Let's get this out of the way. I've had a couple of questions with regard to FD2030.
1. Why didn't the US Marines wait for the US Navy to formulate its plan to fight the Chinese in the Pacific and then flow from that? We are the supporting service. Yes we are a sea service but supporting in the naval fight. The supporting service CANNOT dictate to the SUPPORTED service on how it will fight!
2. If the Navy is so convinced that FD2030 will be key to the fight then why the resistance to building more amphibious ships? Why the slow walking of the Landing Ship Medium?
Well it took awhile but CDR SALAMANDER lets us know by going after the US Army's ALL DOMAIN UNIT. What is that outfit? Think FD2030 on steroids. It's just like a Marine Littoral Regiment except much more robust. It will have bigger, faster and longer ranged anti-ship missiles, it will have a larger anti-air contingent and it will be capable of going toe to toe with Chinese Marines/Airborne/Special Ops units that might decide to attack it on the ground.
Even better? The Army put this unit together without gutting its other capabilities.
But lets see what CDR Salamander has to say about this thing...
As it was in the past, so it shall be in the future - a war in the Western Pacific will be primarily a maritime and aerospace fight. Army will be the supporting service, not the supported.
Not that our ground forces don’t have an important role. Someone has to take and hold islands, to reinforce allied forces ashore when needed … but regardless of how many times you like to Joint-up your discussions - never forget the entire “Joint” cult is nothing but the Army trying to keep the USN and USAF inside Army fencing.
Oh and I need to highlight this portion of it.
While it is a takedown (IMO) of not only the Army's MDU & FD2030 by extension but it also goes into the realm of service rivalry.
That's why the Navy has allowed the Marine Corps to continue with this plan I believe. The USMC is about to willfully subordinate itself to the Navy instead of acting as an independent service that is aligned with the Navy when units are tasked with supporting the sea battle.
Additionally I need to point out that this is a take down of what the author is calling the "fortress fleet". Again this all goes back to a "power play" to determine who is actually calling the shots in the naval battle.
Under the Army's proposed MDU concept they would be from reading at least taking the chair of joint command of the sea battle if not overall command if fought in certain locations (think the battle of Taiwan).
To be blunt, this proposal is alot less nuanced than FD2030. If you've noticed the Marine Corps is sending its HQ elements all over the place and integrating itself into Task Forces to sail with the Navy.
I believe its an attempt to get a seat at the table of the sea fight even though the utility of the MLR is quite limited (another reason why the focus has been taken off the ship killing capability of the unit and focused on the recon/counter recon aspect of the thing...the MLR is too light in the ass to really sting but if it can keep eyes on then its contributing).
Long story short?
I got my answer.
Despite the Navy playing nice they really don't give a flying fuck about FD2030.
I would bet that we see moves to reconstitute lost capabilities during the term of the current commandant.
FD2030 will go down in USMC history as a failed experiment, an overreaching commandant & a lesson to future leaders on WHAT NOT TO DO!
The transformationalist behind FD2030 failed badly, purposefully created a rift in the fabric of the Marine Corps family and acted in bad faith from the very start.
It won't happen (cause the current commandant was a proponent) but in actuality we should see a number of colonels and higher forced into retirement.
They fucked up but they won't pay in our time. History will ravage them though.
No comments :
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.