For more than four decades, Chinese leaders lulled presidents, cabinet secretaries, and other government analysts and policymakers into falsely assessing China as a benign power deserving of U.S. support, says Michael Pillsbury, the Mandarin-speaking analyst who has worked on China policy and intelligence issues for every U.S. administration since Richard Nixon.Bill Gertz is probably the best defense reporter in Washington and this book (and article) is nothing less than explosive.
The secret strategy, based on ancient Chinese statecraft, produced a large-scale transfer of cash, technology, and expertise that bolstered military and Communist Party “superhawks” in China who are now taking steps to catch up to and ultimately surpass the United States, Pillsbury concludes in a book published this week.
The Chinese strategic deception program was launched by Mao Zedong in 1955 and put forth the widespread misbelief that China is a poor, backward, inward-looking country. “And therefore the United States has to help them, and give away things to them, to make sure they stay friendly,” Pillsbury said in an interview. “This is totally wrong.”
The Chinese strategy also is aimed at gaining global economic dominance, he says, noting that China’s military buildup is but one part. The combined economic, political, and military power is seeking to produce China as a new global “hegemon” that will export its anti-democratic political system and predatory economic practices around the world.
In the interview, Pillsbury, currently director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Chinese Strategy, said new details contained in the book were cleared for publication by the FBI, CIA, and Defense Department, including details of formerly classified presidential directives, testimony from previously unknown Chinese defectors, and alarming details of writings from powerful Chinese military and political hawks.
The book also discloses for the first time that the opening to China in 1969 and 1970, considered one of the United States’ most significant strategic gambits, was not initiated by then-President Nixon’s top national security aide Henry Kissinger. Instead, Pillsbury shows that it was Chinese generals who played the United States card against the Soviet Union, amid fears of a takeover of the country by Moscow.
Some sensitive details were removed from the manuscript by the government. However, the totality of the book represents an authorized disclosure of China’s secret strategy....
The book, The Hundred Year Marathon, is available on Amazon here.
Chinese strategic capabilities are overstated. Edward Luttwak thinks the Chinese are strategic imbeciles. Chinese are convinced of the incredible effectiveness of ancient strategic wisdom which favors deceit and economic inducements but have been repeatedly defeated by primitive steppe nomads employing straightforward force. China spent two thirds of the last millenium under foreign overlordship and its strategic naivete played a huge role in the western penetration of China in the 19th century. Luttwak convincingly argues that ancient Chinese wisdom about strategy applied to warfare among states who shared a similar culture - for instance, prioritizing economic factors, and without deep racial or national animosities - that simply don't apply on the international scene, where other factors operate, but the Chinese are too blinkered to understand this.
ReplyDeleteLuttwak calls this Chinese malady great state autism.
China's capacity to deceive others and achieve some grand strategic coup is nil. America's own often idiotic cultural assumptions - a fanatically ideological commitment to free trade, guilt towards non-Europeans - have led it to deal foolishly with the Chinese (and countless others in a manner no different, despite their lack of ancient Chinese wisdom).
But the logic of strategy will eventually dictate the formation of a coalition against China for the purpose of its containment, a result that will be entirely self-inflicted.
how did Edward Luttwak enter this debate? i don't even know who he is or if you're even properly representing his ideas but marvel at how you took the time to attack him when he is no where mentioned in this article.
DeleteNo, I'm defending Luttwak. I agree with him. I see Chinese strategic thinking as simplistic and not embodying any special subtlety, and after reading Kissinger's fawning admiration for examples of Chinese strategy that seem naively obvious, its incredibly refreshing to read Luttwak's considerably more grown up take.
ReplyDeleteAnd the fact that China spent most of the last thousand years dominated by supposedly unsubtle foreigners speaks volumes.
Luttwak writes about strategy. He's quite brilliant you should check him out.
ok. now i get it. i will. i did a google search on the guy and he seems interesting. do you recommend a particular book?
DeleteAll the ones I've read have been great. He's one of those guys who always says something interesting. His latest book is about China's rise and you seem interested in that so you might want to start there. IT features a fascinating examination of Germany's strategic predicament during its great power rise as well.
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