A short conversation with USMC 0802 led me to this conclusion. The USMC labored hard to produce a doctrine that is completely null and void. In short the Ship to Objective Maneuver concept (STOM) is no longer valid.
Reference the video of the hour...ACV Ground Modernization. One of the bullet points from the video is to use LCACs and JHSVs to carry the ACV from the sea base (which could be located up to and over 100 miles offshore) to a launch point approx 3 miles off shore and then they will do an "in stream" launch of the vehicles.
Think about that for one minute.
We're going to send LCACs and JHSVs...and possibly even updated LCUs into an area that is so heavily defended that we won't send our combat capable amphibious ships. So instead we send these thin skinned, unarmed surface transports in!
That's insanity!
But it gets worse. If you're a "seagoing 101st" Marine Corps advocate then consider the planning necessary to setup a corridor for the MV-22 to get to the LZ. Not only will you have to knock out any and all anti-air capable systems (this will range from S-500/400/300 to shoulder launched missiles, to RPGs and then small arms) but you will also have to escort the V-22s to the landing area. Remember that the MV/CV-22 had its skirt raised in Africa not too long ago when Navy SEALs flying aboard it got chewed up and they're lucky to not have died. They only suffered terrible injuries...injuries so bad that they had to do an inflight blood transfusion to save the wounded.
But back to the insertion. Marine planners have found that the AH-1Z is too slow to keep up with the V-22 and the F-35/Harriers are too fast. So before you even get to mission planning on objective you have a tremendous logistical challenge to solve....and thats just with the aircraft involved. Do you launch your V-22's first and have the F-35's arrive just before touch down? Do you need to sanitize the area first? What is your loiter time for close air support? Oh and want a savage kick in the pants? The average MEU will not have enough Fast Movers to maintain an effective cap and if the MEU/sea base is operating anywhere from 60-100 or more miles off shore then AH-1Zs will not be able to arrive to help with the work (Google the effective range and loiter time of a fully loaded Viper...you will be unpleasantly surprised)!
And then finally we get to the last leg of the STOM triad. The EFV or as they call it now the ACV. We've gone from having the Marine Personnel Carrier being a surrogate vehicle to it now becoming the actual replacement for the AAV! What do we get for the inability to carry a full strength Marine Rifle Squad in each vehicle?
We get a ride that is wheeled (and I have yet to see documentation that wheels can go where tracks can), carries half the number of Marines that an AAV can, can go through the water at the same speed and is supposedly more mine resistant by virtue of it having higher ground clearance.
We labored hard to produce the Ship to Objective Maneuver concept but didn't do the work of seeing how the pieces would all fit together.
As much as I like the Havoc and SuperAV. As much as I'm warming to the Terrex 2. One thing is obvious and Marine Land is gonna hate me for it.
We need to fucking stop.
Think about the possible.
Think about the now.
And re-do our entire concept of operations. The real answer is the old answer. We are going to have to roll back enemy defenses. We are going to have to have the US Navy big deck carriers on deck. We are going to need major support from the Surface Navy.
If it is a contested landing...even if we land where they ain't...modern enemy defenses require that we neutralize the threat before we send forces ashore.
Old skool Marines know this. We thought we knew better than they did and we were wrong. We were so wrong.
NOTE: Hindsight is 20/20. When the EFV program collapsed, so did the STOM concept. It got buried when the former Commandant started his diatribe of operating up to 100 miles off shore. While I'm positive it was an attempt to explain his vacillation and indecision on the ACV...while at the same time promoting the use of the V-22, it instead condemned the Marine Corps to a delay in getting its messaging and doctrine straight. STOM is dead. The USMC family just needs to accept it.
I get the bad feeling that no one...including the Corps leadership...believes we will ever do a contested amphibious landing. You can use an LCAC or JHSV if all you are doing is offloading at a beach, not fighting over it. They are focused on counter-terrorism ops where they will be securing a beach purely to have place to drop off their stuff without needing a deep water dock. Further, they actually believe that those pretty new F-35's will sneak in and blow all the defenses off the beach.
ReplyDeleteIn Ambrose's great book on DDay he mentions that part of the reason for the bloodshed on Omaha beach was that LeMay (American bomber commander) said his B-17's could come in and saturate the beach with enough bombs that most defenses would be down and the beach littered with ready made fox-holes (craters). They missed the whole beach.
Men died because Lemay was overconfident.
This belief that jet fighters are enough is pandemic in the military. The airheads have long dominated the USN and now they have grabbed the Corps. Even a large part of the Army bought this...until they tried getting close air support in Iraq and Afganistan...now they are all for updating their artillery. The USAF/USN/USMC pilots worked their asses off but except for the AC-130s (which are sitting ducks without air superiority) their loiter time and response time just isn't enough and the cost of up to 30 grand a sortie was breaking the bank.
This is not to say that fighters aren't a key element in success. I would hope that if we ever had to do an attack on a 2D/AD beachhead that we have EA-18s take out the enemy radar first then follow up with serious air bombardment...but that may not be enough.
I do have one out of the box idea regarding merchant ships though: the RO/RO ships we use for supply could probably take multiple missile hits as is (they are tougher than a Perry frigate and one of those took two exocets) mostly due to their ungodly huge mass. Speed them in full throttle with banks of CIWS/SeaRAM on deck for some anti-missile protection and beach the mothers just like an old LST. They have a deep draft at the moment, but newer ones could be made with a shallow draft. so that we could roll out lightly amphibious versions of the Bradley and Stryker that couldn't make OTH trips but could do a mile of on.
If...big if...Burkes could get in closer so that their anti-missile abilities could be use to escort lightweight JHSVs past shore based missles, they might have a chance. Against China though, they might be too busy keeping themselves alive to keep missiles off the back of our landing ships. Maybe that is what the replacement for the LCS could finally do: provide shallow watter missle interception. Most the SSC proposals include Evolved Sparrows and SeaRAM, so maybe they could escort them all the way in...big maybe.
You are right about the sheer mass of large auxiliaries and sealift ships being an advantage when attacked. Unfortunately the naval lawyers have decreed that NO offensive operations can be conducted from MSC/USNS ships without a USN officer as skipper at minimum. Which is a legalism saying NO WAY~
DeleteScarier thought is using LCS to support amphib ops~
Dunno about the whole sea maneuvering thing, not the topic I am really proficient in. I can tell you a thing about wheeled amphibious vehicles. I know some folk who served in Russian Army. I recall one of the conversations we had about wheeled vs tracked. From their words, wheeled BTR's were a bitch to use in amphibious combat scenarios. Specifically, you need to have a really smooth shore, low angle, preferably solid ground. The reason for that is when you transition from water to shore, you have that situation where the vehicle is semi-out of the water, which means that the wheels do not have enough grip, since not enough weight is pushing the vehicle down, and on top of that, your water engine generates far less thrust due to the water being too shallow. If the landing spot is not as smooth as a baby's ass, you get stuck. Simple as that. Tracked BMP had no such issues, due to tracks usually having enough grip to drag the thing out of the water. Thats what they said at least. Dunno, maybe that thing has some tricks up its sleeve, like ability to lower the water engine to fully submerged state even in shallow waters, or some extra grippy and heavy wheels, who knows.
ReplyDeleteWell like I said amphibious warfare these days is just too high risk. Just like Airborne assaults behind enemy lines in the modern era.
ReplyDeleteNO!!!!! that's the wrong take away. the correct understanding is that both amphibious and airborne assaults are INTENSE affairs that you can't simply high tech your way out of! both can be done successfully but if you're doing FORCIBLE ENTRY (and that's what STOM is oriented to...it works in every scenario but forcible entry...and to the USMC's credit we're thinking about that...haven't read one article that seriously talks about airborne forcible entry except on Sparky's website) and understand the undeniable facts.
Deleteits gonna take a full court effort!
its gonna be potentially bloody!
it MIGHT fail!
forcible entry operations are NOT too high risk but they do have risk! that's the basic failure of STOM and the USMC's approach. we're trying to take the risk out of these ops. i blame Bush 1, General Powell and General STormin' Norman for that thinking taking hold. we could have and should have done an amphibious landing but they said no. they were scared of the risk. the fighting could have been over sooner, we would have spent less time in the desert and our core competency confirmed. it didn't happen and we all freaked out. we fought well but we didn't get to do OUR JOB!
Airborne assaults and amphibious assaults have always been very risky and always will be very risky. Now unless you have something else to add to that besides stating the obvious. I fail to see what makes either airborne assaults or amphibious assaults irrelevant in modern era.
DeleteWhat makes them irrelevant is that they're too simple of a tactic to use against modern defense tactics and arms. Of course the big wigs were against an amphibious invasion. Why take the risk when you could just drive through the desert and flank your enemy. A smart commander is not going to use a high risk tactic like amphibious or airborne assault unless necessary. Both of which are never needed today. Technology is going to change the way we fight. What seemed like smart tactics back then are irrelevant today. That's probably why Marines are all wrapped up on aviation now. They're other problem is trying to be a self sustainable force. That means budget issues.
Deleteyou're smoking crack tankerboots11! that war was simplicity itself. a Lt in basic school could have laid out the general plans on a dirt table to a platoon of other boots. the need for an amphibious assault laid with the threat assessment. your memory must be fading but the entire affair was risky. those weren't the days after the 1st Gulf War....we're not talking about when the rest of the world looked to the US as being the master of the tactical and technical operational art...no this was when the US Army was still trying to come to grips with the poor performance of its 82nd in Grenada, when the forerunners of SOCOM weren't cocky because nothing went right on that island and the Marine Corps was full of piss and vinegar.
Deletebefore that war there was much doubt, there were so many body bags laying around that they were used as improvised sleeping bags at night. the planners expected chemical weapons to be used, for us to be under constant artillery fire, and some intel types swore to God that Sadaam had nuclear weapons.
a major fear was that the Iraqi's would try and get us into a siege type war that would last for years. the idea for an amphibious assault came from thinking that a lightning strike toward his rear...and his command and control would help the break through and divert his forces from the main effort by the Army and allied forces coming through the desert.
that was just sound planning and i highly recommend you read the official Marine Corps history of the war and turn off that service bias. when the USMC is wrong i'll let you know but trust me on this one. the idea was beyond good and if the Iraqi air force was even a 1/5th as competent as its army then Stormin Norman would have given the go ahead because the air campaign would not have been as effective with decent...not even good but decent anti-air.
oh and if you want to know the foundation for the belief that airpower wins all its stems from Gulf War 1. not WW2, not Korea, not Vietnam but that pitiful little Arab air force that buried their airplanes instead of fight in them...that's what turned the US into an air power disciple.
What makes you think an amphibious assault would be any different today against a modern military? You have so many threats to deal with at sea its ridiculous. Also what countries out there would we ever require a full scale amphibious assault? Air power has always been the decisive factor in every war since WWII. You can't control the ground without controlling the skies and that has always been the factor! In Desert storm we clearly overmatched the Iraqi military alone with our air power so that had nothing to do with the "airpower wins all" saying. Let's not forget how the Iraqis were poor equipped with cut off supplies. They were surrendering to apaches and our ground force because they had no food or water and were being hit by tank rounds they thought were from air strikes. Looking back at the war I'm sure an amphibious assault could have been done with low or no casualties. They didnt know everything about Iraq's defenses so said it wasn't worth taking a risk. Either way the ground war would have been short anyways. Marines still kicked ass through Kuwait. After all Gen. Schwartzkopf was Army so a ground invasion was what he knew best. By the way I hold no service bias. I'm not in favor of high risk operations unless they are absolutely necessary. I would much rather see different approaches taken to keep casualties at the minimum.
Deleteyou're not getting it. do you remember the briefings? do you remember what the intel was saying? do you remember the wrinkled and worried looks in the old skool guys faces? i do. they would look you in the eye and it would appear that they were looking at a ghost. let me repeat myself. the intel said that we were going to get hit with chemical weapons. regiment and division state that flat out. additionally we were told that it could get real bad. bad as in some thought that the Iraqi might have nuclear weapons.
Deleteabout the airpower thing. the air side of the house was confident but expected to get hit hard too. they didn't know what to expect and thought that they were going to run into an integrated air defense with the former Soviet Unions "big 7" and the missiles that went along with it. additionally they had planes that were on paper a match. they had forces that had fought the iranians to a standstill and they used the most barbaric (well up to that time) tactics to not win but simply not to lose.
are you sure we're talking about the same run up to the same war?
Of course they expected the worse knowing the Iraqis had chemical weapons and possible WMDs. Iraqi equipment was downgraded garbage. Best fighter was a monkey model mig-29 in low numbers. They're radars were destroyed before they could even warn of an attack. Politicians hyped up how great Saddams military was but Iraq was bankrupt beyond repair. I don't know what run up you talking about. Saddam was shitting bricks before the war started. He knew if Iran could kick his armies ass he had no chance of an attack by the U.S. and coalition forces.
Deleteyou keep twisting this around. i'm not talking about what we found out after the fighting. i'm talking about what was going on during the great desert camp out and the information that was filtered down. i don't get how you could not know this stuff though. maybe i'm wrong but i don't think so.
DeleteI couldn't tell you what the Intel was during the war because I was not there. I'm sure a lot of reports of chemical weapons were going through. I'm not saying the chemical weapon threat was not high. I'm talking about our knowledge of the equipment Iraq had before the war started. We technology overpowered them. The real major threat was chemical weapons and that's it. The air campaign showed how weak the Iraqi defenses were so yes I would say we knew well about the capabilities iraq had before the ground war even started.
DeleteIf you look at what CDR Salamander is calling the terrible 20s you will see massive acquisition train wreck coming across the entire DOD. This is driven by the fact that during Iraq and Afghanistan we bought a lot of vehicles that we did not want to use long term.
ReplyDeleteThe US has been attempting to buck every historical trend in weapons procurement, which is the following:
-Weapons are developed much faster during a time of war; casualties and battlefield feedback trump politics and testing at home.
-Weapons are improved much faster with the instant battlefield end users
-Legacy weapons are rapidly destroyed and thus interoperability or dual use of the supply lines is not a problem
What all of this points to is that the USMC should have pushed hard for the MPC back in 2004 after AAVs were first chewed up in Iraq. With several dozen dead AAVs around us we never should have pushed for the EFV or the MRAPS. If we would have purchased the MPC back then we would be arguing over how to deploy our 1000 MPCs right now not arguing how are we going to afford buying them in 2021. Instead we attempted to buy the EFV.
The Air Force spent a decade chasing the all stealth dream. The Navy spent a 2 decades chasing the LCS dream. We spent a decade chasing the EFV dream. And the Army spent a decade chasing the FCS dream.
i can't argue with you on that. but riddle me this. why do you want to basically double the size of the AAV battalion and increasing command and control difficulties by putting the rifle squad on two vehicles instead of one.
DeleteI would reduce the rifle squad to fit inside of a single vehicle and possibly play around with adding a 4th squad to the platoon. So you would have 4 squads of 8 or 9 Marines each per platoon, or possibly a 4th Platoon with 3 squads per platoon. Additionally I would base each squad around a CSW either a M240 for a support squad or a SMAW for an assault squad. This would reverse the idea that the CSWs support the rifleman and have the rifleman support the CSW. The German idea of WWII with a rifle squad built around a Panzershrek or a MG42.
DeleteI saw this based on my own experience in Afghanistan and reading where others have essentially recreated this same T/O. Many rifle companies in Afghanistan reduced their squads to 2 fire teams and added a 4th platoon. Additionally with all the weight most grunts carry squad sized firefights are typically conducted by the squad or platoon digging in and unleashing a torrent of well aimed fire back at the enemy. Bing West describes this style of fighting best in "A Million Steps."
If we bought the IFV version of the MPCs with a 25mm or 30mm main gun, it would give the squad leader a rifle fire team, a CSW fire team, and a vehicle mounting both a medium machine gun a high velocity cannon capable of firing PD, Delay, or programmable air burst ammo.
So a generic platoon would be 2 squads with M240, 1 squad with SMAW, all mechanized in 3 wheeled IFVs. You mechanize this force with M1A1 and you have serious ass kicking capability.
As for the idea of each squad leader having 3 rifle fire teams and a CSW team transported by 2 vehicles, I think that is too much for a squad leader to handle and still be in the thick of the fighting. Either the squad leader will have to pull back from the fight, more like a platoon commander, or he could be overwhelmed with 5 different maneuver elements. The platoon commander would still have 3 maneuver elements but that would include 6 vehicles and possible fighting between the squad leaders and platoon commander's over who owns the CSW teams.
Or you keep the MPC as a straight up APC that drops the grunts off 5 km from the objective in which case I think the 17 pax school bus is a better idea but you have to be very cautious too keep it out of harms way.
I think it would be worth taking a look at these ways of doing things and yes these are just ideas. It needs a real honest to God experiment ran on this with dedicated company and field grade officers that believe in their assigned idea. It needs to be judged and supervised by a General that is willing to run it as a true experiment and not have a dog in the fight on which of these succeeds or fails.
As for the dismounted troops that are transported by MV-22B or MTVR I would not touch them and leave the base platoon and company organization the same. Weapons company would probably have to be reworked if they were MV-22B transported.
Until a vehicle shits the bed on the march, and normal combat attrition kicks in, and you're now running a 3-vehicle 10-12 man "platoon". You'll be understrength on Day Two of a deployment, and it only gets worse from there.
DeleteOne guy goes down in any subsequent assault, and your entire "squad" is combat ineffective trying to evac the casualty, and your entire platoon assault force is less than half a dozen guys.
We'll need companies to assault two two-man fighting holes.
When a USMC "platoon" will be smaller than the entire 1970s Symbionese Liberation Army at its greatest extent, I think the concept has been rather bastardized beyond usefulness.
So maybe not that.
I don't think we will ever again see an opposed amphibious assault, not that we don't have the material anymore (or for that much longer anyways) but simply we don't have any US politicians that would approve of it. I don't want to go into politics and forget past 2 presidents or current one, anyone really believe the current crop on the right or left have any inclination to take massive casualties on an amphibious assault that by nature is a very risky operation???
ReplyDeleteIt's not just a question of material, technology and firepower, I just don't see the top civilian leadership giving the GO to an operation that really needs human resolve and determination at it's finest. USMC still has it but that doesn't mean the civilians that need to give the order do....they are thinking reelection, PR and how this plays out on the news.
you're wrong Nico and i'll tell you why. name the last time that the United States and Europe had an actual fight for survival.
Deleteyeah. WW2.
since that time we haven't had a fight for survival. but its coming. if not for us then for our kids. we can't lose the capability to project real power against a real enemy. we can't focus on these desert wars that are basically pointless. the focus must be on wars for survival against a foe that can actually put us in the ground.
thats why amphibious and airborne assault will always be necessary.
This is what happens when the guiding philosophy of materiel acquisition is based on Johnny Cash's song One Piece At A Time.
ReplyDeleteInstead of looking at what you want to accomplish, and working from there backwards to acquire the pieces that make the puzzle complete, the Corps has been saddled (and saddled itself) with things that are shiny and sound great, but have no relevance to the ultimate mission: kicking the door down and crapping in someone else's living room.
So we've been saddled over the last 30 years with no AAV replacement, tanks too heavy to launch ashore on anything smaller than a pancake the size of Rhode Island, howitzers that were too heavy to pick up and move by most of the lift assets, no new lift assets, and fleet of moldering obsolescent ones, and a shiny gold pig that cost more than the entire Air Wing used to, and yet is less capable than century-series a/c.
We had one or two Commandants in the last 5 or so with a clue, and as a result, our guys have better boots, better LCE, better cammies, and better snivel gear for the first time since the 1940s. We have first aid kits that can actually save a life. And a legacy rifle platform and crew-served small arms that are probably about as good as things will get this side of phased plasma rifles in the 40megawatt range.
So now somebody needs to start where we are, and put the pieces in place to get us where we should have been. The sooner someone bites the bullet and kills the F-35, the better off the Corps will be. If the Commandant did it, the Corps would take the crap, but the rwality is, two other services and 20 allies would all silently mutter thanks. A short-legged under-capable hangar queen to valuable to risk in actual combat isn't going to help when we're not much worse off than if we were launching grunts onto the beach in sailor-rowed whaleboats a la 1910.
Kiss the Thunderpig goodbye, make do with older and more capable airframes, and get an AAV replacement.
Then concentrate on light armor that can punch higher than its weight, and will serve for any conflict likely in 98% of the world.
The other 2% is why there's an Air Wing, and why there should be more naval gunfire and carrier battle groups.
Stop fighting the last war, and worrying about the IED threat: the point is to get on the beach, and then move inland, while killing as many enemy combatants between Beach A and Objective Z.
If we weren't stupidly fighting misbegotten meals-on-wheels wars, we wouldn't be dealing with the gottverdammt IED problem in the first place.
"...working from there backwards..."
DeleteWhoa, whoah, woah there cowboy!
Are you actually suggesting that a branch of the US military use *backwards planning* when it comes to acquisitions?
*backwards planning*. Let me document these two words for future reference ;)
Currently, for reference, they use bassackwards planning:
DeleteThey figure out who's bribing the best, buy their stuff, then ask for more money when it doesn't do the job.
Actually, one could consider a considerable tactical advantage of having a multi-JHSV group sprint to a vehicle launch point 3 miles offshore at 40mph, than say a lumbering $4B LHD/LHA. Just equip such future built JHSV (supplanting LCS?) with perhaps a twin-BAE 54mm gun turret + a twin-40mm Bofors turret for added counter-air/missile? Complete with your Griffin C and even anti-armor/mines, counter-battery MRLS? Further escort JHSV-combatants with some M80 Stiletto MOC-type hulls deployed from sea-basing/LHD for added fire-support and UAV ops? Far better doctrine in my view at least, than say, pulling the traditional LHD up to shore.
ReplyDeleteAlso, think high-endurance, modified A-29 Super Tucano (single and twin-seat variant) launched from LHA/LHD (STOBAR similar to how Skyraiders operated from old Essex class) for escorting the V-22!
Arm with Maverick, LG 500lb, guided rockets, SDB, AIM-9/python and even 200km-ranged IMI light cruise-missiles, cued by spec ops, or pre-positioned stealthy UAV, to take out any clearly identified threats/AAA sites, etc in area of ops.
every weapon system you add to a JHSV means it can carry less cargo. additionally when fully loaded i'm not sure how much faster it is over a San Antonio Class LPD. they say those new ships can move! but again you're missing the point. the JHSV making that run means you're going to have to defeat enemy anti-ship systems. probably have to take out a bunch of the anti-armor stuff too...at least the stuff that can reach out that 3 miles. which means you have to neutralize every MBT on the beach. the point? we're back to the "old skool" forcible entry type op that the Corps is saying we don't do anymore.
Deletethe marines should learn the Israeli lesson in 2006. Total failure because iDF underestimate their enemy , militarily and politically. The IDF at that time still have the aura of invincibility they earned in the old wars.. but in 2006 it really showed how a superb military turned into prison guard and got mauled in lebanon. US military experts were flabbergasted by how IAF go thru all their warstock of PGM in just 10'days, and the hubris of IDF leaders thinking they can defeat hezbollah rockets by air power alone..
ReplyDeletein the end they send their premier units like Golani and Maglan , and even these elite units got nowhere on their offensive.. And they have to calll the reserve , even when their elite units got mauled by a crafty enemy.. Witness how the hezbollah cleverly ambushed Sayeret Egoz units and blow the house they hiding inside, killing many.. and the scene was repeated again when Israeli reserve paratroopers put 50 soldiers in one building, and predictably hezbollah hit them with ATGMs and killed even more soldiers..
The comment from US military personel is rather telling "after decades of constant COIN operation in palestine area, the IDF forgot the basic tactics for combat with armed enemy. Thats what years of fighting stone-throwing palestinian got you.."
All these american COIN experience in iraq and afghanistan wont be useful when they fought real enemy like Iran or China or Russia...
Wow, and I thought you were serious, right up until you included Iran in the same league with China and Russia.
Delete