F-35 is now 107 million dollars each. Let me tell you why that's smoke and mirrors.

Andrew is telling me that the negotiations between Lockheed and the government has resulted in a price of 107 million per airplane.

My reaction.

Big fucking deal.

Why?  Because sequestration is baked in.  Congress and the President aren't only looking at continued sequestration but also the possibility of a government shut down.  Add to that the fact that its obvious to everyone that Lockheed Martin is finally feeling the heat for this over priced, under delivering, Pentagon chewing, Marine gobbling master piece and they probably low balled the hell out of the plane.

Call it a loss leader.

They take the pain now and will recoup lost revenues in later blocks.

But lets get back to sequestration.  Its gonna continue which means that the number of F-35's that the government will be able to buy is going to--out of necessity be cut.

That means we're looking at the death spiral that they've been teetering on the edge of.

That means that by the time the first F-35 squadron is suppose reach IOC with the USMC, it will be unaffordable.

If my little troll is right then we're already fucked.  We're on a road without exit ramps and the cliff is staring us in the eye.

The Battle of Phase Line Bullet. The battle the Iraqi's won.

So you think that Gulf War 1 was easy?  Let me introduce those people to the Battle of Phase Line Bullet.  via Wikipedia.

The Battle of Phase Line Bullet was one of the clashes which led to the destruction of the Tawakalna Iraqi Republican Guard Division, on February 26, 1991, by a simultaneous attack of two US Armored Divisions (1st and 3rd), an Infantry Division (the 1st) and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment.
The battle was one of the rare examples of a US armored force repulsed by a screen of Iraqi entrenched infantry, APCs and Iraqi T-72stanks during Desert Storm. The incident involved American friendly fire casualties.
BackgroundThe initial skirmishes between American and Iraqi Republican Guards units took place earlier that day around pre-established line 73 Easting, some 30 miles west of Wadi al Batin, where the 2 ACR managed to destroy two Iraqi Armored Brigades. The skirmishes in this sector were still going on when the 3rd Armored Division, positioned north, made the first contact with a brigade of the Tawakalna Armored Division around 3:30 PM.[1]Weather conditions were extremely poor, hampering visibility and identification of targets.
Flank screen maneuverAs the usual practice for armored reconnaissance, a troop of M3 Bradleys (Alpha Troop), belonging to the 4th squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, was scouting ahead of the main tank force. The flank screen maneuver took place along the southern boundaries between the 2 ACR and 3rd Armored Division operational areas. Task Forces 4-34 and 4-32 were advancing from the rear. The general movement of the US forces followed an eastward direction. The fumes of hundreds of oil wells set on fire by the Iraqis, combined with an intense shamal, forced the US vehicles to use thermal sights.[1]Surprising contactAt 3:00 PM, the 14 Bradleys strong troop received information from the GHQ of the 3rd Armored Division that no enemy unit remained between them and the Kuwaiti border. Suddenly, they found a screen line of Iraqi APCs straight ahead, barely 300 meters to the east. The poor weather, along with burning oil fumes, reduced the visibility conditions to almost zero.[2] The enemy screen line was part of the 9th Armored Brigade of Tawakalna Division.
US Abrams tanks from TF 4-34, positioned in the rear echelon, fired in support of the IFVs, destroying at least one T-72 and several Iraqi APCs. They also hit three Bradleys (A-24, A-31 and A-22), with two American KIAs.[2] The 2 ACR also became entangled in the fighting from the rear right.A burst of small-arms and heavy machine gunfire, RPGs and Sagger missiles erupted. Initially, the American commander thought they were engaging dismounted infantry supported by BMPs, but later he realized that they were also receiving main-gun tank rounds.[3] The US vehicles retaliated by firing TOW missiles, 25 mm cannon and machine gun fire. The contact lasted for about two hours, until the Bradleys, battered by enemy and friendly fire and running out of ammunition, were forced to withdraw.[4]Another Bradley (A-36) was first disabled by a 12.7 mm round from an NSVT heavy machine gun which penetrated the transmission[5][6]and later shattered by a large caliber shaped charge impact in the turret's front.[7] Bradley A-35 also took some damage from a mix of ricocheting 12.7 mm bursts and indirect fire, but was able to be driven out,[8] while A-33 suffered two injured and its radio station hit by 12.7 mm fire. During the process of rescuing casualties from A-24, Bradley A-26, commanded by Sergeant Major Ronald Sneed, was near-missed by a T-72 main round, which spattered the vehicle with splinters.[9][1] While providing cover for A-21 who was attempting to assess the situation with A-36, Bradley A-22, commanded by Staff Sergeant Meyers, was struck in the turret by an M-1 tank from TF 4-34 resulting in one KIA.[10] The gunner of A-24 was also killed by a friendly tank round.[11]The disabled A-22, A-36 and A-24 were left abandoned on the battleground, while A-31, although heavily damaged, was able to pull back.[12] All the remainder Bradleys were raked by machine gun fire and shell splinters, but they were still marginally operational.[13]AftermathThe U.S. forces were unable to find a breach in the northern Iraqi lines until the first hours of February 27. That morning, the 7th Cav scouts found the hulls of 18 APCs, mostly BMP-1, and six T-72s disabled or abandoned by their crews. The clash is one of the few recorded actions where a US assault was fenced off by Iraqi dug-in armored vehicles. The commander of Alpha troop, Captain Gerald Davie, later acknowledged that the cause of the fiasco was that "we were ten times too close to the enemy than we would choose to be".[14]

Environmental conditions played a major role in this battle.  What happens when the next battle is fought in the rain, under the jungle canopy and fog commonly found in the Pacific?

Know your enemy. Meet the Mig-35.

Raytheon's Griffin® missile vid.

Geez.  Thats one slow missile!  The Javelin looks faster.

KF-X Concept

Read about it here.

I'm seeing a trend developing.  Moderate stealth, retaining full agility and hopefully lower costs.  It appears that cracking the full stealth code is too hard and perhaps costly.

Is that what our competitors are learning from the F-35 program?

LCS 2 Maneuverability Vid.

China is getting its sea legs. At sea replenishment.

The jaded among you will say that this is no big deal.  Even tiny Western Navies have been doing at sea replenishments for years.

Where you're missing the point in my opinion is that this is just another of the series of building blocks that the Chinese Navy is engaging in to develop a true blue water force that is capable of going toe to toe with the US Navy.

The irony of the situation should be obvious.  For years the Navy has been focusing on fighting in the littoral zone.  Meanwhile the closest thing we have to a peer competitor is building a force to fight us on the open seas.  The idea of taking COIN strategy to the sea is going to bite us.  You heard it here first.

UPDATE:  Alexander informs that the Chinese have been doing this for years.  I'm aware.  But a few missions off the coast of Africa and getting in a bit of work in is one thing, but when it becomes common place thats when it actually is something new.  I contend that this is now part of normal Chinese Navy operations.  When the once difficult becomes common place, thats when you're seeing professionalism creeping in the door.  My bigger point is that the Chinese are becoming professional in their approach to operations at sea.

A Golden Age for Naval Guns?

Are we entering a golden age for naval guns?  I'm not sure.  Gabriel gives his opinion on the subject at UK Armed Forces Commentary Blog here.  Check him out.

A note about my stance on the F-35.

Sferrin was kind enough to point to MANY articles that I've written in support of the F-35 and basically calls me a flip-flopper because I'm calling for a delay to the Marine Corps purchase.

He's right.

I've been one of staunchest supporters of the F-35 program.

But times have changed and events crystallized when the Marine Corps had to kill the very promising Marine Personnel Carrier program in order to help keep funding flowing for the F-35.  That was when I realized that people that I had criticized vehemently were right...about the costs portion of the airplane anyway.

We can't afford it.

Moral courage demands that when information changes, or rather when it becomes obvious that the information that you received is no longer valid, that its time to rethink your planning.  That's all I'm doing with the F-35.

Cowards or fools continue the course when information informs them that the path they're on is leading to at best trouble and at worst disaster.  This applies doubly to defense projects.

So yeah.  My position has changed.  The information has changed.  Therefore the procurement plan must change.

Iveco is taking the MPC on the road.

via UPI.

BOLZANO, Italy, July 23 (UPI) -- Italy's Iveco Defense Vehicles plans a comprehensive display of products next month at the Defense and Security Equipment International exhibition in London.
The military vehicles Iveco will display will showcase company engineering capabilities in taking existing platforms and transforming them to meet evolving requirements, the company said.
Among the vehicles:
-- SUPERAV, an amphibious 8x8 to support littoral operations.
-- The Medium Protected Vehicle Ambulance, which comes from the company's MPV family of vehicles for route clearance, casualty treatment, communications and command and control. The vehicle is a 4x4 designed to provide medical staff with the opportunity to provide life-saving treatment well forward in the battle area.
-- A CBRN reconnaissance and survey vehicle for detecting and assessing various chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents.
The company's protected Enhanced Pallet Loading System Demonstrator and a bridge-launching vehicle designed for the Swiss army will also be on display as well as a protected fuel tanker.
The vehicles will be on static display at the trade show Sept. 10-13.

Uh wow.

The Italian Marines will soon have a winner on its hands.

Grunt life. Don't have it? Ok. We'll make do.

What you see above is the perfect example of Grunt life.  Don't have it or couldn't bring it?  That's ok.  We'll make do.

A simple pic of Marines "lifting weights" while they have a little down time is the Marine Corps that everyone loves.  This pic should be on the wall in every Marine procurement office.  It'll help clear the cobwebs and keep them on a straight course.

Its not about the gear, its about the Marines.

Incredible via Harris Tactical.

The Naval Strike Aircraft Conundrum. A Proceedings Article.

Until I get permission from my reader to post his name crediting him with pointing me to this article, it will remain unknown.  Thanks to Andrew for giving me the link to this article!

Averting the Navy's Tactical Aircraft Crisis
The U.S. Navy is facing a serious shortfall in its strike-warfare capability. What aircraft are in its future?By Ensign Anthony C. Robinson, U.S. NavyProceedings Magazine - June 2013 Vol. 139/6/1,324We cannot afford to wait any longer before our fighters-most of which were acquired during the Cold War-become worn out beyond repair. At the moment, the Navy is buying the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and developing the F-35C Lightning II. However, with sequestration taking effect, the service does not have enough money to afford both and must make some very tough decisions. So which of these aircraft should the Navy buy? First, let's be clear that when talking about fighters, the costs given for aircraft can be measured in several ways. There is the procurement cost, which is the total price of the aircraft, Then there is the flyaway cost and several other measures that often have different names and different prices for the same aircraft since they include or exclude certain factors. For the purpose of this analysis, we will use only the flyaway cost, which is also called the "per-unit cost." It values the aircraft at its marginal cost, including only the price of production and production tools immediately accruing to the building of a single unit.
 1 It excludes prior costs such as research and development (treating these as sunk costs), supplementary costs such as support equipment, or future costs such as spare parts and
maintenance.
F-35A Is Cheap; F-35C, Not So Much
When discussing the price of the F-35 series, many proponents of the program will be quick to provide the costs for the cheapest version, the F-35A for the Air Force, which is said to be $107 million. The version for the Navy, the F-35C, currently is estimated at $186.5 million, which is extremely high. By comparison, the Super Hornet costs $66.9 million, meaning that for every
F-35C the Navy purchases it could also have purchased 2.8 Super Hornets.  In fact, it could replace every legacy Hornet in the inventory with a Block II, add an extra squadron of Block IIs to all carrier air wings, add a new carrier air wing, and still save money by sticking with Super Hornets and choosing not to buy the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The crucial question here is whether or not the F-35 delivers the amount of capability that it costs.  Those same proponents of the F-35 program also will be quick to mention that when the aircraft enters full-rate production, the unit price will supposedly drop to $100 million for all models. This is far from the truth. The concept of mass full-rate production being used to create a low-cost
fighter was based on a business plan that focused on the fighters having enough common parts with their sister variants, roughly 80 percent, that mass-producing them would be easy. That plan has already failed at the design stage. The engineers for Lockheed Martin, the maker of the F-35, ran into several problems and had to account for them by modifying the design of
each one extensively. What they eventually ended up with was a design that shared only 20 to 30 percent common parts. Each of them is now essentially a different aircraft. Unit costs for the Navy version, the carrier-based F-35C, have skyrocketed. The reason is that there are terrible design flaws in the F-35C that cannot be fixed without excessive amounts of money that will not be available in the new fiscal environment. The flaws have made little progress toward being fixed. The F-35C as of yet is unable to be used in combat and is not even
able to adapt to the carrier environment. 
Three Problems with the Navy JSF The F-35C has not been able to overcome three major problems. The first is that it cannot land on a carrier, which is an absolute necessity. The designers of the F-35 placed the tailhook too close to the rear landing gear. As a result, the landing gear presses down the wire, and the hook merely scrapes over it instead of catching it. The JSF team has designed a sharper hook point to compensate for this. However, the improvement is not good enough. The wire caught the hook only a few times during the tests, which is not satisfactory. To solve the problem the F-35C airframe would need to be stretched, destroying any commonality left with its sister
variants and causing yet another drastic increase in the price. The second problem is the difficulty of keeping the stealthy materials maintained at sea. Lockheed Martin has failed to prove that the stealth materials of the F-35 will not corrode away if they take a beating at sea.
These materials are extremely expensive and difficult to maintain as they are now. If this problem is not fixed it would drastically drive up the cost of maintenance for an F-35C fleet.
The last problem is the most pressing and most difficult, which is also found in the other two JSF models. The F-35s have 24 million lines of software code that is extremely difficult to test and is as complicated as anything on earth. Nearly 10 million lines of code are needed on board the jet. These software lines are needed for the JSF capabilities that Lockheed
Martin has promised. By comparison, the Boeing-built F/A-18E/F Super Hornet has about 4 million lines of software code with only 1.5 million lines of it being on board the aircraft.

Four Things Right with the Navy JSFThe F-35C currently holds four main advantages over the Super Hornet Block II: longer unrefueled range, infrared (IR) scanning cameras, a powerful IR sensor in the nose, and stealth. Boeing has attempted to even these out by making an upgraded Super Hornet called the International Road Map, which is essentially a Super Hornet Block III with a different name.
This Block III has a set of conformal fuel tanks that add a combined 3,500 pounds and bring the F/A-18E/F's internal fuel load to 18,450 pounds, not too far away from the 19,750 pounds on the F-35C. The Block III also features IR scanners that cover the entire area of the aircraft and a new internal IR search-and-track sensor built under the nose. This gives the jet
missile-warning capabilities similar to the F-35. The Super Hornet Block III still uses the standard Joint Helmet Mounted Queuing System, which is relatively simple and provides information at high speed.  To increase the level of stealth, Boeing made a stealthy enclosed weapon pod that can be mounted under the fuselage or under the wings. Each pod has a
stealthy shape and can hold two AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs) and two bombs, a similar payload to the F-35's internal weapon bays. Boeing attempted to do a similar type of change to the F-15 and created the Silent Eagle, which has stealth-reducing features such as reshaping of the body, radar-absorbent materials, and an angled active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. Their radar testing showed
significant reductions in radar cross section (RCS), and from the frontal aspect of the Silent Eagle the RCS was close to matching a stealth aircraft. The Super Hornet airframe already features some extensive radar-signature-reduction features, such as stealth shaping, radar-absorbent materials added in crucial areas, heavy use of composite materials, and the
aforementioned angled AESA radar. The removal of external stores with the weapon pod will provide a significant increase in stealth that may not equal that of the F-35 from every aspect but will definitely make a great difference. Included in these improvements are a glass cockpit display similar to the F-35's and upgraded engines that have increased thrust by 20 percent.
In short, the Super Hornet Block III, if fully developed, will be nearly as good as the F-35 series was meant to be, and it will have a price cheap enough for us to produce in vast numbers to not only fill our fighter gap, but also have greater flexibility for all of our forces around the world. The Block III could easily replace the legacy Hornet fleet and fulfill all the roles the Navy currently performs. The great thing about these upgrades is that they can also be retrofitted on the Block II aircraft the Navy currently operates.
The Trouble with SAMs Many proponents of the F-35 program will also quickly claim that stealth is absolutely necessary to survive in the environment of future conflicts, but the advantage to the warfighter is slowly eroding away with time. Our potential enemies have been able to make surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries with longer ranges that could prevent our forces from accessing
their area. These new SAM batteries also have the ability to be networked to form an integrated air-defense system that could pose a considerable threat. To defeat it, the Navy does not need stealth technology but better jammers and an upgraded version of our current weapon that is often used to kill enemy SAMs with ruthless efficiency: the AGM-88 high-speed anti-radiation missile. Russia and China have been able to develop new and better SAMs, such as the S-400 and the HQ-19, both of which have ranges that exceed 200 miles.
It is important to note that if an aircraft has a certain level of stealth, then it would greatly
decrease the range that an S-400 or HQ-19 could detect it. This does not change the fact that these SAMs are still a major problem. The current way to answer this problem is putting money toward stealth. Unfortunately, the SAMs are not the only problem, as advances in counter-stealth technology-such as networked multi-band radar systems and long-range
infrared search-and-track (IRST) sensors-are slowly reducing the advantage stealth brings to the warfighter. Hypothetically speaking, the stealth on the Block III Super Hornet decreases
the range that an S-400 or HQ-19 could detect it to 100 miles. Current AGM-88s have a speed of mach 2. An upgraded AGM-88-type anti-radar missile with a speed equal to or greater than mach 5, a range of over 120 miles, and a size that is small enough to fit inside the stealthy weapon pods on the Block III could very easily allow Super Hornet pilots to lock onto enemy S-400s or HQ-19s the moment they turn on their radar. The time from launching the missile to
killing the SAM from a distance would be short if the missile had enough speed. A missile of this type is well within our technological capability. For example, an AMRAAM (also made by Raytheon, like the AGM-88) has a top speed of mach 4. New AESA radar modules that could be made for passive detection would make the AGM-88 extremely precise. This new AGM-88-type missile would also force SAMs to fire at the targeted aircraft from longer ranges if
they want to survive. This would give the targeted aircraft more time to employ jammers, countermeasures, and, if available in the environment, terrain masking to avoid getting hit.
This combination of Super Hornet Block IIIs and upgraded AGM-88s would be cheap to use, easy to operate and maintain, and would provide great capability that can defeat our current and projected SAM threats, as opposed to buying a few expensive and problematic F-35Cs of questionable capability. Because SAMs are advancing quickly it would be much better to focus on the more aggressive approach of finding and destroying them rather than the passive approach that involves sneaking around them with stealth. The conclusion is simply this: What the Navy needs is not simply the best aircraft in the world or simply a stealth aircraft. It needs superior ordnance and an aircraft that is better than those of our potential enemies,
good enough to get the job done, and able to be made in large enough numbers to be flexible in tactics. The Super Hornet Block III fits this mold down to the letter. The F-35C does not even come close.
Stuck with the F-35
However, the Navy is not able to end its involvement in the F-35 program even if it wanted to. The F-35's eight international partners-the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Italy, Turkey, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands-are losing patience and becoming increasingly alarmed by the trends in the program. Heavy pressure to keep our allies satisfied is one of
the motivating factors that have kept the U.S. Navy in the program. Recent statements by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert made it clear the Navy was not going to end involvement in the program. "It has to be integrated into the air wing," said the admiral. He went on further to note that "If we bought no -Cs, it would be very detrimental to the overall
program" and to international partners. It has become common to hear, admirals say in public statements that the Navy "needs the F-35C," but it has become uncommon to hear any admiral praise the aircraft. Those leaders also never address why the Navy needs the F-35C, and it is clear from public documents that the Navy's needs are not met by the F-35C. As one article notes, "It is now fair to say that Navy budget spending for the Joint Strike
Fighter is now more important to the Department of the Air Force and the, Department of State than it is for the Department of the Navy, because it is more important for the National Security Policy of the United States for the F-35A to be affordable to multinational partners than it is for the F-35C to fly off U.S. Navy aircraft carriers."  
So what should the Navy do now that it is stuck in the F-35 program? The best answer is for it to replace all its C-model orders with A models.  If the Navy is going to make any F-35 purchases, then the best option would be to make the one that would be the most effective at lowering the price for our allies at the cheapest cost to us. The F-35A is that purchase.  Apart from that, an F-35A is roughly $79.5 million dollars cheaper than an F-35C.
For every F-35C order changed to an F-35A we could buy a full Super Hornet and still save about $12.6 million. The cheaper the A model becomes the more money the Navy saves. This would allow the Navy to save money and purchase more aircraft that are usable as well as keep its commitment to make the F-35A affordable for our international partners. Some may ask what the Navy would use the A model for. The truth is that it does not really matter at
this point. This is the best answer to the Navy's crisis as well as that of the Department of State and should be implemented immediately.

Uh.  Wow.

Tanks slide via TacBlog.

Someone would be court martialed for doing this in a Western Army!

More indecision on the AAV.

Thanks Jonathan for the article.

via Inside Defense.

The Marine Corps is considering a limited reset approach for its legacy Assault Amphibious Vehicle personnel variant to gather as much information as possible about amphibious vehicle options for senior leadership going forward, a Marine Corps spokesman told Inside the Navy last week.
Limited reset comprises replacement, recapitalization and repair. Replacement includes buying new parts and replacing obsolete or worn out parts that are critical to extending the vehicle's life cycle. Recapitalization will extend the equipment's "useful life" by returning it to a near zero-mile/zero-hour condition based on the original performance specifications from the last upgrade effort in 2007. Repair is an effort that will overhaul the vehicle's condition to Marine Corps standards, according to a July 5 request for information posted on Federal Business Opportunities.
The AAV is the Marine Corps' self-deploying, fully amphibious combat vehicle that supports joint forces and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. It was originally fielded in 1971 and the last major rebuild effort was completed in 2007. The end-of-life for the platform has been extended until 2030, the notice continues.
The Marine Corps "is developing an acquisition strategy for a survivability upgrade on roughly 40 percent of the vehicles in service; however, this effort does not address long term sustaining maintenance effort," the RFI reads.
The program office is taking a holistic approach to what the future is going to bring for amphibious vehicles and this effort is a continuation of the service's research, service spokesman Manny Pacheco said July 11.
According to the RFI, the service is conducting market research to assess available sources to perform a limited reset for 1,064 vehicles from fiscal year 2016 through 2030. This may include a public/private approach, a purely public approach or a purely private approach.
"A limited reset approach is not intended to increase the capability of the legacy platform; however, it is intended to enhance reliability due to the focused attention on sustaining maintenance," the RFI reads. "Specific maintenance actions taken/executed on an individual AAV during a limited reset may be dependent on the condition of the asset when it is introduced into the process."
The government is seeking responses based on proven historical implementation and assumptions relative to the AAV platform to ensure a "comparative analysis on alternatives," RFI continues.
The Marine Corps lists three scenarios on which companies should base their responses. The first is an inspect and repair only as necessary approach. The second is an open approach based on the facility' s best practices and lessons learned. Responses should provide scenarios that fit the facility's capability. The final scenario incorporates all aspects of the second scenario with performing an AAV force protection upgrade.
The AAV force protection upgrade will better protect the AAV fleet against the improvised explosive device threat. The service released an RFI in May for force protection improvements and intends on releasing a request for proposals during the fourth quarter fiscal year 2013.
The Marine Corps requests responses by Aug. 8 for the limited reset approach RFI.
The service will have to figure out a path forward for the AAV program. The Marine Corps must decide if it will continue to have AAVs when the new Amphibious Combat Vehicle is fielded. Since the Marine Personnel Carrier has been taken out of the budget, the service has not decided on whether or not it will keep AAVs while ACVs are fielded to provide lift for infantry battalions, Col. Keith Moore, then-advanced amphibious assault program manager, told Inside the Navy during a June 26 interview.
"What we're certainly planning for within AAV is to provide at least the space for senior decision makers . . . to let them know we've got plans to allow you to make up that delta in AAVs until you can either decide to buy MPC or decide whether you're going to lift those infantry battalions in some other way," he stated.

Long story short.

They don't have a fucking clue.  They're playing for time and sticking to the F-35 at the expense of everything else.  One airplane has practically bankrupted the Marine Corps.  If you have a plan and information changes then you change that plan.  The F-35 was touted as an inexpensive replacement for the Harrier that wouldn't break the bank and would provide the Marines with its airplane of the future.  The F-35 is not affordable.  Its late.  Its killed off other much needed programs.  Its time to shoot that plane in the face, take it down to the river and hold it underwater till it stops kicking and time to chop it up and feed it to the hogs.

Its obvious to anyone paying attention that at this time, in this budget environment, the Marine Corps cannot afford the F-35.

Maybe in 5 or 10 years but not now.  We have the buffers in place in the form of the F/A-18 Super Hornets that the Navy is buying and the Harriers we bought from the Brits.  All we need is the courage to admit that we were wrong and to act on the information that we have sitting in front of us...and yeah.  It takes courage to realize that long held beliefs (funny talking beliefs when talking about weapon systems) were in error and a change must take place, but moral courage is something that Marines pride themselves on having---just as much as physical courage.  Its time for the USMC leadership to display that moral courage.  If they don't then it was just a bumper sticker slogan sold to the troops. 

Concept Art. by Nils Ducker. Update.

I lost the note that identified the artist and the person that linked to the photo.  Hit me up on e-mail so I can credit them both.

Thanks Bob for finding the info!

Blast from the Past. F8U-3 Crusader III. What could have been....

Thanks to "Unknown" for reminding me of this potentially world beating airplane.   This plane had world beater written all over it but the Navy went with the technologically less risky and mission flexible Phantom (essentially breaking with its own requirements for a fleet interceptor).  Read about it here.

Boeing F/A-28 Tiger Hornet by Kitsune.

Republicans have turned on the Pentagon....Sequestration is a fact of life.

via The Daily Caller.

The Department of Defense has continued to cry wolf about the possible results of sequestration. But before making serious claims about not being able to promote our soldiers, or move them to new locations, or attend military schools essential for career advancement, they should probably take a closer look at what the Pentagon is spending taxpayer dollars on.
In an attempt to persuade congress from letting sequestration happen again next year, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently sent a letter to Congress stating that the DOD would have to inflict “an extremely severe package of military personnel actions including halting all accessions, ending all permanent change of station moves, stopping discretionary bonuses and freezing promotions,” in addition to cutting weapons programs and other actions that will hinder military readiness and weaken national security.
Well, that just sounds terrible doesn’t it?
Before you panic, thinking our military has no money to conduct business, consider the following expenditures that are currently a priority to the Pentagon in the wake of sequestration.
The military recently spent $34 million on a construction project in Afghanistan. The money was spent building a headquarters for planning U.S. military operations. Unfortunately, the structure is unoccupied and will most likely never be used. It will either be demolished or handed over to the Afghans.
Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington State received $3.5 million from the Department of Defense to purchase land around the base to protect gophers that inhabit the area. The DOD also gave Eglin Air Force Base in Florida $1.75 million to save a tortoise habitat.
Less known, but even more wasteful is the military’s acquisition process. The U.S. Army has been attempting to find a replacement for the current light attack/reconnaissance helicopter, the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior for over 3 decades. First came the Comanche helicopter program, but after 21 years and $6.9 billion the program was cancelled.
Next the Army developed the ARH-70 (Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter) program which was cancelled after 4 years and cost the taxpayers $3 billion. Most recently, the U.S. Army decided to put on hold their $6-8 billion Armed Aerial Scout helicopter program.
30 years and $10-15 billion of taxpayer dollars later, the U.S. Army only has an updated version of the original OH-58D helicopter they’ve sought to replace. The Kiowa Warrior (as aged as it is) was an essential aircraft through out the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and maintains the most successful mission capability and readiness rate of any other helicopter in the Army’s fleet.
What this comes down to is uncontrollable waste. The Pentagon’s spending priorities are disheveled in addition to their fiscal mismanagement and decision-making abilities. Spending millions on gophers and vacant buildings is a classic example of fraud, waste, and abuse of not only military assets, but taxpayer dollars as well. The Department of Defense even has a hotline people can call for waste like that. And wasting billions on mere attempts to improve military equipment shows a completely broken system that must be addressed.

The Daily Caller is a conservative publication.

For this article to be part of my daily updates tells me one thing.  Republicans have abandoned the Pentagon and the ground is subtly being laid for sequestration to continue.  Democrats won't save the day because they don't like military spending and they have other priorities.

Hagel is running around the country sounding the alarm bells on sequestration but the message is falling on deaf ears.  No one is listening and those that are don't believe.

I'm preaching to the wind, but the cuts coming will be much more dramatic than is being told.  The service chiefs WILL cut personnel to pay for programs and the only programs that are protected is one.  The F-35.

Winslow Wheeler was right.

The F-35 is gobbling the Pentagon.  This is turning from a conversation about capability to one concerning affordability.  Necessary weapon systems are now threatened to support one airplane.

F-8U Crusader, Da Nang, Vietnam. via War Machine.