On a discussion on a different topic that touched on tanks, Lane brought this up to refute one of my theories...
MCWP 3-12 Marine Corps Tank Employment:
"Tank units provide the MAGTF commander the
ability to attack, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces
through firepower, shock effect, and maneuver in
coordination with other elements of the MAGTF.
The M1A1 tank offers the MAGTF a vast array of
capabilities—excellent cross-country mobility, sophisticated
communications, enhanced day and
night target acquisition, lethal firepower to defeat
most enemy mechanized platforms, highly effective
armor protection—and all of its capabilities
are interrelated."
"Tanks provide five major capabilities to the MAGTF:
armor-protected firepower, mobility, shock effect,
extensive communications, and flexibility."
Nowhere does it say that the vehicle used to provide that shock, outstanding cross country mobility, sophisticated communications, day and night acquisitions and lethal firepower must be wrapped in a 72 ton frame.
And that is my issue with the M1A1 Abrams. The Marine Corps is suppose to be an expeditionary force. Yet on every MEU, we're taking along 4 vehicles that weigh in the neighborhood of 280 plus tons, that consume outrageous amounts of fuel and whose primary function is to support our infantry, not duke it out with enemy tanks. We have precision artillery, the AH-1Z or UH-1Y, and numerous vehicle and shoulder launched anti-tank missiles that can destroy them.
The Brits had the right idea during WW2.
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Matilda II |
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Valentine MK III. |
First, let's cover the infantry tank concept...
The infantry tank was a concept developed by theBritish and French in the years leading up to World War II. Infantry tanks were tanks designed to support the infantry in the attack. To achieve this they were generally heavily armoured to allow them to operate in close concert with infantry even under heavy gun fire.
The concept is the important thing here and something that the Marine Corps should pay attention to. These tanks were specifically designed to operate in conjunction with the infantry. A hallmark of Marine operations.
We've been here before. This isn't the first heavy tank used by the Marine Corps.
I would pay good money to know the thinking behind the USMC acquiring the M103. More than likely it goes a little like this. "Take it. Its free." That kind of thinking is all kinds of right...especially considering the day and age. Right after the war. People are tiring of defense spending. Money must be saved in any way possible.
Yeah. It made tons of sense. But the Marine Corps of that day and age also had a ship that has gone by the wayside. Without that particular ship, having dedicated tank units becomes a bit of an issue. You recall the LST (Landing Ship Tank) right?
The LST was, according to the old skool guys, the most comfortable ship you could be assigned to. More importantly it could discharge a company plus of tanks right on the beach or launch AAVs out the stern gate. If we still had this ship in the inventory...if we had abandonded over the horizon assault earlier...if we had actually adopted a super sized LCAC as a ship to shore connector instead of focusing on the MLP. If I knew the lottery numbers I'd be rich. The ship is no more and with its passing the enabler for a heavy armored force has gone away too.
Mobile Gun System. Good idea. Terrible execution.
Ironically the US Army really touched on the idea. They just executed it badly. No. Badly is an understatement. The Army fucked up the concept with the Stryker Mobile Gun System. It fills all the check marks of the vehicle that the Marine Corps should have. Its relatively lightweight. Its highly mobile. It has a large caliber cannon.
The problem is it just doesn't work. What does work? The Italian Centauro.
The Centauro. The Italians call it a tank destroyer and its assigned to their middleweight brigade combat teams. The truly sad part of all this is that the US Army trialled the Centauro yet still decided to go with the MGS.
Future armored design is leading to self sufficient, fuel efficient, combat capable forces that fight as combined arms teams that minimize their logistics tail and can scale to fight large armored formations of the past or insurgent terrorists of today.
In essence the Marine Corps should be at the cutting edge of todays armored development/theory. If the EFV and MPC had been procured then we'd be looking at a force that is perhaps unmatched in its reach and combat effectiveness. Since that plan has been scrapped we need to adjust to the new reality.
The costs of maintaining Tanks, along with the fuel costs, mixed with what will soon be a unique vehicle (once the Army moves to the M1A3) all point to the need to make a decision on heavy armors future in the Corps.
I say its time to shed the 70 plus tons, settle on ACV(AAV)/MPC force with a turreted 120mm gun on our MPC to do the mission of infantry support. We're already seeing the concept of tanks performing the infantry support and not the independent shock action already in Afghanistan.
The moral of the story? FIX MARINE ARMOR!