USMC Infantry. Going from Superb to Special Operations Capable.

I had the chance to talk to USMC Col. Doug King (Ret), Director of the Ellis Group.

A little background first.  What is the Ellis Group?  The best ditty on the organization comes from Small Wars Journal....

The Ellis Group was created by Marine Corps Commandant General James Amos in December 2011 to conduct a detailed examination of emerging warfighting challenges, identify opportunities for increasing naval warfighting effectiveness, and coordinate with naval partners. Composed of 10 officers and civilians hand-picked by the Commandant, Ellis Group has five specific areas of emphasis. These are: strengthen naval warfighting partnerships; inform the combat development and integration processes; enhance naval partnership with US Special Operations Command; focus innovation in naval warfighting; and develop littoral warfare expertise.

The purpose of the conversation?

Its been unanimous.  Every Marine I've talked to has cheered the EF21 MAGTF-GCE initiative that the Ellis Group put forward (you can read it below).  We have a chance to actually "improve" Marine Corps Infantry.

The document below outlines the concept, but I still had concerns.  Luckily a couple of my contacts were able to put me in touch with King and he was able to fill in the holes....What follows is MY interpretation of the answers given to my questions, not a word for word quote.

Risk and Survivability.
The concept attacks this issue at the very start and its been a major personal concern of mine.  Examples are given of missions that seemed benign and turned deadly.  How do you deploy a USMC Rifle Squad, Company Landing Team or even Battalion Landing Team at distance, yet prevent a Ft Apache situation or a Khe Sanh from occurring?  C2/SA & Advanced Joint Fires.  Personally I'm betting that you will see a component of the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability grow into a system that is able to be plugged into by USMC ground forces to provide timely fires when needed.  Destroying grid squares is so Desert Storm 1.  For better or worse we're into an age of precision fires...at distance.

How do you get steel on target?  This ties in with the Commandant's push to "professionalize" the Infantry (don't get this twisted...Marine Infantry is extremely professional, it hasn't however had clearly defined career paths like you find in the aviation community...that is changing).  Every Squad will have a Joint Fires Observer.  Every Company will have a JTAC.

Make no mistake about it.    Just in its ability to call for fires we're approaching (not quite there) the capability set found in Special Forces A-Teams.

But also emphasized is that the "scalable" aspect of the MAGTF is going to be maintained.  Squads...the building block of the Battalion Landing Team...will be the new baseline.  If C2/SA works as advertised, even if sugar turns to shit, you will see a rapid increase in combat power.  The example of the SEAL Team inserting into Sierra Leone is a good example.  It was suppose to be a passive environment.  In flight the situation changed.  Talon Reach demonstrates that for a Marine Rifle Squad doing the same mission you would see them being updated in real time on approach to the LZ.  Instead of flying into a hornets nest they could divert, orbit and wait for assistance OR simply abandon the mission and come back with the full firepower of the Battalion Landing Team.

Are we going from Recruiting to Selection when it comes to Infantrymen?
If you read the attached document then you will see standards that are far more stringent than that found for (as an example) US Army Rangers.  The GCT scores are higher.  The physical fitness requirements are higher.  The standards are being raised and that will rebound throughout the Ground Combat Element.  Will we be able to recruit to this standard?  Can we get enough bodies to staff our 24 Infantry Battalions with these new standards?

Its believed we can.

King pushed back a bit but I contend that we're moving toward a selection type push in the Infantry.  I personally consider it a good thing.  Young men do stupid things at times but stupid versus morally bankrupt are two different things.  I expect 1st Sgt's and Company Commanders to spend ALOT less time dealing with the idiotic 1% if this initiative goes forward.

Buy in by the Fleet.
This is a concern that I put forward because I'm part of the Marine Corps family.  Getting the FMF to buy into this is going to be a chore.  First the taskings aren't going away.  Then you have the idea that increased op tempo combined with the idea of getting personnel down to the School Houses for the necessary training to make these ideas a reality, mix it all in with funding to actually make it happen and you have points of failure baked into the cake.

Fortunately this is high on the Commandant's list of priorities.  Dunford hit the deck with an idea to improve the Corps, and now has 3.5 years to make it happen.

The power of the Commandant's office is a sight to behold.  If focus is maintained at the highest level...if setbacks are properly dealt with and the people implementing the policy have the agility to adjust...and if questions about the concept are dealt with in a respected way then this will succeed beyond my wildest dreams.

Summation.
I hate Pentagon buzzwords, but this is truly a transformational concept.  We won't have to "figure out" how its going to work.  We have expectations ahead of its implementation and we know the desired outcome.  If this works then you will see Marine Infantry become (once again) the most powerful, technologically advanced on the planet.  Missions that were once considered too hard for conventional forces will be well within our wheelhouse.  Our MEU's should deploy with the Special Operations Capable label again (actually we never should have given that up considering how much overlap their has always been).

This is an exciting time for Marine Infantry.  I hope they embrace it.