Is Airborne Assault still viable as a forcible entry option?

Tim, a reader of the blog found this tidbit...

"Moving Airborne Forces with Strategic Airlift
United States Army airborne forces, namely the 82nd Airborne Division, require a considerable amount of airlift to deploy. The large quantity of vehicles and the space they require in aircraft is the primary reason. The Logistics Handbook for Strategic Mobility Planning contains two models for estimated strategic airlift to deploy the unit. A mix of C-141s and C-17s would require 1,010 C-141s and another seve nty-nine C-17s. This quantity would move the equipment and 4,430 of the paratroopers. An additional 8,719 paratroopers would still require transportation. A total of 1,009 C-141s and forty-seven C-5s move the unit’s equipment and 4,516 paratroopers, leaving another 8,633 to deploy. This is a huge amount of airlift, mostly because of the bulk of
wheeled vehicles.29"

The above passage is from a paper written by then Major Delancey while at the Army Staff College.  It reads like a primer on the MRZR (at the time he was partial to the Flyer ITV) but the questions he raises about the amount of lift required to get one Airborne Brigade Combat Team to conduct forcible entry operations bears study.

The upshot?

Even with the 82nd moving to lighter vehicles the number of aircraft required to move them is staggering.  We already know that except under ideal conditions the 101st is NOT a credible forcible entry option.

Can the same be said of the 82nd?  Is Airborne Assault still viable as a forcible entry option?