructors you have to lug around too. In places like Iraq and Afghanistan, it's the translators or the dog unit etc. Go "minimum size" and your attached personnel are going to sit on the roof. Not to mention the question of what happens when a track starts burning and you need to redistribute the surviving passengers to the rest of the vehicles.
DeleteIn APCs/IFVs/AAVs, there is never any "extra" space.
Well, I would say that question was answered clearly. Wasn't surprised after the first paragraph. Good reading.
ReplyDeleteThis has less to do with reducing the size of the squad and more with the MPC/ACV issue. The USMC is getting screwed they are trying to bring in too many new things at one time and the money just isn't there. For the ground combat element the Marines should seriously look into procuring modified versions of the Army's Stryker. This has been suggested many times before on this blog but I propose taking it one step further. Use the 105mm mobile gun system variant of the Stryker to replace the M1A1 Abrams and the reconnaissance variant to replace the LAV-25. This will dispense with most of the expensive R&D and allow for speedy and effective replacement of the current combat systems with a relatively affordable combat proven family of vehicles.
ReplyDeleteThoughts?
Yup, Mech. wheel/trac must make allowance for vehicle carry capacity, leg outfits use trucks and can go larger, Paratroops need bodies too and once on the ground become truck or leg while surrounded.
DeleteCurrently mech and motor is driving the squad size by adding firepower and the number of the crew.
How many squads are actually at strength?
ReplyDeleteMy understanding is there simply isn't a company with every billet filled even in peace time, let alone war, or at least day two thereof.
If that's the case, is this really a worry outside of power point presentations?
Aesop makes a great point about losses, however I don't really see how a 12 man squad that takes three injuries is any less nullified than three 4man squads that take a casualty each.
If the big squad can send the three injured back with three guards, can't the little squads do the same?
In a hot war entire squads, platoons, companies and even battalions are going to be shredded in minutes of combat are going to have to be reorganised based on what's available on the ground.
For what its worth (not a lot)
I'd want light/motorised infantry squads to be 20 strong, split in to 5, 4man, teams, 4 weapons teams (very much a gunner, assistant, 2 spotters/guards/carriers) and a HQ.
How they travel isn't that important they shouldn't be fighting directly from vehicles.
Circa 1970's.
ReplyDeleteSquads size per TOE was 13 men, three four man fire teams, one dedicated grenade launcher M-79 or M-203. The first fire team leader was also the leader of the squad. three AR men, two FT leaders and nine riflemen.
Squads in real life tended to be six to four men.
The reason was not enough Marines, too many on court martial, guard, mess duty, in the brig or UA/AWOL, TDY elsewhere, schools and in sick bay. First day of any training ops saw the BAS filled with malingering Marines.
Six man squads had an M-60 as base of fire/AR, one squad leader, one grenadier who carried a M-79 as well as his rifle and three riflemen. Each weapons man had a rifleman for a team and a rifleman was the scout/point. one rifleman humped the radio as well as the other duty or a comm man was assigned.
Four man squads were simply a fire team with an AR assigned man, two riflemen, one humped the radio and an FT leader.
Four man squads were understrength for almost all missions outside static defense.
Six/seven man squads worked great for maneuver. Had the fire power especially with a weapons team attached with rockets.
I saw TOE met only during Tac tests and CONUS/OCONUS deployments but in the field they shrunk, sometimes to two man squads.
Currently there are supposed to be three men who are Rifle/GL, three men AR, three dedicated riflemen, a SQ Leader and radio man. For eleven man Squads. Mech/LAV/AMTRAC counts the driver and TC as a Squad members.
I'm thinking six + one comm for seven is good but nine is better.
Best is the old thirteen man Squad as TOE.
The improvement in weapons and support as well as Comm, command and control make the squad smaller when you add the support a LAV, AMTRAC or APC can give with it's on board weapons.
The old small squads were reinforced by adding weapons teams of rockets (Two men), tubes (60 mm/four men), MG's/Two to three men and such making the true size of a squad larger as far as manpower went.
A reenforced Squad could contain sixteen men if every weapon was represented, usually it only had one weapons team so a Squad plus rockets would be 7 + 2 or 9 men or 10 with an MG 3 man team, 11 with a 60 mm tube, add one more for a dedicated radio man and ya got a combat squad..
The true test for a squads size is the area it can attack or defend in frontage as a part of a platoon. Fewer men means fewer area frontage covered.
In some units I saw sub units of One man Squads.
These contained the most Infantry men in the world.
im not expert on infantry , but shoudnt squad size determined by the ground combat needs ? and not by their method of transport ?
ReplyDeleteassuming someday theres a super APC that can carry only 3 infantrymen, do you further reduce the squad size ?
Sol,
ReplyDeleteI don't know if you received my earlier email. For whatever I seemed to be challenged when it comes to posting on your website. If you did not receive my last email I linked about a half dozen good articles about squad/platoon size and organization. I also wrote that according to my math the platoon Mr. West wrote about in A Million Steps was within the historical causality percentage range of 20-30% - closer to the high end so thank God for large squads and a large platoon. I believe squad size should be dictated by METT-TC and platoons need to be robust OR companies are comprised of reinforced squads and not platoons. I agree with the author of the first linked article below:
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/ODRCALL.CALLCENTER1/My%20Documents/Downloads/Small%20Wars%20Journal%20-%20Predicting%20the%20Next%20Army%20Transformation-%20%20From%20the%20BCT%20to%20the%20Small%20Unit%20of%20Action%20%20-%202012-11-09%20(3).pdf
I believe the doctrine of closing with and destroying the enemy with fire and maneuver encourages attrition warfare. The following is an option:
https://www.mca-marines.org/files/The%20FMF-%20An%20alternative%20future%20and%20how%20to%20get%20there.pdf
Pushing CSW down to squads is the focus of the next two articles. IMO too much weight when HE, especially indirect HE seems to be doing most of the killing:
https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/rethinking-rifle-company
https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/rethinking-rifle-platoon
This one is a good read written by someone who knows his stuff. What size the squad should be has been studied by the Army half a dozen times in the last 50 years.
http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/D0002705.A1.pdf
This dude had an interesting take on this topic:
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/ODRCALL.CALLCENTER1/My%20Documents/Downloads/Small%20Wars%20Journal%20-%20The%20Network%20vs%20the%20BCT-%20Organizational%20Overmatch%20in%20Hybrid%20Strategies%20-%202013-11-18%20(2).pdf
VanRiper. Thats a guy that people should be paying attention to. Nice posts.
Deleteoh, and here is another good one:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.jameswebb.com/articles/military-and-veterans/flexibility-and-the-fire-team
As an aside (almost off-topic) I always found the WWII Ranger TO&E interesting. A Ranger Battalion (obviously used mostly for quick hitting raids),,, was very different. http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/UnitedStates/united_states_army_ranger_battal.htm Back on topic: Army infantry in WWII TO&E http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/UnitedStates/Infantry/united_states_infantry_battalion%20mid%201943%20to%201945.htm and... WWII USMC http://www.bayonetstrength.150m.com/UnitedStates/Marine/MarineInfantry/united_states_marine_battalion%20mid%201944%20to%201945.htm
ReplyDeleteLike this part from the WWII USMC bit -- The twelve man Squad seemed to provide only an interim solution to the search for the best tactical unit. Following extensive trials, a revised Squad appeared in 1944 based upon a new concept, namely the Fire Team. The Fire Team consisted of a Corporal, an automatic rifleman with BAR and two riflemen, one acting as an assistant to the BAR man. The original tables armed the assistant with a Carbine, but this was quickly changed to an M1 Rifle as carried by the Corporal and rifleman, both of who had grenade launchers for their M1. Three Fire Teams were led by a Squad Sergeant with a Carbine. The firepower of the squad was now extremely heavy, but it did not stop there. Each Squad was given access to a man pack flamethrower and a demolition kit while each Platoon could call upon a Bazooka from Company HQ.
ReplyDeleteEvans Carlson is the main driver behind the squad org of the world war two era it was he who instigated the four man fire team in his Raider Bn.
DeleteCarlson was considered a bad Marine by HQMC, the Japs hated him and his men loved his kick ass l'il heart.
Not much different than our squad and fire team of the seventies, 13 men, a thump gun with three 4 man fire teams each a rifle M-14/M-16 one man designated AR two riflemen one as asst. AR and a fire team leader. First FT leader was also the squad leader.
DeleteEveryone had a rifle though the AR were simply standard M14/16 with a bi pod and selector for auto fire or set for auto fire only.
The M-14 armed fire team had only the M-14 with a selector switch and un attachable, installed bi pod as AR, you couldn't hit shit with it! the M-16 came with selector on every rifle and a clip on bi pod was issued, in practice the bi pod was useless and the fire team all fired on full auto.
Line units in actual combat usually issued an M-60 as an AR for fire teams and the AR asst became a ammo humper too, as did every member of the fire team to feed the hog, no tripod was carried but the spare barrel bag was. Some Marine squads went into battle with two to three M-60 MG's in the squad.
Those who fought in WW2 and Korea stated this was true for the Fire teams then as every FT had a BAR for three BAR's per squad.
I've read where Airborne outfits carried bi pod Browning 1919A1's as AR's in their squads and teams. In place of BAR's.
There is a story where at Saipan and Pelilui shot down and damaged US warplanes had their .30 cal and .50 cal MG's scavenged and turned into hi rate of fire aircraft style, special MG weapons called "stingers" usually carried only a limited amount of ammo and was used as a bunker buster/suicide attack weapon,
circumstances and on the ground tactics dictate the Squad and fire team organization and as in all things US military the book gets tossed first day of contact and battle.
What is stated as TOE ain't always the way things go.
WW2 had Flames and rockets assigned to Combat engineer troops. It wasn't until Korea I believe that the Riflemen got infantry assigned Rockets and flames in the weapons Bn.
DeleteEach line company has a weapons plt, made up of rockets and 60 mm mortars, H&S had flames and rockets as well as Recoilless rifles parceled out to line units as needed.
This is the kind of discussion's I like!
ReplyDelete-----
Usually if there wasn't enough space for an entire squad or plt in a vehicle/helo the extra guy was assigned to another lifter, as a cat's and dog's and went in with support weapons, Corpsman and HQ teams.
After inserting the extra man would make his way to the plt/Sq as time and circumstances permitted by the best means available or prearranged location.
Return on his own or rounded up by Gunny.
The question is, Is the insertion an assault with unit integrity intact or just a battle taxi event piecemeal.
Tracs and APC for assault and six by's for piecemeal was the old method.
There were always more trucks than tracs and sometimes the best way in was to ride tanks.
With blast proof seats, what is the most a new vehicle could carry without appearing like a barn.
ReplyDeleteWith IEDS, ATGWs and RPGs, what are the risks of having an entire squad within a vehicle? A platoon is swimming ashore, one vehicle nailed, the platoon is down a whole squad.
There isn't any perfect way to suck the egg.
ReplyDeleteThe ideal "Light Infantry" Squad from a Ranger perspective is a 12 man squad, two Fire Teams of four and a medium machine gun team of three plus the Squad Leader. The USMC replaces the MG team with a third Fire Team, and still creates a Heavy Weapons Platoon in the Infantry Company for machine guns, missiles, and mortars. All the USMC Infantry Officers and NCOs I knew said they took the machine guns from the Heavy Weapons Platoon and turned a fire team in each squad into a MG Team to get back to the "ideal" light infantry Squad.
So a rifle Platoon for the USMC is very much like the Rifle Platoon for a Stryker Platoon. 13x 3 = 36 Riflemen, plus Platoon Commander, Gunnery Sergeant, and Corpsman makes 39. If you add on another 13 man weapons squad now we are up to 52, but overall the number of Marines in the Company stays about the same as a USMC Rifle Co.
But, Strykers are not exactly "light Infantry" as the vehicles are fighting vehicles, designed to deliver dismounts and provide fire support. In essence you don't need a heavy weapons squad since you are carrying M2s and Mk19s on the Strykers.
39 Marines can easily fit into 4 Strykers, BUT, you can't easily fit them into 3 Strykers. Hence the 9 man Squad (which the US Army considers an ideal compromise for mechanized transport). Now each vehicle contains a squad of 2 fire teams and a Squad Leader, and each squad gets organic heavy machinegun support from the Stryker.
Should the USMC change to use Strykers? I think it would be smart if the USMC doesn't figure out how to get a USMC specific vehicle that matches their current task organization in the next three to six years. And the USMC has to ask itself whether it wants the Marines to fight as "Light Infantry" or as "motorized Infantry" or "mechanized Infantry" in the future.
Doctrinally the Rangers have 3 nine man squads and one 9 man weapons squad with three gun teams, but in practice it generally becomes the 12 man squad I referenced at the beginning. Strykers only give up one gun team, but gain two Javelins in the tradeoff. The Rangers I know who rolled in Strykers in Iraq had no problem task organizing their unit to fit into the vehicles (there may only be 11 seats by doctrine, but giving up the ammo bearer for the 240 made sense since the vehicle did the majority of the ammo carrying.
So to sum it up, if I had to task organize a USMC rifle platoon into Strykers, I would go four 9 man squads. That is 36 dismounts, but organized into 4 instead of into 3, but you don't have to reorganize after dismounting to find your leadership. I'd do the same for the Heavy Weapons Platoon, one squad per Stryker, so that a Weapons Squad could just drive into a Rifle Platoon formation and get briefed on the mission via tacsat while moving.
It isn't ideal, but there never is an ideal way to suck the egg.
yeah distributing weapons platoon was popular but i know many who frowned on it. i guess it depends on leadership style. if you want to influence the action and be able to determine and then deliver "decisive" fires then many believed that the commander needed to keep them in his back pocket and get to the place where the extra firepower AND his leadership was needed. more to come on this subject.
DeleteThe USMC can do way better than the Stryker (it still has way too many problems). You also do not want its logistics costs which fly way far beyond what wheels should do. And oh yeah, get something that will swim. They would be better served with something in the class of a BTR-80 and BMP 3. Keep the squad size and just get more vehicles.
ReplyDeleteThere you go again, saying "way too many problems" without actually addressing how any perceived problems would affect the USMC.
DeleteFor the Stryker, every soldier i have talked too raved about the vehicle. Mostly because they were easy to work on and had outstanding up time. I have seen numbers from Iraq with Stryker units at 95-97% uptime.
DeleteThe vehicle they all hated was the M113 Gavin because it was always broke.
The Stryker is a poor choice for the marines anyways, regardless of the pros and cons of the vehicle itself.
DeleteThe marines need a vehicle capable of transporting a proper squad (not this 7-9 man bullshit), with at least 12.7mm protection (14.5mm if possible), amphibious capability, and reasonable firepower. Not a IFV with Bradley characteristics, but an amphibious assault vehicle.
I don't disagree with that statement, but right now that vehicle doesn't exist at a price point the USMC can stomach.
DeleteDon't let "perfect" be the enemy of "good enough." Or the USMC will continue to not have a good patrolling option and continue to ride around in logistic trucks.
instead of arguing on how many marines can be carried in one APC, why dont USMC just put a 4 men fireteam on a jeep-like vehicle and be done with it.. You can put HMG or grenade launcher on the jeep's rooftop turret , and in an emergency the jeep can carry more marines / carry wounded personel..
ReplyDeleteas a side note, anyone in USMC ever think of using bicycle (rugged/mountain bike) in the infantry ? if im not mistaken the japanese bicycle army once annihilate british armies in the jungle of malaya ..
Bicycle and jeep armor kind of sucks, and their amphibious/fording capabilities blow chunks too.
DeleteOtherwise, it's no worse than some of the stuff suggested seriously.
And trying to make the USMC a mech infantry force is a recipe to redundancy and ultimately to being disbanded.
We have mech infantry forces. (we also have airmobile and airborne troops as well). What nobody else has is the ability to readily and rapidly put infantry ashore in the middle of nowhere without large amounts of organic or assigned airlift forces.
Missions and roles, plain and simple.
Folks in charge should quit trying to reinvent armored and mech divisions, and focus on getting a viable and capable new AAV, and a small amount of light amphibious tank/IFV capability, and call it a day.
Everything else is trying to be Hulk on a PeeWee Herman budget, and no assigned roles.
The largest rationale for sending Marines into Iraq and A-stan was because we've drawn down so far, we had no choice, nationally.
But strategically, it was four-star stupid. We have forces configured ideally for mech and armored war, and even a mountain division. But outside the river basins or the southern marshes and seacoast of Iraq, there shouldn't have been any Marines assigned to SWAsia, for the same reason why, in Vietnam, the USMC should have been deployed in the Delta, rather than I-Corps. (The reasons that didn't happen there had a lot to do with a lot (certainly not all) of draftee-heavy Army formations not being up to the task of being up north, and saving our best and hardest from Big Green for a potential Main Event with the USSR. Not to mention the desire of a certain MACV commander to happily sacrifice Marine units as "bait" for airpower, and spare Army units the same privilege.)
It was still doctrinally stupid in all sorts of ways, but just one thing on a list of such in that conflict, as in many others.
The Marines continue to exist in no small part because they accomplish more with less, and for less money, than a comparable Army formation.
If the institutional attitude is, or becomes, that the Corps should try to ape Army TO&Es, and take on Army missions and roles, in short order, some bright young beancounters at the Pentagon and congressmens' offices will begin to question yet again what need there is for "a second army and a third air force", and they'll increasingly be right.
can the army units survived the DMZ area ? if i recall even the marines got battered and mauled by the north vietnamese in DMZ battles.. even wiped out / overran in some cases.. i wonder if reducing the squad size will be beneficial for marine infantry if they are facing another military , real military power not some insurgent type..
DeleteAesop, what you have is mechanized infantry, true. What mechanized Marines will be is *amphibious* mechanized infantry, which they are partially already. Or did you think they stripped down and swim from the LHA to the shore? They use the AAV, which already makes them "mechanized infantry" though a with a particularly weak "APC". Which is one of the reasons why I think the MPC is a good step in the right direction. It allows the "shore connector" a greater say in the participation of any battle.
Deletebuntalanloco you might want to check up what does the "DMZ" stand for. Shadowrun jokes aside, it's not an acronym for Downtown Military Zone. There was only ONE major skirmish in the 60s which was where your "overrun" came from, the rest of the time, it's a no man's land and a zzzz. 50 casualties in about 50 years is a record that I wished Iraq and Afghanistan had. And I spoke to people heading there before. The DMZ is an Army responsibility, not a USMC one.
Gee, thanks Owl, I almost totally forgot how it works from my two tours in the USMC there for a second. On their best day, the level of "mech" available barely confers the abililty to move 1/3rd of any larger force short distances. That ain't "mechanized", it merely means there's occasionally an organic taxi force available for some operational use. Every guy shuffled from line companies into running mech vehicles is lost to the fight most days and times. And any two machines suck parts, dollars, gas, and support tail like any platoon of grunts does, for less return on investment, and a minimal improvement in offensive or defensive capabilities, until you invest to the point of recreating the 1st Armored Division (or at least a brigade-sized half of it).
DeleteDoubtless the operational budget of same is confidential, but I'll happily wager that keeping that one armored division "up" costs more annually than the total annual budget for 1st and 2nd MarDivs combined, in perpetuity, in any year since 1946.
That is not a recipe for even bare capability, let alone martial success.
And the AAV was never intended as (and makes a miserable example of) an IFV.
It's a water taxi from ship to shore, and occasionally useful in fording and riverine ops. They would be quite handy in San Francisco Bay, New York harbor, the Mississippi River region, the bayous of Louisiana, or the swamps of Florida.
They're tolerable coming ashore from the ocean anywhere along the coast where such landings are possible.
But once they get to the deserts, forests, hills, or plains, they straight up suck ass.
The LAV was an attempt to overcome (somewhat) the shortcomings of the AAV.
As something to sprinkle in the mix, they work fine.
It is criminal that the armored gun version was never procured for service.
But trying to transform three regiments of Marine infantry per Division into LAV/LI Bns would be an epic miscalculation of biblical proportions. They would be neither truly mechanized nor amphibious. And they would go through budget money like a drunken sailor on liberty.
Couple that strategic error with the gold-plated Thunderjug hung around the neck of the Air Wing, and the Marines would probably cease to exist within a generation, due to lack of interest and institutional bankruptcy. We would have the highest-tech obsolete air force incapable of ground support ever assembled, in service of the most maintenance-intensive poorly-capable non-deployable non-amphibious formations in the Corps' history. We could change the mascot from a bulldog, to teats on a boar hog.
The nearest equivalent would be hiring sumo wrestlers as ballerinas and gymnasts, or vice versa.
And the result will be a lot of dead Marines, failed objectives, and national strategic defeats.
Let the "shore connectors" worry about getting the troops and goods ashore.
Let the combat Marines worry about having a say in the participation of any battle.
And stop envying the Army. Let them be good at what they're good at, since they have the budget for it, and the defined institutional mission to accomplish it.
We seem to have done just fine without apeing them so far.
You want a mission from God?
Go kick the Navy in the nuts, and remind them amphibious shipping and naval gunfire support isn't an option, it's a core mission, unless they just want to do drive-bys. Torpedos, tomahawks, and alpha strikes are all fine things, but until they can plop a few divisions onto a hostile shore, nothing gets decided. Like the Air Force and their long-cherished mythos of strategic bombing, they persist in thinking they decide conflicts, when what they really do is prepare the ground and guard the flanks. Both vital, but neither decisive.
Boots on the ground, campers: The only thing that matters, and our bread and butter (just like it is for Big Green) for almost 240 years.
You don't get more of them there by starting off with less of them.
Well Aesop, I for one would not mind having a vehicle that can shrug off 14.7mm fire taking point when your door to door starts to get bogged down. Even better if it is lugging something that can dissuade the enemy from bunkering down in strongpoints. Like a 106mm RR. Sometimes, you just need a battering ram/door knocker. The Ontos did pretty well for itself IIRC.
DeleteI guess your biggest worry now is literally the budget. America hasn't really recovered from the mauling it took in 2008. If you had the budget levels pre-2008, you won't be worrying about robbing Peter to pay Paul.
Never going to happen.
DeleteThat money was set on fire, and our grandkids will be paying the interest.
And it's always nice to have a Magic Problem Solver right when you need it, but the first step is getting it to the beach. We haven't tried to do that as a real-world problem since about 1950.
I typed all kinds of stuff that went into cyber wherever. I'm not going to type it all again, but here are a couple more articles:
ReplyDeletehttp://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/LWSC/Our-publications/~/media/Files/Our%20future/LWSC%20Publications/AAJ/2013Autumn/Tink_Non%20Linear%20Manoeuvre.pdf
file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/ODRCALL.CALLCENTER1/My%20Documents/Downloads/ADA508428.pdf
http://regimentalrogue.com/blog/caj_vol13.3_06_e.pdf
Marines get into trouble when they are forced to walk where a _light_ track could go. IMO, the day of infantry only operations is done and we should size units around air insertion to allow rapid DRIVE, not march, to the sound of gunfire, from far enough out that the tiltrotors or helicopters are seldom at direct fire risk.
ReplyDeleteYour CSW should always be mounted and incorporate either 40mm loft (multiple ammo types including thermal cam) or/and a Spike capability to shoot where you can't see and don't want to expose. If you took something like a Wiesel and gave it a simple RWS instead of that massive 20mm, you could open up space along the sponsons for slant missiles and have a two man compartment in the back for liason, medevac or scouts.
German CH-53G can take two Wiesels, internally. There is no reason to suppose that CH-53K could not do so as well. That's a much faster transit and no sling issues.
So you say there is a driving need to pack Marine TOE squads into Army sized IFV? Why is it that nobody asks the right question which is: "Why does it have to be human?"
You look at HULC and the other exos. Everyone of them leads the human response so that he feels no weight lag as muscle distress. That means that these suckers could walk if they were fully powered with a balanced (fuel, armor, optics) loadout in the manprint volume.
Now imagine that you are stacking these things in each other's laps or hanging them like a Chinese laundry, down the middle. Can you replace a man or two in the squad with a teleo robot?
Can you teleo that robot down a fires infested street to climb a staircase, twist a knob and have a look see without having to go kinetic on the women and kids inside?
Say it can't walk for the first iteration. If you have a platoon eyes-on/fight's on problem, why not go with a MARS or similar? Now your M240 has an automatic Iron Man pack of 1,000rds of ammo and your gunner (should you choose to go that route) has a ready made gunshield where he sits.
More importantly, if you have 2-3 of these things and they stitch-video your platoon commander can indeed maneuver five elements and give overwatch instructions to the squad leader who fights his section elements as the situation dictates and with the certainty that you have gained back an infantryman.
The USMC are wasting a whole lotta money replicating the CVN for no real purpose, this is true (smart mortars and NLOS missiles will do a better job, faster, in greater inventory density) but the ground force alternative recap does not spend money on new tech to reduce the size of the force, reduce their exposure or provide a juicy contract to the were-bankers in Congress.
If Advanced Warfare level Exo is not yet on the table, you could do worse than to run tactical field problem experiments which STARTED with the question: "What is the best combination of fires and maneuver to get this done at minimum risk." i.e. From the beginning please, ground up. How long has it been since the Marines experimented with mobile explosive fires at the squad level? Can you make an XM25 into a CSW? Can you lower the ROF on an XM27 to the point where it can ride on a MARS level robot? Can you make it light enough that the bot doesn't have to go in the troop compartment at all but can ride the roof?
So many reasons to believe that the Marines are doing it _the hard way_, on purpose.
As someone with a passing fancy in Electronic Warfare, remote telemetry robots is a bad fracking idea.
DeleteThink about it for a bit, and if the answer why isn't obvious, ask for clarification.