Task Force 58.
It is a footnote in the history of the war in Afghanistan but its caught the attention of the Commandant, the Air Wing, Think Tanks, Opinion Makers and Marine Corps futurist.
And they're all wrong.
A down and dirty....Task Force 58 was composed of Marines from the 15th MEU (Battalion Landing Team 1/1) flew into Afghanistan across Pakistan from the sea, in essence conducting the longest heliborne assault in our nations history. They were also the first conventional forces in theater (although they earned the Special Operations Capable designation) and they were led by General Mattis. Long story short, it was a successful operation and the Marines were relieved in place by the 101st Airborne (Air Assault).
SIDNOTE: Many people confuse the fact that the 26th MEU linked up with the 15th AFTER the initial assault and believe it was a combined op. Technically it was but as I stated earlier. The initial assault was conducted by the 15th MEU and BLT 1/1. Information is spotty on the net but a fairly brief and not well written account of the action can be found on Wikipedia under Camp Rhino (click here to read it for yourself).
Procurement is not matching doctrine.
Marine Corps leadership is currently infatuated with the idea of an "Airborne Marine Corps".
I found an article written by Major General McKenzie, the USMC representative to the Quadrennial Defense Review is quoted by Foreign Policy as saying....
"I think the best example of what being amphibious means to the Marine Corps is Task Force 58. I think it's Brigadier General Jim Mattis launching off the Pakistan coast, striking deep into southern Afghanistan. No amphibious vehicles crossed a beach in that operation," said McKenzie
Unfortunately for Marine leadership, the premise of that type thinking was based on a perpetual war on terror. US involvement in hotspots all over the globe and no "pivot to the Pacific".
Its been said that the Pentagon is like an aircraft carrier at sea. It changes slowly. I'd say its more like a crack addict waiting on a fix. If certain "mafia" organizations inside that five sided building can tailor a particular administrations thinking to fit their worldview then they latch onto it like a bulldog on a bone. That's what the Marine Corps did in pushing this "Airborne Marine Corps Concept," in attempting to tailor its "Sea Base" to the current administration's emphasis on humanitarian assistance and protecting populations worldwide but NOT in its pivot to the Pacific.
And that's where the Airborne Marine Corps falls apart.
In a A2/AD world, a heliborne USMC is far more vulnerable both in the assault and follow on assault phases. Additionally the number of personnel available to conduct either a raid or more ominously a deliberate assault will be so small and so dependent on aerial support as to make cutting them off and destroying them in place a real possibility.
The main problem is simple.
An Airborne Marine Corps does not fit with the Air Sea Battle Doctrine (as I read it anyway). If AOL Defense is correct in the US Army actually seeking a seat at the table
(read it here) then the "airborne" portion of the equation is actually covered. What is needed is a robust, sea going, combined arms force capable of carrying out missions across the spectrum.
The real answer is painfully simple.
Enhance the capabilities of the MEU. Practice real contingency operations with the MEU/Army Airborne & Stryker Brigades, integrate Army Air Defense Artillery (and other capabilities found in their ground formations) into MEU's and MEB's through detachments that can fly in and are trained in how "Marines operate"...and develop interoperability across the services (you can toss the USAF a bone by getting their Red Horse Group some sea legs and have them follow the same type planning as with Army units detached to Marines). Not in the ponderous COIN model, but in a fluid-high intensity warfare model that will highlight strained communications, intense small unit actions against capable foes, increased reliance on artillery instead of air assets etc.
Remember the pic below? I wondered aloud where the CH-53's were. Now I think my suspicions have been confirmed. I think a dry run was being practiced to see whether or not the Marine Corps should/could transition to an all MV-22 force.
An all MV-22 based force would be a mistake.
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, heliborne assault was the wave of the future. Helicopters would rule the battlefield and if our vehicles were air transportable then they were no good out the box. What did we get for that type thinking?
Above you see the Mighty Mite. It was designed to be lifted by the UH-34. It was rendered obsolete when regular helicopters could easily transport the standard jeep. Below the pic of the Mighty Mite you see the Ontos AntiTank Vehicle. It was designed to be air transportable and provide antiarmor punch and infantry support for air transported Marines.
Both had extremely short service lives because they were narrowly tailored weapon systems designed around a need that had no doctrinal basis.
We'd be repeating the mistakes of those futurist before that wanted to transform the Marine Corps into something it was never meant to be.
If America needed another Air Assault Division the Army would marinize some UH-60M's and teach its soldiers how to swim.
The future of the Marine Corps is found in its past. Most ready when the nation is least. Shock Troops. Teufel Hounds.
Aviation centric thinking at the highest level of the Marine Corps is leading to basic mistakes. The desire to "leave his stamp" on the Marine Corps is leading to bigger mistakes. I don't know how to do it, but the "Airborne Marine Corps" talk must be crushed (Like how I did that?)