Sunday, March 06, 2011
Golan MRAP...why didn't it succeed?
I'm looking back at the history of the MRAP program and one vehicle keeps popping up as "looking" like a winner yet failing to gain substantial orders. The Golan.
Does anyone have specific information on why it wasn't chosen and why the manufacturer failed to seek sales elsewhere? It would be appreciated.
Sunday's Must Read..."The ARG at the Vortex of Change"
Second Line of Defense writes....
Lessons Learned From Operation El Dorado CanyonRead the whole thing and consider it carefully. Quite a bit of truth lies in this short article.
During Operation El Dorado Canyon in Libya in the late 1980s, the United States conducted a strike against the Libyan government in response to the state-sponsored bombing of a disco in Berlin that resulted in the injury of over 200 people, and cost the lives of two individuals. Much of the accolades that followed the successful raids on Libya revolved around the long-range, EF-111 and FB-111 bombers, along with the KC-135 and KC-10 aircraft that conducted long-range refueling operations while originating operations out of the United Kingdom.
Less talked about was the role of the Naval Forces off the coast of Libya that also participated in the raids. Well over 30 Naval strike aircraft participated in the raids as well, and the Naval Force was also on stand-by to conduct search and rescue operations as needed with helo-borne forces. The Naval Fleet provided command and Control as well, and the security of the airspace was guaranteed through the use of carrier-based F-14 Tomcats that were in position to react should something arise.
What is more important is what did not take place. Had there been an unforeseen emergent air threat that resulted in significant delays, the bomber force that had transited the Atlantic would have been unable adjust to the extended operations, and would likely have had to turn back toward England without dropping their ordnance. In an equivalent scenario in today’s day and age, that would most certainly be viewed as a strategic failure and then subsequently be plastered all over the mass media as exactly that.What is more important is what did not take place. Had there been an unforeseen emergent air threat that resulted in significant delays, the bomber force that had transited the Atlantic would have been unable adjust to the extended operations, and would likely have had to turn back toward England without dropping their ordnance.What the Naval Services provided operational commanders during Operation El Dorado Canyon is exactly the same thing the ARG provides today– the ability to react to change and absorb operational friction across a spectrum of operational conditions. That is something that typically doesn’t make the history books. Instead of a single-focus, long-range strike capability, the USN-USMC team provides operational commanders with a series of strategic, operational and tactical options that a one-dimensional bomber force cannot provide.
British SAS captured???
I can't imagine how this happened. On this one, I'll wait to hear the details before I comment.
Saturday, March 05, 2011
The USAF gives us what NASA can't. A reliable space plane.
USAF.
X-37B fact sheet.
X-37B fact sheet.
F-35 Avalon Air Show Media Kit...
Viewable here...unfortunately its not available for download but very nicely done. Worth checking out.
Amhibious by Nature...Expeditionary by Training...the F-35B is essential for future operations.
via Second Line of Defense...
I couldn't say it better myself. Future operations with the gear that's due to come online soon will not lessen the danger but will make them more "do-able"...we're still capable-still formidable, but the effort to carry out these wide ranging missions will strain current systems.The Libyan Crisis: Beyond “Bosnia ’96″
How the New Amphibious Ready Group Expands the President’s Options
By Robbin Laird
03/05/2011 - The Libyan crisis is occurring in a period of challenges to the USAF and USN’s ability to deliver capabilities useful to the President. Part of the problem is the significant commitment of dwindling assets for use in the region. Even though there are elements of this crisis which look like 1996, President Obama has not nearly the assets President Clinton had. Part of the problem is the relatively inflexible quality of those assets. The USAF can line up its AWACS and air fleet to do “Bosnia 1996″, but given the constrained geography of the Middle East, this is a major operation. The USN can move a carrier battle group to engage Libya and support a no fly zone. And then there is the desire to move US and allied airlift into the area to support humanitarian missions, although that requires securing an airfield to execute the mission, something only Special Forces or the USMC can do, either by seabasing or air drop. But this requires air defense assets as well.None of these are great options and each will be executed with a deliberate Presidential decision, which will indicate to the Libyan leadership a virtual act of war.
Fast forward to the newly configured USMC Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).
- The new ARG built around the LPD 17 has a larger deck to operate from, with modern C2 capabilities.
- The F-35B can be launched as the picket fence operating on the border of Libya able to do electronic warfare, C4ISR and preparation for kinetic or non-kinetic strike.
- The CH-53K can take off from the amphibious ships and carry three times the cargo or passengers of a CH-53E.
- The USMC Ospreys can support insertion operations with speed and range.
The force can of course secure an airfield for humanitarian airlift; the picket fence of the F-35s replace the AWACs and can guide coalition airpower into Libyan airspace to support agreed upon missions. The USAF does not need to move a large air operation into place to send combat air; the USN does not need to move a large aircraft carrier battle group into place to prepare to strike Libya.What the newly equipped ARG does is provide a significant shaping function for the President. And this shaping function allows significant flexibility and, is in fact, a redefinition of the dichotomy between hard and soft power.
The USN-USMC amphibious team can provide for a wide-range of options for the President simply by being offshore, with 5th generation aircraft capability on board which provides 360 situational awareness, deep visibility over the air and ground space, and carrying significant capability on board to empower a full spectrum force as needed.
And if you add the LCS to the USN-USMC amphibious team you have even more capability and more options. As a senior USMC MEU commander has put it:
In short, simply by completing the procurement of what the USN and USMC are in the course of doing in a very short period, the nation gains significant flexibility to deal with ambiguous strategic situations. US Army Special Forces or USAF special operations Ospreys can be deployed on the decks of the amphib force ready to do insertion operations. UAVs can be launched off of the decks of the amphib force as well.You’re sitting off the coast, pick your country, doesn’t matter, you’re told okay, we’ve got to do some shaping operations, we want to take and put some assets into shore, they’re going to do some shaping work over here. LCS comes in, very low profile platform. Operating off the shore, inserts these guys in small boats that night. They infill, they go in, they’re doing their mission.The LCS now sets up — it’s a gun platform. It’s a resupply, refuel point for my Hueys and Cobras.
Now, these guys get in here, okay. High value targets been picked out, there’s an F-35 that’s doing some other operations. These guys only came with him and said hey, we have got a high value target, but if we take him out, we will compromise our position. The F-35 goes roger, got it painted, got it seen. This is what you’re seeing, this is what I’m seeing. Okay. Kill the target. The guys on the ground never even know what hit them.
Simply by completing the procurement of what the USN and USMC are in the course of doing in a very short period, the nation gains significant flexibility to deal with ambiguous strategic situations.
The F-35, Upgrades to the AAV and upcoming ACV...the LCS...CH-53K...further development of the MV-22B and systems coming online with our sister services should hold us in good stead.
F-35A AF-7 First Flight
Bjørnar Bolsøy! Thank you my friend! Another dagger in the heart of the F-35 "haters"...
Pacific Horizon 11 Amphibous Exercise Continues...
After Action Report on the EFV Debacle.
Thanks Jonathan...this article hits me where I live...very timely...
I've been waiting for the post mortem on the EFV debacle from leadership. The Commandant moved on smartly to its successor (the Amphibious Combat Vehicle project and the upgrades to the AAV), General Flynn talked about the Marine Corps of the future, but no one talked about the mistakes that were made during this process. This article from the Brookings Institute fills in the holes...
The Marine Corps Is All Right
Peter W. Singer, Director, 21st Century Defense InitiativeArmed Forces Journal
March 04, 2011 —Here lies the United States Marine Corps.
Born: Nov. 10, 1775, in a Philadelphia tavern.
Died: Jan. 6, 2011, in a Pentagon news conference.
“235 years of Semper Fi, until the EFV died.”
To hear the critics describe it, that epitaph is currently being inscribed on a tombstone at Quantico. “An attack on our military,” said Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio. “He’s trying to destroy the Marine Corps,” claimed Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif. “You’re not going to have a Marine Corps anymore.”
Based on such fears, one would think that the ghost of Harry Truman had taken over Defense Secretary Robert Gates in a voodoo ceremony and that legislation from 1947 to disband the Marine Corps had been resurrected . But that wasn’t the case, as far as we know. Instead, Gates had done something even worse: He had decided to cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV).
How could a single program cancellation be taken to mean the end of a service with more than 235 years of distinguished history? It couldn’t, and that is the very problem. We should never get to the point where a troubled acquisitions program is framed as equivalent in our minds with the role and survival of a valued military service. Yet, that is how the situation with the EFV has been debated inside the Beltway for the last decade, illustrating a key problem of recent defense policy and politics.
CONCEPT AND REALITY
The original concept for the EFV was a good one. It was to be an updated assault amphibious vehicle (AAV) that would be able to operate over the horizon and move Marines at a higher speed onto potentially hostile shores. The new vehicle would also have an enhanced sensor, communications and weapons suite. By all measures, it was to be superior to any Marine tracked vehicle that had fought ashore before.
Unfortunately, as the program went from original concept back in 1988 to actual development and initial manufacture more than two decades later, the threat environment changed and, even more importantly, the program was plagued by a range of cost and reliability issues.
Offshore, new families of guided anti-ship weapons were developed, and then proliferated not just to potential enemy states but even to nonstate actors like Hezbollah. These new missiles extended their targeting range well past 75 miles, meaning the EFV’s range of 25 miles was no longer the critical game-changer originally hoped for. Now remaining inside an enemy’s threat envelope, the additional range of the EFV wouldn’t protect the ships from which it was launched. Nor would the EFV itself be protected from even more numerous precision-guided munitions and guided anti-tank weapons that could strike it on its way closer in to shore. Once past the beach, a lightly armored, flat-bottomed 35-ton vehicle (too heavy to lift by helicopter), with the size and maneuverability of a city bus, was a less-than-ideal match for a world of ever-proliferating urban battlefield environments and improvised explosive devices. Indeed, even for the increasingly frequent humanitarian response situations, its ability to carry bulky cargo is considered to be worse than that of the AAV it was to replace.
But more troublesome than the vehicle’s comparative capabilities was the matter of cost. As requirements crept and a number of tests were failed over the years, the original plan to buy 1,071 EFVs had to shrink to 535, solely because of the escalating price of the vehicles. By the time Gates pulled the plug, the expected per vehicle price was between $17 million and $22 million (depending on who was running the numbers), about seven to nine times the price of its predecessor AAV-7 and ironically the same price as the 150-ton air-cushioned landing craft, known as LCACs, which might be used in its stead to ferry ashore a wider range of combat vehicles from a greater range and speed. Indeed, immediately after the EFV cut was announced, the Corps issued plans to use the freed-up funds to pay for an upgrade of current AAVs, the purchase of a new Marine personnel carrier and ultimately an AAV replacement that would be more reasonable in price and better optimized for modern land warfare with a V-shaped hull, faster land speed and better handling capabilities.
OFF THE BEACH AND INTO THE FIRE
Yet, at the same time the EFV program was slipping and sliding, its defense became wrapped up in hyperbole. It was as if the Corps’ very identity and survival was at stake from the rhetoric that surrounded the debate. Rather than contemplate a post-EFV future, defenders typically jumped straight to 11 on the volume scale. They would claim that a Corps without an EFV would be an extinct or, at the very least, a toothless force. “We’ll just pray that we don’t have to go into harm’s way in the next 10 years,” said retired Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold (notable in that the EFV buy wasn’t planned to be completed until 2026), while defense industry consultant Loren Thompson sent out a series of fax and blog blasts that painted the blood of future Marine casualties on Gates’ hands, accusing him of “killing Marines.”
But, after the decision was made, the storm passed and senior Marine leadership issued a series of statements that made clear they had recommended the cancellation because of the costs and doctrinal issues mentioned above and that the Corps and its capabilities were never in jeopardy.
CORE LESSONS
Three core lessons thus emerge from this episode. The first is that in many ways, the Marines’ normally effective power in public debate — the very thing that saved them when Truman made the egregious error of thinking to go after the Corps — worked against them here. The EFV’s flaws and costs have been well-known for almost a decade and it essentially has been a “dead program walking” since the 2008 Quadrennial Defense Review. But like a zombie kept alive by the best lobbying shop in existence, the program lumbered on, essentially awaiting Gates to amass the political power and moxie to finally go after it, long after he had ended the other services’ similar exquisite programs in the previous budget cycles. These years represent not just hundreds of millions of lost budget dollars, but also lost time in the still-needed effort to get Marines the effective and affordable systems to replace the venerable AAV-7.
Indeed, in the zeal to defend the program by making appeals that all too often connected the EFV to the very existence of the Corps, a key issue was set aside: What would have happened if the defenders of the EFV had been successful and the program continued? Part of the reason the current Marine leadership didn't go down fighting to save the EFV was their realization that the cost of the EFV, even at the limited numbers planned, would have been “unsustainable,” as Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos said, not simply for the EFV program but for the Corps itself.
Akin to the corner the Army had painted itself into with the Future Combat Systems program a few years back, the EFV was threatening to not be the one program that kept the Corps in business, but rather the one program that ate the Corps whole. Purchasing just 535 EFVs would have taken up about 80 percent of the Marines’ acquisitions budget, at a time when the entire Corps has significant reset and refit needs.
But in letting a program define their vision of a service, rather than the other way around, defenders of the program illustrated a second lesson that must not be forgotten. As Dakota Wood, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel who is now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, explains, “The Marine Corps used to say, ‘Our weapons system is the Marine,’ and tout its affordability as a service. But they seem to have become enamored with the very high-end programs that in previous years they would have criticized the Army or the Air Force for pursuing.”
Proponents of the EFV would counter that it is the ability to carry out a massed amphibious assault that has defined the Marines, and without the sophisticated capabilities of the EFV this capability, and potentially the Marines’ very identity as something other than merely the nation’s “second army” (what President Eisenhower reportedly told Gen. Alexander Vandergrift he worried the Marines were becoming), would be lost. But by making such an appeal, they not only vastly overstate the ability of this system to make a fundamental difference in forcible entry operations, they also mischaracterize the unique tool that the Corps is in the nation’s arsenal.
Contrary to the way it is often painted in the movies, neither the Marine Corps’ identity nor its core capability is large-scale amphibious assault against a heavily defended shore. Indeed, such massed assaults across the sands of Iwo Jima may have the most notoriety, but they have been the exception, rather than the rule, in the Corps’ long history, extending only from the period of 1942 to 1950.
Instead, as Lt. Gen. George Flynn, the Corps’ deputy commandant for combat development and integration, noted there is a third lesson that must not be forgotten. The hallmark of the Corps in the past, and for the foreseeable future, has been its role as “America’s expeditionary force in readiness,” using the sea as a point of origin and maneuver space, but not always as the point of primary contact.
Whether its Samuel Nicholas’ first raids on New Providence in 1775, Presley O’Bannon’s march across the desert to Derna in the Barbary War, Daniel Daly fighting off more than 200 Boxers during the Battle of Peking, Chesty Puller working with local troops to relentlessly drive after bandits in the mountains of Nicaragua, James Deveraux turning Wake Island into the Alamo of the Pacific, Stanley Hughes leading the urban battle for Hue or today’s Marines deploying to the fight in Helmand province, the thread that runs throughout the long history of the Corps is not so much about mass assaults across enemy beaches than it is about independent units, operating in austere environments, that can rapidly deploy anywhere in the world with all their capabilities organic. The Corps’ unique benefit to the nation is that Marines don’t just typically arrive first to the fight, but are also uniquely able to operate on their own in the fight, bringing all their capabilities and support structures with them.
Fortunately, it is this very capability that will be needed in the years ahead, in just about any scenario one can imagine.
This is not to say that there are not serious issues to resolve, but they lie far beyond that of a single system like the EFV, even if it were capable and affordable. The Corps faces a tough transition in areas that range from how to reset after a decade of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to how to incorporate new war-fighting capabilities in the emerging electronic and cyber realms. Even more, the true challenge for future Marine operations at sea may not be about how to get Marines and their armored vehicles off Navy ships, but rather the very nature of coordination between the Corps and the Navy. That is, whether it is differing concepts of sea-basing, differing assumptions about assault and transport shipbuilding plans, or the significant questions that remain about the Marines’ role in the development and execution of Air-Sea Battle doctrine, the alignment between the Marine-Navy team is not as seamless as it should be.
These issues are all tough and, notably, none of them are issues that the EFV would have solved. But fortunately, all are manageable with the same type of leadership, creativity and fortitude that has characterized the Corps of the past and present. So, for those of us who cherish the role the Marine Corps has played in our nation’s past, we need not worry that the cancellation of a single program will jeopardize its future.
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