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| The flagship aircraft with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 166, Marine Aircraft Group 16, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, touches down following the final flight of the squadron on Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, June 30, 2021. VMM-166 conducted its final flight in preparation for deactivation in accordance with Force Design 2030, which is a plan that will ensure the Marine Corps is prepared to stand as the nation’s naval expeditionary force-in-readiness. |
via Cpl Frisk (read it all here)
The point about staying in service further resonates with the product support question. ALIS gets good points, the maintenance system is modern and simple, and the large number of both fighters produced in general and European operators in particular ensure cooperation opportunities in both training and operational usage.
ALIS gets good points? Do I really need to dig in here? ALIS is a joke and a disgrace. The idea that Lockheed Martin and the USAF were able to sell this thing as being good to go is a sin.
I could write a long-winding paragraph about it, but Steve Trimble summed it up perfectly in 280 characters:
There is, I admit, a cognitive dissonance between what USAF chief of staff & HASC chairman say about F-35A's operating cost and evaluation results in international tenders, and I'm not quite able to explain it without access to comparable data from European fighters.
— Steve Trimble (@TheDEWLine) July 1, 2021
No need to dig in here.
Something is WAAAAAY off. The USAF is supplementing the F-35 with additional buys of the F-15. That practically says it all.
There is a significant difference between those struggling with whether to upgrade early blocks and export customers now jumping aboard and getting what presumably will be TR-3 hardware (slated for introduction in 2023) from the start. Especially considering the significant maturity the program has achieved in the past few years it is likely that the maintenance and operating costs will continue on a downward spiral.
However, the GAO isn't overly impressed, and while originally deliveries from 2026 should have been Block 4, that standard is pushed back, and GAO isn't sure that the current schedule will hold either.
In 2020, the program added a year to its Block 4 schedule and now expects to extend Block 4 development into fiscal year 2027. We found, however, that the program office did not formulate its revised schedule based on the contractor’s demonstrated past performance. Instead, the schedule is based on estimates formulated at the start of the Block 4 effort, increasing the likelihood that the scheduled 2027 completion date is not achievable.
The Swiss are a brave lot. The US military is facing flat budgets and you can bet that as soon as the Next Generation Fighter is ready to go then money will be SHOVED into that program as fast as possible.
It might be worse than even I imagine because they're looking at a family of aircraft and the US military is getting big into unmanned systems.
The F-35 might NOT EVER achieve Blk 4 status.
This difference is evident in the DSCA-notices as well, were the Swiss DSCA-notification include a grand-total of 40 AIM-9X Sidewinders, 12 Mk 82 500-lb bombs with JDAM-guidance kits, and 12 SDB-II small glide-bombs. You do not fight a war with that kind of stock, although the possibility to carry on the weapons currently used by the Hornets are there. As has been discussed for Finland, the weapons and spares bought will be a huge part of the overall acquisition costs, suddenly making the 8.2 Bn EUR Swiss pricetag look less than stellar (although granted the Swiss DSCA-notification included more spare engines compared to the Finnish bid). Comparing costs is a case of apples against pears against olives with the occasional mango thrown into the mix, but the resulting smoothie evidently tastes like Finland won't be able to acquire and operate 64 F-35As at Swiss prices.
More confusingly, if that is 20% cheaper than everything else, there's some serious discrepancies between what the Swiss asked for and the five packages offered to Finland for 9.6 Bn Euros.
Read Cpl Frisk's entire article. He lays it out quite well and deserves better than me parsing out his statements.
Long story short?
Quite honestly this win is not impressive.
The Swiss aren't serious about warfighting with this package and even if they are the US has signalled to all involved that its going a different way.
The USMC is cutting its purchase. You can bet the USN will follow suit and so will the USAF.
The F-35 will have a truncated service life in the US military and most of its "active duty time" will be spent in development, not in operation.
This plane is a failure.
It's marketing genius.
I guess we've found the reality of things. Marketing can make up for a bad product as long as you develop a few "true believers".
Hornet presents its Remote-Controlled Weapon Stations for the first time in France at SOFINS 2021The 2021 edition of SOFINS is the opportunity for Hornet to present its range of Hornet remote-controlled weapon stations, already chosen by the French Army to equip its new generation of combat vehicles, the Griffon, Jaguar and Serval.Within the framework of the exhibition, Hornet wishes to contribute in its own way to the reflection on the evolution of the equipment of Special Forces vehicles. This reflection is done today by inviting discussion on the relevance of modern tools such as remotely operated turrets for Special Forces units, both in France and abroad.The remote-controlled weapon stations of the Hornet range are very versatile products, combining an effector and latest generation sensors. This makes them the tool of choice for observation, reconnaissance and intelligence, but also for information sharing, blue/red force tracking, designation of enemy targets and indirect fire guidance. It can be a tool of choice for search patrols or deep attack groups, complementing traditional Special Forces skills.In the configuration presented at SOFINS, the Hornet turret offers unique performance in a very limited space, with a weight of only 260 kg for the turret without its options. This weight limitation makes it possible to consider using it for long-range, autonomous missions with limited equipment and ammunition. The Hornet turrets are also incomparably more accurate than a circular-mounted weapon, particularly in movement. They are gyro-stabilised from the optronic unit, which gives them exceptional stability and accuracy. The probability of hitting on the first shot is enhanced by a sophisticated ballistic solution calculation system that takes into account various parameters such as weapon, ammunition type, range, target movement and vehicle behaviour. These different capabilities allow for the reduction of ammunition carriage where necessary, while still allowing for superior tactical effects.Designed for conventional forces as part of the Scorpion programme, the Hornet RCWS can be adapted to the very specific employment framework of Special Forces, respecting the essence of Special Forces: using equipment in a different way to carry out their own missions.Building on the experience of the Scorpion programme RCWS, Hornet now offers high-end remotely operated weapons systems with the most advanced technologies and capabilities. The current offering includes the Hornet, the flagship product of the new range, and the Hornet Lite, a lighter version with the same optronic systems. These RCWS fully enhance the capabilities of the vehicles equipped with them, taking them to fully new operational levels. All Hornet RCWS users will benefit from the feedback and possible upgrades to the range.
I've warned about the unintended consequences of Berger's Folly...rather his jacked up Force Design.
Now?
Now the chickens are coming home to roost.
via Breaking Defense
The Navy will build the Light Amphibious Ships (LAWs) it wants, but there’s a trade-off. The number of large amphibious ships will decline by five to nine — 15% to 27%. Marines and others had expected that the LAWs would be added to the full number of large amphibious ships, not force a cut. The shift is good news for medium-sized shipbuilders who might build the LAWs, but it is bad news for Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), which builds the large amphibious ships.
It’s also a warning to the Marine Corps: if you can’t explain why you want multibillion-dollar ships, then you probably won’t get them.
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For decades, the Navy and Marine Corps had a settled approach to amphibious ships and amphibious operations. The wartime requirement would set the total size of the fleet. However, that fleet was large enough to sustain a continuous forward presence for crisis response, humanitarian assistance, and exercises with allies and partners in three theaters―the Indo Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe. That construct is now shattered. The smaller fleet of large amphibious ships implies a reduced level of forward deployments. The LAWs are too small to fill in. (Even the 33-ship fleet was too small to meet all the requests of the regional commanders. That requires “close to 54” amphibious ships.)
The Navy and Marine Corps might argue that the day-to-day force demands are enough to justify the higher requirement for large amphibious ships. Services have justified elements of military force structure―most prominently, the carrier fleet―that way in the past. Gen. Berger recently seemed to contradict the shipbuilding plan by calling for “no fewer than 31 traditional amphibious ships: 10 LHD/LHAs and 21 LPFs.” (He also asked for 35 LAWs.) Nevertheless, seeking ships without a strong warfighting justification will be a tough sell.
The amphibious fleet is in an uncomfortable place, with no stated justification for its most expensive elements and strong conceptual support for its least expensive and least capable elements. The Biden administration may move in a different direction when it publishes the full long-term shipbuilding plan, but for now, the future of the amphibious fleet looks stormy indeed.
We've seen it over and over in the US military. A complimentary capability evolves to be the primary.
Additionally Berger's concept is so freaking vague, flighty and basically based on the undefined definition of "competition" that law makers won't/don't understand it.
This is how you first break a great institution and then kill it.
This concept was supposed to make the Marine Corps relevant going into the future? Tying ourselves to the Navy as Berger demands will just have us being bill payers for new warships.
Berger doesn't know it (perhaps he does) but he's imperiling the future of the Marine Corps.
If you watched the earlier vid then you know the Chinese Army Amphibious Troops and Marines are complimentary in their mission sets.
The Chinese Marines are generalist, are lightly equipped (although heavier than Berger's Marine Corps) and have an expeditionary role.
The Chinese Army's Amphibious Troops are MUCH heavier, and have an assault/forcible entry role.
Considering the fact that Amphibious Assault is probably the ONLY VIABLE (it will be costly though) form of forcible entry do you think that we could see the US Army adapt at least a division or two to the amphibious assault role?
Just because the Marine Corps has vacated that mission set does NOT mean its not essential.
What do you guys think?
You just don't have to deal with China's Marines. You also have Amphibious Army Troops to deal with. Just luvly. Below is a bonus vid from these dudes. I like their stuff. Open source is good stuff.
