Having said that, I really enjoy some of the sea stories that they tell from time to time. This is a good one.
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I was the CO of Weapons Company 1/8 during the Gulf War.
A few days before we began combat operations in Kuwait, a team from the 8th Marines Regiment came to brief my company on proper handling of Prisoners of War (POW) and to review the aspects of the Laws of Land Warfare that applied to same.
1stSgt Bryant and I stood in the back of the audience. As I listened to the two young Marines – a Sergeant and a Corporal – I realized they were not giving a legit brief and were actually saying things like “You all know what the rules are, but nobody is watching out here in the desert, so do what you think is best” and “We already have too many POWs, so there’s no need to bring us more” and other statements that were essentially encouraging my Marines to do whatever they felt like doing to captured enemy soldiers.
After several minutes passed, I had 1stSgt Bryant interrupt them and tell them the brief was over and they should leave immediately. Frankly, I was pissed that they would say such things to my Marines about such an important topic.
After they left, I stood in front of my Marines and set things right, using some of my previous experiences to convey the proper message.
I made sure they understood that we were about to face Iraqis who would definitely try to kill us and that we’d kill all of them if that’s what it took, but once enemy soldiers surrendered to us and we disarmed them, we would not abuse them in any way.
I left no doubt among the Marines regarding what was expected of them relative to handing captured Iraqis.
A day or two into the ground war, one of our CAAT teams (a group of heavily armed Humvees) had somehow veered off course in the darkness and was headed straight at us.
I thought it was odd they were moving in the wrong direction and was pretty sure they were members of my company, so I figured they would just drive up to us and we’d get them reoriented and on their way.
The smoke from the burning oils wells had turned our uniforms dark and as such they resembled the uniforms worn by Iraqi soldiers. That caused a big problem. My Marines thought we were Iraqis and shouted at us to drop our weapons.
I realized they didn't know who we were and that they couldn't hear us yelling to them.
They were about 100 yards away from us and while we could hear them talking as if they were standing next to us, they obviously couldn’t hear us due to the direction of the wind.
I heard one of the Marines say, “If they make any threatening move, open fire” and I realized that something very bad could happen if the situation went in the wrong direction.
So, I told everyone near me to drop their weapons and raise their hands.
The gun vehicles slowly approached us and I can tell you that staring down the barrels of 50cals and MK19's was a new experience for us all – suffice it to say that the “pucker factor” was quite high!
As they approached is, I heard one of them say "The big one on the end looks a lot like Captain Ettore” and another one say, “He does and and he looks pissed off, too!" which caused some of the others to laugh.
As the vehicles got closer to us, we remained standing with our arms raised upward, I could hear the Marines talking among themselves, and one said, “Oh shit…that is Captain Ettore!” and the group went silent as they slowly came closer to us.
When they got to us, one of the team leaders said, "Sorry Sir, we thought you were Iraqis."
I told him "No problem...thanks for not lighting us up!"
We reoriented them and sent them on their way and nothing more was said about this incident, which serves as a great example of what’s called “The Fog of War.”
I've often wondered if this story would have turned out differently had I allowed the POW briefers to put the wrong mindset into my Marines regarding handling Iraqis who were surrendering?
I’ve had several memorable experiences as a Marine serving in combat operations, and I must say that staring into the barrels of friendly weapons and being taken prisoner by my own men ranks as one of the most memorable, and frightening!
There are several leadership lessons associated with this anecdote, but perhaps the most important are:
- Leaders must supervise and be aware of what's happening within their units. Had 1stSgt Bryant and I not attended the brief given to our Marines regarding the handling of POW's, we'd likely never known that they'd received defective (and illegal) guidance on this topic, and some might have acted upon it, thinking they were within the established laws and rules.
- Marines must be trained to be aggressive in combat and to "arrive violently" when engaging with an enemy force. That said, this aggressiveness must be tempered with sound judgement, because once rounds and ordnance are sent downrange, they cannot be "recalled." Thus, before Marines unleash the awesome firepower they have at their disposal, they must be 100% positive that they are shooting at enemy forces and legit combatants.
- The Fog of War remains on the modern battlefield, despite advances in technology. Leaders should expect it to happen and remain vigilant, so they and their Marines can avoid having "tunnel vision" regarding the original plans and details made regarding combat operations and ever changing battlefield conditions.
.- Leaders should remember that everyone at every level of the chain of command can fall victim to the Fog of War. When such a situation happens, it's best to focus on getting everyone reoriented on the stated Mission of the unit, along with any modifications that are needed due to changing battlefield conditions that will enable the achievement of the Commander's Intent.
- Individual and Unit Discipline is critical to success in combat, and both must be continuously taught, developed and enforced in peacetime. An undisciplined Marine or Marine unit will not suddenly obtain necessary levels of discipline simply by deploying to combat and an attitude of "OK...this is for real...time to get serious about thing." It's easy for some leaders to ease up on various aspects of discipline in peacetime/garrison, but history has shown that without fail, undisciplined Marines and Marine units almost always experience higher casualty rates and mission failure than their well-led counterparts.
Semper Fidelis,
Mike Ettore
