via Breaking Defense.
“Software is different from hardware (and not all software is the same),” the report warns. That means the Pentagon needs not only a separate process for acquiring software differently from hardware, but also needs the flexibility to acquire different kinds of software different. Even on a single program like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, for example, the code actually embedded in the aircraft, controlling highly classified sensors and weapons, requires a different approach from the mission and threat profiles, which require a different approach from the maintenance and spare parts database.Story here.
The F-35’s maintenance and spares software — Lockheed Martin‘s Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) — has been an unshakeable albatross around the program’s neck for years. Rather than simplifying ground crews’ jobs, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson has said, ALIS requires them to spend an extra 10 to 15 hours a week finding ways to work around it. The Air Force has unleashed its elite Kessel Run team of in-house coders to fix Lockheed Martin’s mess, but that’s a stopgap.
Full disclosure.
The F-35 is a favorite target of mine of govt waste, corruption and malfeasance in office by top DoD officials, both civilian and military.
But this software thing gives me serious pause.
Are we in essence building into our systems a vulnerability that can be exploited by the enemy? In the case of the ALIS we're looking at a system that is not only causing maintainers to work longer hours (affecting retention) but also because it will be so widely deployed susceptible to all kinds of villains... ranging from bored individuals hiding in the proverbial basement to dedicated agents of foreign powers.
I don't know cause I'm hardly a software guy but from the cheap seats this looks a bit silly.
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