via Marine Corps Manual.
A Marine air-ground task force organized, trained, and equipped with narrowly focused capabilities. It is designed to accomplish a specific mission, often of limited scope and duration.It may be any size, but normally it is a relatively small force--the size of a Marine expeditionary unit or smaller. Also called SPMAGTF. See also aviation combat element; combatservice support element; command element; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force; Marine expeditionary force (forward); Marineexpeditionary unit; task force.The SPMAGTF-CR is an abomination. It is a fictional unit that does not fit with Marine Corps doctrine and was produced out of thin air to (in my opinion) certify the Company Landing Team concept and the MV-22.
It has failed miserably. It is morphing into an MEU without ships or armor and very little artillery....and its throwing an already stretched Marine Corps into unneeded chaos. Want proof? Check this out from Marine Times.
In an after-action report from Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Central Command's first 100 days on the ground, task force staff said the "unavoidable and compressed schedule" of the unit's first deployment resulted in minimal predeployment training and forced the unit to rely on I Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters group to assist with tasks like checking Marines into the unit and assigning duties.The unit has been plussed up both on the grunt and medical side, has added aircraft in the form of the Harriers and EA-6Bs and I predict that we will soon see AH-1Zs and UH-1Ys.
The Kuwait-based unit, which activated Oct. 1, began supporting Operation Inherent Resolve, the U.S.-led effort to counter the Islamic State group, within its first days on the ground. Troops from the unit are supporting U.S. embassy security operations in Baghdad, Iraq, and are training Iraqi troops in Al Asad. The unit's commander, Col. Jason Bohm, told Marine Corps Times in December that his Marines are also conducting air strikes and surveillance operations and had responsibility for tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel missions in the Middle East.
Because of emerging mission requirements, the number of personnel assigned to the unit increased during the first 100 days, according to the after-action report. The report did not specify how many troops the unit added to its initial strength of 2,300, but said the expansion included additional casualty evacuation capability. The unit was also augmented with a shock trauma platoon and en-route medical care teams to facilitate unit medical care and support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions as needed, the report states.
The unit currently includes: a regimental headquarters from 5th Marines; a ground combat element from 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines; an aviation combat element from 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing with MV-22B Ospreys from VMM-263 and AV-8B Harriers from VMA-211; and other detachments including a KC-130J element and an EA-6B Prowler squadron.
We actually expect a smaller Marine Corps to support three continuous MEUs, approx 4 to 6 SPMAGTFs, have Marines on the ground in Iraq, support unit deployments to Okinawa and Australia...and still have adequate dwell time for our Marines to keep from going bat shit crazy?
I don't think so.
The answer is simple. The SPMAGTF-CR needs to go. MEU's need to be reinforced by adding an AFSB to the Amphibious Ready Group...and a moratorium taken on half baked ideas.
Actually, I thought the SP-MAGTF was supposed to be the 'latest take' on atomizing the Marines by shifting from a Batallion level force down to a supported Company (500 people anyway) unit.
ReplyDeleteThis stinks of provisional expeditionary ad hoc'ism.
IMO, in case any of you are still wondering, they are trying to tire out, deunify and flat out retire in disgust enough of the 'wrong kind' (sane, operationally astute) people from the Armed Forces that when 'The Big Plan' finally hit's it's NWO H-Hour, there will not be enough folks out there, close enough or strong enough, to stop it.
Turning the USMC into a large scale GB force doing nation building and COIN is one way of doing this.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with sending a SWAT team to a Civil War. We do it all the time with SOF. The question is whether mission focus and capabilities sets are a matching fraction (particularly relative to force protection and base security in the host country, look out if they contract it).
If we get bogged down in an Asian Landwar, the Marines may need to reevaluate their From The Sea Forwards littoral vision towards a heart-of-continent condition where airmobility is the only way to leapfrog around as a fire brigade putting out local blazes.
Speaking of which, this could likely give a mission to their otherwise useless F-35Bs as a distinct Cactus Air Force that can operate from M-FARPs against gang banger type threats (I'm thinking of Jennys going after Nicaraguan Guerillas without road access to bring up field guns here).
http://www.genebenson.com/history/marine_museum.htm
But the cost may be remissioning away from the water and the high intensity conflict condition, altogether.
Which makes sense if you don't want to get Task Force Smith mauled by the Chinese in a Taiwan or Korean condition.
The problem as I see it, is that the Marines still have yet to mount up. The MV-22 is a sucky platform for doing it since you are hard pressed to put a golf cart in it but the reality check MUST BE the 4,500 Hueys that we lost in SEA and the 300+ that the Soviets lost in AfG.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Soviet_aircraft_losses_in_the_Soviet_war_in_Afghanistan
We have the capability to bring forces into these remote areas and fight hard because the technology levels have increased far above those available in the 1960s. But the -cost- of those platforms means fewer of them and much higher replacement value which means that Marines may ultimately have to choose between having immediate tactical insert and support vs. making a long walk-in and losing surprise. With the variable being whether you have enough airframes to get the more forces in or out in a single lift when the op is done or in trouble.
Accept this and move to mount your forces on lightweight 4X4 APC and scout tank armor and you solve both problems in not putting airlift at risk with close insert and not putting Marines down with a long walk and no heavy weapons to support them as a function of who has surprise and who can /maintain/ initiative.
DeleteIn this, the Osprey is, quite simply, a artifact of another age. Dump the photo op moment and go for a simpler Stallion and you can deliver your small Air Mech force in a platform that can forward refuel from that KC-130 and _stick around_ to get the Marines either as they come back out at 30-40mph. Or as they secure the objective sufficient to bring the heavy lift in to extract them directly.
The neat thing here is that, if you have a scout tank with a universal turret well, the difference between a 20-30mm autocannon and quad box of Javelins, a 120mm Dragonfire Mortar, a 7.62 M134, 40mm M27 and ADS vs. a VLS pallet of SPIKE NLOS is one of plug and play mission modules, depending on how close in with a heavy force you want to get
Two hundred Wiesel type minis can equate to a 600-800 mission capability sets depending on your module loadout and whether they are the force protection for an infantry force or the infantry are doing the security mission for an anti-armor mission.
At 800,000 (Mk.1) to 1.2 million (Mk.2) dollars with 2 per CH-53K, a helo force of 10 choppers = 20 vehicles in a mix of Wolf and Wiesel or equivalent.
How long has it been since a Marine has been able to whistle up 20 vehicles into overwatch or block force positions on an objective an enemy force didn't want to give away? Korea?
As pretty as they are, air is just the FedEx delivery agent. It's what you put /inside/ those platforms that makes the difference on the pointy end.
What the SPMAGTF does is keep Marines relevant (at least until we face a more formidable opponent). And time deployed is less time for Marines to get in trouble at home with cars, motorcycles, alcohol, etc. The focus now is on staying relevant and staying out of bad headlines.
ReplyDeletethat is a lazy answer to a serious question. how is the Marine Corps any less relevant without this stupid formation that delivers nothing to combatant commanders? how does having a fully capable MEU on hand with the ability to fly in Marines when necessary not every bit as viable without the added expense, maintenance burden and dwell time troubles that we're now facing? that "if they're at home they're gonna get in trouble" is lazy thinking. i point to the incidents in Okinawa and now that tragedy in the Philippines.
DeleteSurfGW i like you but that wasn't at all convincing.
Slowman
ReplyDeleteJust read the wikipedia entry on the Surion KUH 1 helicopter. Apparantely the chopper and its full technology has been offerd by your Govt. to us and I wanted to know your inputs on this along with inputs of any other people here familiar with this chopper. The Indian Govt. is scouting for a light utility chopper to be made completely in India and is expecting to make anywhere between 440 to 600 copies of it.
AFSB won't do anything for an MEU or a SPMATG-CR. NO lift capability just an encumbered flight deck. AND there will will only two at $500 mil a copy. Why do Marines always want expensive toys that have a limited mission set?
ReplyDeleteI agree that some from of transport is needed for all Marine forces afloat, but there are MANY ships in the US (not justd DOD) inventory which can provide LIFT - supplement the billion dollar baby warships. And NOT cost hundreds of millions to boot~
IF you have to have a warship why not a RSN Endurance class mini-LPD?