Wednesday, August 31, 2022

Ship runs aground in the Suez Canal..the supply chain will be jacked again. Its almost like this nonsense is planned!

1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 11th Airborne Division fire the Javelin Anti-Tank Missile System during the Orient Shield 22 training exercise at Oyanohara Training Area, Kumamoto, Japan

The Japanese are building a 20K ton Arsenal Ship Destroyer????!!!!! This is gonna be one HUGE bitch!

Could that possibly be right? 20K tons?!?!?!?! That is gonna be one huge bitch! It would replace the carriers as ships that MUST be hit first by the Chinese! Wonder how many launch cells it'll have. The Burkes have what? 96? It's got to be at least if not more than 150 or its a waste of tonnage! If those are all land attack variants then this one ship could practically hold small nations at risk of military destruction!

Think about the possibilities if these ships are at the center of a Surface Action Group filled with anti-ship missiles that are LONG RANGE!

If the missiles can reach out say....1K miles then an aircraft carrier as currently composed would be toast to it!

If missile tech catches up then the aircraft carrier will be obsolete!

Boris Johnson (UK Prime Minister) blocked a peace deal between Ukraine & Russia???

Thanks to Cogitans Iuvenis

So it is about regime change.

This will end badly for the EU.

As far as this offensive is concerned?  From my chair it smacks of desperation.

The Ukrainians are trying to make gains before the winter hits.  There is realization that the alliance will be under strain at that time. 

3d Battalion, 3d Marines conduct a live-fire sniper range on Camp Schwab, Okinawa, Japan

3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division, run a series of ranges in preparation for a Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE)

Creating a Real Deterrent to Defend Taiwan by Gary Anderson, of Wargaming and Alternative Analysis at the George Washington University’' Elliott School of International Affairs

 via Military.com

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger believes that the threat of having Marines leapfrogging from island to island plinking at Chinese warships in the South China Sea with anti-ship missiles will either deter China from starting a war or will be decisive in winning it.


He is wrong.


China's warships are a very expendable part of its overall strategy. The Chinese believe their mobile missile launchers, high endurance drones, reconnaissance satellites and swarms of attack aircraft, combined with attack submarines, would be sufficient to create a bubble that would prevent Americans from interfering with an invasion of Taiwan.


The Chinese view their surface navy as mere pieces on the chessboard. Americans should realize that the key to deterring a war or winning it will be to deconstruct the Chinese recon-strike complex and use attack submarines to first sink Chinese amphibious ships attacking Taiwan and then strangle Chinese overseas maritime commerce.


At the present time, we can do the second with existing submarine assets, but the first will need new capabilities to prevent incurring unacceptable casualties. Attack submarines can stop an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, but we must also defeat the anti-navy capability in order to reinforce Taipei's forces. A combination of these two capabilities could deter Chinese adventurism, but the United States must be able to show not just the capabilities themselves but the will to use them. This would mean demonstrating the willingness to fight a long war of attrition, which China cannot afford.


China is an export economy. American attack submarines could effectively enforce a blockade of those exports. If Beijing realizes that we are willing and able to disrupt Chinese trade if it initiates a conflict with Taiwan or any other state in what it believes to be its sphere of influence, deterrence is possible. Such a conflict would be painful for us, but disastrous for China. We can demonstrate our determination by building more attack submarines, particularly cheap automated craft to augment our already impressive capability.


Countering China's anti-navy capability would be more complicated. The center of gravity of its capabilities is its recon-strike complex centered on mobile missile launchers, including tactical anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles but also long-range strategic attack systems capable of striking U.S. bases on Guam, Japan and even Australia. By shooting and moving, the Chinese hope to keep these systems protected.


As we found during the failed SCUD hunt during Operation Desert Storm, locating and destroying such systems can be a wicked problem. If we can demonstrate the capability to find and destroy such mobile systems, the Chinese will be much less likely to employ them.


As director of Marine Corps Wargaming in the early 1990s, I initiated a series of war games to examine potential solutions to the mobile launcher problem. Later, we partnered with the late Andrew Marshall's DoD Office of Net Assessment to look to 2030 and examine where China might take its nascent anti-navy capability. What we found in both series of games was that overhead detection of mobile launchers would remain difficult against a skilled adversary. But once fired and moving, the launchers could be tracked easily if there were enough "eyes" on the ground around the point of origin to follow the vehicle in whatever direction it moved. It could then be targeted by precision strike assets.


Of course, the problem was getting the eyes on the ground behind enemy lines to do the tracking. Our conclusion was to do this by covertly inserting swarms of small-to-micro robotic sensors along all possible routes a launcher could take from point of origin. We began to call this concept a Reconnaissance-Surveillance-Target- Acquisition (RSTA) Cloud. We also quickly realized that this would need to be a joint capability. At the time, the technology to realize the capability did not exist. We did some field experiments to track mockup SCUD launchers using surrogates for the small sensors we imagined.


I came to believe that the concept was viable. That technology exists today. We should not only develop it, we should advertise it if we want to create a credible deterrent.


A credible South China Sea deterrent strategy that emphasizes our capability to use attack submarines to disrupt a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, blockade Chinese commerce, and effectively cripple their anti-navy capability would not increase our defense outlays radically and would reassure our Indo-Pacific allies of our capability to support them.

Story here 


Note.

I personally don't believe even senior Marine Corps officers believe in Force Design 2030.  When you have leaders that have to basically revert to speaking liking they're defending their thesis then you have a problem with your concept.

If it ain't understood by the LCpl with two years in the Corps, spends his free time lifting weights and chasing ass on the weekends and is a true believer in everything the Corps once stood for then you have a problem.

Berger and senior Marine Officers have a problem.

This plan is made for, designed for and backed by star chasers. It ain't built to defend this nation.

Worse?

The Navy don't believe in it and the State Dept is so inept that they can't properly support it.

The so called big brains in the Marine Corps labored hard and produced a steaming pile of dog shit.

Hide and Seek Exercise: Training for the Modern Battlefield

Note. An organization that once prided itself on locating, closing with and destroying the enemy is now running fucking hide and seek exercises! Just wow.
MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. – Divesting, integration and reorganization of our forces is a result of the efforts to address present and future adversaries from obscure environments to uncertain domains. What does this massive change look like, and what are some of the ways training is being executed to coincide with this?

Hide and Seek Exercise (HSX) is one such training that encompasses the multi-domain planes of kinetic and non-kinetic effects, where friendly forces and adversaries are pitted against one another, equipped with material for the anticipated, modern-world battle.

The exercise was comprised of a blue team and a red team; the blue team acting as the friendly element and the read team as lead adversary.

“This unique exercise offers one of the most realistic ways for units to train,” said U.S. Marine Corps Maj. Aric Ramsey, the regimental communications officer with 10th Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division. “We created a free play, force on force scenario involving a blue force operating fires, logistics, command and control, and a red force leveraging just about every information related capability available to collect, fuse, and attempt to target the blue forces using their signature.”

Ramsey said both sides employed equipment necessary to meet the needs of present and future warfare, facing friction across all domains and in uncertain training environments. The conduct of the exercise was shaped by Force Design 2030 concepts.

“We have been grappling with the Commandant's Planning Guidance, expeditionary advanced based operations (EABO), and the concept for stand-in forces for some time,” he said.

Stand-in-forces were curated among subordinate commands to prepare for immediate action to various threats. This hyper vigilance of preparation comes with concepts such as EABO, which establishes an operating base within a small timeframe, and oftentimes within an enemy’s weapon engagement zone.

U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Matthew Stevens, a tactical imagery analyst with 2nd Intelligence Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group, and a prior infantryman, explained from his perspective the strength of incorporating the idea of Force Design 2030.

“Exercises like this provides the opportunity to operate in this capacity, where you really see how the movements are conducted; there’s fidelity among the operations and fusion that exists between [different intelligence disciplines],” he said.

It became apparent to II MEF that an exercise on the East Coast would be beneficial, particularly one that would combine every information related capability, imitating a near-peer adversary that would target U.S. forces through their signatures. This exercise would satisfy the need to improve numerous tactics in order to serve as a SIF. It did not take long before HSX had the attention of many units from within MEF, such as 2nd Marine Logistics Group and II MEF Information Group.

Ramsey went on to discuss the bigger picture with keeping training front and center.

“The end state is for Marines to understand every aspect in which they conduct their mission, particularly for a SIF,” he said. “They will see how attention to details contribute to camouflaging their position, planning their routes, receiving sustainment, and managing their communications to successfully operating within the weapons engagement zone.”

Ramsey explained that mistakes made during the exercise allowed Marines to identify solutions.

“The mistakes that are made and the lessons identified through them will save lives and contribute to mission accomplishment should these forces ever be called to operate against near peer adversaries with an advanced intelligence and fires complex.”

According to Ramsey, the HSX is invaluable for its ability to place Marines and Sailors in a training environment where there’s more freedom for those participating. With any exercise comes the responsibility of honing in on what needs improvement and what should be sustained.

Exercises such as HSX provide the units with the realistic training necessary to remain a combat-ready force that is capable to deploy at a moment’s notice.

The units that participated all benefited from the freedom that existed in the planning architecture which enabled them to complete their training objectives, learn from mistakes, and hone in on potential solutions for problem sets of the future fight.

1st Bn., 4th Marines, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel training exercise

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