The fatal flaw in the Marine Corps’ approach to countering China

 via Task & Purpose

Because SIF detachments will be widely distributed and unable to reinforce each other, their survivability will depend almost entirely on their ability to remain undetected. The concept suggests that the SIF is less detectable and survivable than U.S. Navy warships. A cursory comparison of SIFs and Arleigh Burke destroyers, which likely would be the Navy asset to have the same mission envisioned for SIFs, renders this claim highly questionable.

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 Beyond the survivability of the SIF itself, two of the primary means for inserting, displacing, and withdrawing a SIF cannot survive inside of an enemy’s weapons engagement zone: Marine Corps C-130 transports and CH-53 helicopters are not designed to survive in such a zone; they will be easy prey to a variety of enemy weapons.  

Confronted with these facts, proponents argue that SIFs achieve low observability by operating in “penny packets.” The smallest size one of these so-called penny packets could achieve is a missile section consisting of five JLTVs with two supporting trucks and trailers, not counting a necessary security element, minimal air- and missile-defense capabilities, and a basic logistics support team. The missile section alone will certainly not be low observable by any reasonable person’s definition. (Interestingly, Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery prompted the common use of the term “penny packet” in World War II when he used it to denigrate the parceling out of airpower in elements too small to be of operational value while also too many to protect.)

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 In essence, those who conceived the SIF concept are arguing that an operational commander should place Marine SIFs — with a marginal ability to avoid detection and to protect themselves — in areas near where U.S. Navy ships with systems to disguise their location, divert enemy weapons, and protect against attack dare not go because of the enemy’s extraordinary surveillance and targeting capability. The illogic of the SIF concept could only be offered by technologically and operationally uninformed officers.

If the Marine Corps were to bring this concept to fruition and future commanders employed SIFs as designed, there could only be one result — many dead and captured Marines. Continuing along this force development path, with divestments already underway, makes little operational sense. The Corps and the nation will be better off when the current Force Design 2030 folly ends — although less well off than before it started. 

Here 

The Marines should be prepared to take on the nation’s foes in “any clime and place” rather than wannabe missileers stranded, vulnerable, and unable to survive on forgotten Pacific islands. Fourth Marines are currently being reconfigured as a SIF. I fear that storied regiment may once again be heading into ignoble confinement similar to its Second World War experience as the original SIF in 1941.