via Marine Corps Historical Division...
The second battle for Khe Sanh began on 20 January 1968 when Marines from the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines attacked a North Vietnamese battalion between Hill 881 South and Hill 881 North. More than 100 of the enemy were killed. This week's publication is _The Battle for Khe Sanh_, by Captain Moyers S. Shore, II. First published in 1969, this was one of the earliest records of the battle and siege of Khe Sanh Combat Base.The battle of Khe Sanh was taught to every Marine in boot camp not that long ago. Its the story of Marines under almost constant fire, living in hellish conditions and with the assistance of some extremely brave airmen fought and won where the French had failed.
Its one of those "finest hour" stories that is known only inside the military (note also that this was a truly joint service fight...the US Army, Air Force, Navy...everyone showed up, everyone fought and everyone bled).
One of the sidenotes to the fight is the battle for the hills surrounding the base. If those battles are analogous to what company landing teams will face (and that is my fear) then we're looking at sending future Marines into meat grinders.
This history is a must read.
Imagine what USMC could have done with JDAM and HIMARS.
ReplyDeletei'm not sure. we wouldn't have had to rely so heavily on air power BUT the enemy would be advanced too so what would they do to counter heavy rockets and precision guided munitions?
DeleteIt was that Airpower the French lacked.,men on the ground at Dien Bien Phu were of at least the same quality ,Legion Paras probably better than most of the words fighting units of the day, great many of them German WW2 veterans.
Delete''Khe Sanh received 18,000 tons in aerial resupplies during the 77-day battle, whereas during 167 days that the French forces at Dien Bien Phu held out, they received only 4,000 tons'' tonage droped in bombs is in even greater contrast.
France asked for B29 rampage, but Eisenhower deny. I've even heard about nuke reqest, obviously and wisely deny too...
ReplyDeleteIn both cases I think it was a bad idea, bad tactic, bad place for base, because or airstrip...
The Us, with bigger airpower, had made the victory. Dien Ben phu was lost when tha air supply was stopped with the shelling of the airstrip.
There are certain similarities in the Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh set-up. Why one ended in disaster and the other in tactical victory (but strategic defeat) has nothing to do however with the quality of airpower and only to a certain degree to lack of resupplying, in the case of Dien Bien Phu.
ReplyDeleteThe quality of troops on the ground in both battles is beyond doubt. But Dien Bien Phu ended up as a fuck-up because the French brass in charge of planning the battle totally underestimated Giap's ability to move heavy artillery into the hills around Dien Bien Phu.
It's the actual superiority of the Viet Minh artillery that decided the fate of the French forces there, combined marginally with lack of resupplying and the fact the French were actually operating way behind ennemy lines.
That's where the differences with Khe Sanh start because the Marines there were in a better position when Giap decided the hit that base. The major cause for concern I would see for the future, is that today's Generals might actually underestimate the capibilities of tomorrow's ennemy just as much as the French did in 1954 and that is where future Marines might get unnecessarily into harm's way.
Khe Sanh... I always think that they should ad an extra verse to the hymn.
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